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 Abstract 
 
 
The present study examined young children’s analogical performance and strategy use 
in both classical and problem analogies in an attempt to bridge the gap between 
children’s strategy use across both types of analogy. There were three studies in all; the 
classical analogy tasks monitored sixty-four, 3, 4 and 5-year-olds’ performance on two 
separate occasions, six months apart; study 2 monitored thirty-four, 3 and 4-year-olds’ 
strategy use on problem analogies, at week one and week 30; and the microgenetic 
study followed thirty, 4 and 5-year-olds strategy use over a 30 week period, at weekly 
intervals.  
 
The results revealed that children relied on a number of strategies and their choices 
varied over the 30 week period. The microgenetic methodology provided us with a 
chance to monitor intra- and inter-individual changes. The problem analogies raised 
awareness of a number of performance factors that affect children’s strategy choices. 
These included relational knowledge, relational difficulty, practice and transfer. 
Children’s ability to use analogy improved over time with practice, and some children 
showed consistency in their use of analogy over certain tasks, but often regressed to less 
effective strategies on subsequent tasks 
 
The use of individual case studies provided an in depth account of children’s patterns of 
behaviour over the observation period. This allowed us to explore children’s rate of 
change, path and breadth in strategy choices and what affected these changes. The case 
studies provided strong evidence for a gradual wave-like change in children’s analogical 
development. The theoretical and educational implications of this were discussed. It can 
be concluded that preschool children continue to find analogy difficult and the findings 
of strategic variability highlights the fact that 4- and 5-year-olds are in a period of 
transition in the development of analogical reasoning.  
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 1 
Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Cognitive development  
 
 
The central focus of this thesis is on children’s analogical reasoning and problem 
solving.  Richland, Morrison and Holyoak (2006) give an example of everyday 
analogical reasoning in a child “Knowledge of using a stool to reach a toy can be used 
to figure out that a ladder could help reach a cookie jar, this skill enables children to 
draw on prior knowledge representations to make sense of new contexts and to build 
expertise” (Richland et al., 2006, p. 146).  Tunteler & Resing (2002) define analogical 
reasoning as “identifying and transferring information from a familiar domain to a new, 
but closely related one, by comparing the relational structure of the new domain to that 
of the familiar one” Tunteler & Resing, (2002, p. 149).  Using this definition, when 
realising the usefulness of a ladder, the child notices the relational similarities between 
the familiar domain of reaching a toy from a chair and the very closely related domain 
of standing on a rung of a ladder to retrieve something out of reach.  The ladder may 
have been around for most of the child’s life, but when noticed in this way it is encoded 
or recognised as an “affordance” (Greeno et al., 1993). The term “affordance” is taken 
from perception theory (Gibson, 1966).  It is any “resource in the environment that 
supports an interactive activity by an agent” (Greeno, 1995 p.14). 
 
The main research question in the thesis arises from the growing literature on pre-school 
children’s capabilities with analogical reasoning.  It is “what makes analogical problem 
solving difficult in spite of a potential for analogical reasoning?”  Researchers agree on 
the information processing demands of analogical problem solving, but there is 
continuing debate about why it should be difficult except in particular circumstances. 
 
Much writing on developmental psychology concerns very broad epistemic questions 
such as where children’s knowledge and reasoning comes from (the source of 
knowledge), and whether development goes through separate stages which are 
qualitatively different from each other (the path of cognitive change).  Till the last 
quarter of the twentieth century influence of Jean Piaget had been the predominant 
influence on debates about stages of development (the path of development) and the 
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interaction between nature and nurture (the source of developing knowledge). 
 
Followers of Jean Piaget would claim that children proceed through universal, age-
specific stages of growth.  Researchers wedded to such a concept of stages assumed that 
children below the age of 9 or 10 years lack the basic cognitive abilities to reason by 
analogy (Goswami, 1991).  Goswami (1991; 1992) and Reeves & Weisberg (1994) 
reviewed evidence gathered by researchers who questioned Piaget’s theory.  They 
describe repeated demonstrations that very young children have a capacity to 
demonstrate analogical problem solving capabilities under particular circumstances.  
Even infants have been shown in length of gaze experiments to be predisposed to look 
for similarities when encountering unusual novel stimuli.  Very young children can be 
shown to succeed in particular domains of interactive activity, but, nevertheless, such 
children perform in an inconsistent way across problems which more mature people 
perceive as belonging to the same general domain.  Breadth of growing knowledge 
stays narrow and there is much variability within behaviour in the same domain of 
activity and knowledge.  During the last two decades of the twentieth century and more 
recently, there has been study of the importance of problem content and effects of cues, 
hints and guidance on children’s analogical reasoning ability as well as different ways 
of presenting problems for solution (e.g., studies reviewed by Halford, 1993; Reeves 
and  Weisberg, 1994; Goswami, 1992; Singer-Freeman, 2005).  
 
Besides ability, which is domain specific (narrow rather than broad), younger children 
are not successful at verbally explaining solution principles to researchers.  Those who 
had been following Piaget’s theory regarded inconsistent performance on problems 
across domains and inability to verbally explain solution principles as confirmation that 
children remained at an immature stage.  But once Piaget’s assumption of a rigid, step-
like developmental stage had been rejected, inconsistency and varying performance 
were no longer interpreted as evidence of remaining on a lower step in development.  
They can be interpreted as evidence of gradually increasing information processing 
activities which proceed in an individualized, domain-specific manner (see especially 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Siegler, 2006).   
 
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) believes development starts with knowledge, in an implicit, 
rudimentary form and, then proceeds by means of a continuous internal process of 
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recoding knowledge into an increasingly more accessible and eventually verbalisable 
code.  She insists on domain-specific “phases” not stages where behaviour changes are 
broad and across domains.  She also believes that, just before understanding can be 
translated into stable and communicable form, there is a phase where concepts are 
mastered and conscious reflection happens without verbal report.  In the case of 
Karmiloff-Smith’s theory, there has been much investigation of children’s skills and 
conceptual maturing using block balancing tasks (Pine & Messer, 1999; Pine & Messer, 
2003).  However, her suggestions about broad epistemic questions such as what is the 
source of developmental change and how the path should be characterised have been 
difficult to operationalise.  Siegler (2006) provides the framework for this research.  His 
answers to questions about the source of knowledge and the path of development have 
had direct influences on education.  Although there are contrasting approaches to the 
broad epistemic questions, consensus has grown about investigation methods; known as 
“microgenetic methods”. The essence of the microgenetic method is that, through 
observation, the change that occurs during a cognitive task sheds light on development 
(Lavelli, Pantoja, Hsu, Messinger and Fogel, 2005). It has three key characteristics; (1) 
observations are made from the start of the change, spanning over the entire process of 
change until the behaviour being observed, becomes stable; (2) observations are of a 
high density, which may be hourly, daily, weekly or monthly, depending on the process 
being observed; (3) the behaviour being observed undergoes intensive trial-by-trial 
analysis, which enables inferences to be made about the processes that contribute to 
both qualitative and quantitative change (Siegler and Crowley, 1991). Due to the 
density of observations over time, it enables researchers to follow individual 
development across the age range being explored.  Unlike typical longitudinal studies 
that simply look at single snapshots of overall developmental consistency across 
individuals, microgenetic designs follow the actual processes of change.  Thus, 
observations are present at important transition points. Such observations allow the 
investigation of intraindividual variability which seeks to expose the stability and 
instability of the behaviour/action being measured.  The microgenetic design therefore 
provide the researcher with the opportunity to both describe and explain the processes 
involved in cognitive change and development (Lavelli et al, 2005). The most exciting 
aspect of the microgenetic methodology is that it ‘reveals not just what children know but 
how they get there’ (Granott & Parziale, 2002, p.12). 
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The microgenetic methodology has been included in a variety of domains, such as 
mathematical ability (Siegler and Jenkins, 1989); depth perception (Shimojo, Bauer, 
O’Conell and Held, 1986); attention (Miller and Aloise-young, 1996); memory 
(Bjorklund and Colye, 1995); social problem solving (Wertsch and Hickmann, 1987); 
representation (Kamiloff-smith, 1992) and information processing (Bjorklund and 
Colye, 1995). Despite such variety in perspectives and domain, the descriptions of 
change that have emerged from the studies are surprisingly similar, in that they all offer 
a fruitful insight to understanding developmental change processes.  
 
Following the use of the microgenetic method Siegler (1996) proposed a different 
concept for cognitive development, one that incorporates variability and change both 
within and between children of a similar age. His Overlapping Waves Theory describes 
the development of children’s problem solving through a gradual flowing of alternative 
thinking patterns with new strategies being added whilst others are eliminated at 
different times. The theory focuses on children's different approaches to solving a 
problem or carrying out a task, the factors that influence the choices they make, the 
mechanisms that lead to changes made in the use of existing approaches and the 
mechanisms used in the discovery of new approaches, all of which shed light on the 
processes involved in development. The theory, postulates that strategies develop via a 
five component process. These are, acquiring new strategy use, mapping, strengthening, 
refining choices, and increasingly effective execution (see Siegler, 1996).  
 
Siegler’s definition of a strategy helps to explain the importance of observing strategy 
use in problem solving. A strategy is defined as a “procedure that is non-obligatory and 
goal directed” (Siegler and Jenkins; 1989, p11). Therefore, a strategy is not a mandatory 
behaviour which limits children to only choose one action. This definition rejects the 
idea that a strategy is simply behaviour, because behaviours do not imply a particular 
goal, whereas a strategy is chosen from a number of alternatives to fulfil a certain goal. 
In this sense, during problem solving, children use multiple interrelated ways of 
thinking which are continuously changing. For example, if Piaget was testing relational 
reasoning in the formal operational stage, the observation would concentrate on the 
child's actions on that task. If the child was able to use relational reasoning to solve the 
problem, then it can be concluded that that child is typical of a formal operational 
adolescent, whereas if they do not use relational reasoning to solve the task then they 
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are atypical of someone in the formal operations stage. Siegler argues against this 
competence-based assumption (you either solve the problem or do not solve the 
problem) and believes that children may use a number of strategies other than relational 
reasoning and think in a number of ways, and observation of these alternative strategies 
are as important as being able to solve the problem with the correct strategy because it 
tells us something about the individual child's development. Therefore, it is the 
individual changes in strategy use during problem solving tasks that are of importance 
to Siegler, not simply the source and path of development. 
 
The idea of intraindividual variability lies at the heart of Siegler’s theory, which he 
argued is associated with greater learning and performance, in that the more strategies 
children have available to them, the better equipped they will be when presented with a 
novel situation, provided of course, that they can transfer this knowledge (Siegler, 2000). 
For example, if children use all strategies during repeated attempts at task one, they 
should perform better on task two, task three etc.  A further advantage of Siegler’s 
approach is that, observing children’s selection of alternative strategies can tell us a 
great deal about the factors that affect the onset of specific abilities.  
 
A relevant example of how variability exists in children’s strategy choices can be seen 
in Siegler and Jenkins’ (1989) study of arithmetic problems. They identified 4- and 5-
year-olds who knew how to add via the sum strategy (counting from one), but who did 
not yet know the min strategy (counting up from the larger addend).  Over time children 
were able to use the min strategy for adding numbers, but initially, their use of the new 
strategy did not improve their performance. The min strategy was not faster, nor more 
accurate than the sum strategy.  Thus, if new strategies were only generated when they 
facilitated immediate performance, children would not have discovered the min strategy.  
Throughout the early trials children used the new approach only occasionally and they 
continued to use the sum strategy even after they had discovered the min strategy. This 
highlights the importance of strategy observation throughout a task, in that just because 
a child does not solve the problem with the required strategy, does not mean that they 
fail to solve the task per se, they may simply choose a strategy that best suits their needs 
and the needs of the task. Interestingly, when children were presented with more 
challenging problems, those who discovered the min strategy previously used it more 
often. Those children that had not discovered the min strategy were overwhelmed by the 
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new challenging problems and failed to solve them. Thus, even when a number of 
different strategies are used for the same problem, and they do not show immediate 
benefit, having a variety of strategies available enable children to adapt to new 
situations.  This example illustrates the importance of combining qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of learning within a single framework.  Children are able to 
discover qualitatively novel strategies and concepts through quantitative shifts in 
frequency and efficacy of strategies (Siegler and Jenkins, 1989).  
 
Although the Overlapping Waves Theory has been applied across a variety of tasks, i.e., 
serial recall, tic-tac-toe, arithmetic, spelling, reading, moral reasoning, (Adolph, 1997; 
Crowley and Siegler, 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, 1979; Thela and Urich, 1991) it has not 
been applied fully to analogical problem-solving.  Most studies have used older children 
and focused on a single component (i.e. Inagaki and Hatano, 1993, focused on 
acquisition; Kotovsky and Gentner, 1996, on structure mapping; and Chen, 2002, on 
execution of solution).  However, these studies have all found that children use multiple 
strategies at any given age, with variability within the individual as well as between 
individuals and children often move towards more advanced approaches with age and 
experience (Chen, 2002).  
 
How children progress over a specific time frame is of great developmental importance 
to our understanding of cognitive change.  However, to discover and understand such 
change data needs to be obtained by observing the changes directly as they occur, and 
not, as in traditional designs, where behaviour is measured at specific age-related points 
in time, often with lapses in time and performance (Chen, 2003; Siegler and Crowley, 
1991). Therefore, in order to monitor development of problem solving there is a need to 
apply a longitudinal methodology which intensely details children’s behaviour over the 
period of change. This should begin to address the issues surrounding children’s 
cognitive development.  
The microgenetic study in study 3 utilized the concept of the Overlapping Waves 
Theory to observe children’s strategy use in analogical problem solving. It was expected 
that children would vary in their strategy choices, both within and between children. 
Furthermore, children would revert back to less appropriate strategies and through the 
process refinement would settle on a specific strategy. Through the use of a microgentic 
 7 
methodology, children’s problem solving behaviour surrounding analogy tasks was 
monitored.  
Incorporating the microgenetic methodology will investigate some of the issues that are 
missing from contemporary cognitive development research: that is, the disregard for 
children’s alternative strategy use and strategic variability. In the past, rather than seeing 
variability as progressive change, it has been viewed as failure or error variance which 
overlooks micro-changes in regressions and progressions that affect a child's 
performance and development. To enable us to understand the development of strategy 
use and change in problem solving the microgenetic study explored the processes 
involved in change along Chen and Siegler’s (2000) five dimensions of developmental 
change – path, rate, breadth, variability and source of change.  
 
Over the years any change in cognitive development has been understood in terms of 
qualitative change (Piaget, 1954). Alternatively, learning theorists and psychometric 
theories of cognitive change argue that development involves quantitative growth. The 
microgenetic methodology however, posits that the path of change in cognitive 
development involves both qualitative and quantitative growth.  Siegler (1995) argues 
that although qualitative change occurs through new ways of thinking these are of 
limited scope and range. Quantitative change occurs with experience. For example, as a 
child attempts multiple trials of the same (similar) task they learn to execute the solution 
increasingly well. Thus, quantitative change obtained through multiple exposure 
increases the likelihood of cognitive change and success.  
 
In order to follow the path of change in analogical reasoning, a distinction needs to be 
made between qualitative distinct knowledge states. These include object matching, 
lower-order relations and higher-order relations. Knowledge for object matching 
requires the child to understand surface similarity between relations, and according to 
Gentner (1983) this precedes relational similarity. Initially, knowledge is based on 
simple, lower-order relations that only take one set of relations/transformations into 
account. Once children recognize the relations and providing they have the relational 
knowledge they move onto understanding higher-order relations. Thus, these different 
states map out the path of qualitative change in analogical development. 
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The rate of cognitive change depends on the child’s ability to solve a problem and their 
ability to transfer the newly acquired knowledge/solution onto subsequent trials/tasks. 
For example, some children may use analogy to solve the problem on trial one where 
others, on trial four. Therefore, an important part of exploring the rate of change is the 
examination of contributing factors such as practice and task manipulation. Such data 
should highlight the reasoning behind differences in children’s rate of cognitive change.  
  
An important aspect of this dimension is children’s ability to transfer a newly acquired 
skill to a similar problem or tasks. Learning a non-transferable skill is not necessarily of 
any benefit to a child’s cognitive development. Research has shown that even older 
children and adults find transferring solutions from one problem to a structurally similar 
problem difficult (Greeno, 1974). Therefore, research with younger children needs to 
ensure that the tasks are both structurally similar and require similar actions/solutions. 
This way, children should recognise the similarity and transfer their knowledge to 
subsequent problems.  
 
Previous traditional studies have failed to examine strategic variability over time. 
Studies have simply explored task performance and structure. Chen and Siegler (2000) 
found that children’s choice of strategies varied considerably over a period of multiple 
trials. Even when children had chosen the correct strategy they often moved away from 
their choice to less affective strategies. Such findings allow for the examinations of 
variability among individuals and more importantly highlights individual differences 
among children in the same age cohort. It also stresses the importance of variability as a 
measure of how well children choose among different strategies and how they choose to 
use these strategies to solve the problems, rather than simply suggesting that some 
children perform better than others just because they are able to solve the problem. 
According to Hosenfeld, van der Maas and von den Boom (1997) such variability is 
needed to both learn and change behaviour suggesting that variability is a crucial factor 
in a child’s ability to learn analogy. 
 
The source of change examines what causes/facilitates change over the observation 
period. For example, one source of change may be feedback. Over multiple trials, 
children’s knowledge of the task increases due to feedback from choosing the correct or 
incorrect solution. Not being able to solve the task may act as a facilitator of change in 
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that on the following trial they select an alternative strategy. An advantage of exploring 
the source of change is that predictions can be made on children’s future developmental 
performance.  
 
Since the microgenetic methodology provides a framework for thinking about 
developmental change, it seems pertinent to use such a methodology in the exploration 
of strategy development in analogical problem solving. By using the microgenetic 
method we can observe the patterns of variability in children’s strategy choices over the 
observation period. With a tendency of children to alternate between high and low 
variability any observation over time should highlight analogical stability, transition and 
predict subsequent use, which offer explanations of the breadth, rate and variability as 
well as the previously researched source and path of change. 
 
Based on the assumptions made by Siegler (1996) from his study of arithmetic problems, 
it is expected that children’s strategy choices in study 3 would change over the 
observation period and children should show a number of different behaviours/actions 
during the observation period and indeed within the same task.  Therefore, it was the 
intention of this thesis to, through the use of the microgenetic method, shed light on the 
development of problem solving abilities, and in particular, their use of analogy in 
problem solution.  
 
As well as the importance of strategy change, the current thesis set out to examine the 
obstacles and facilitators of children’s analogical reasoning ability. In spite of the 
plethora of research on analogical problem solving, questions behind children’s failure 
to use analogy remain unanswered. Therefore, it was the intention of this thesis to 
explore some of the issues discussed in the introduction relating to children’s difficulty 
with analogical reasoning. 
 
 
1.2 Problem solving  
 
 
Problem solving plays a vital part in children’s lives and occurs through their play, 
education, physical and social worlds. Whatever the problem children face, all problems 
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have two things in common. First, all problems feature a goal, whether that be reaching 
the cookies on the table or finding if you have enough money to buy your favourite 
computer game. Secondly, the goal is not always immediately achievable, which results 
in the problem solver working through a number of actions/processes in order to solve 
the problem.  
 
Research on problem solving explores the interaction between problem solver and the 
problem itself, and more specifically what procedures the problem solver works through 
in order to reach the desired goal. A governing feature in the problem solving literature 
is the effect of experience on problem solving. A first encounter with a problem may 
result in a lengthy, difficult solution process, but when faced with the same or similar 
problem at a later date, the problem solution becomes easier. Thus, the more experience 
with a particular problem the quicker and more efficient the solution time. This success 
with problem solving following experience is known as positive transfer.  
 
Transfer plays an important role in problem solving as it serves to access generality; 
that is, whether children are able to take newly acquired behaviour and transfer it to a 
new context or domain. Transfer plays a significant role in education since schools 
cannot teach children everything. Transfer makes future learning possible in that, 
children use what they learn to solve novel problems and adapt to new situations. 
Schools hope that children will transfer what they have learned to a variety of situations, 
from one class to another, from one year to the next, and of course from the classroom 
to the outside world. Much of the research to-date has come to the same conclusion that 
adults as well as children find this concept difficult. And despite the amount of practice 
a child has with different problems, they still find difficulty in transferring to other 
domains. 
 
One dominant form of problem solving that works from the premise of transferring 
previous experience is analogy. When faced with a novel problem people often search 
their memory for relevant situations or similar scenarios to solve it. Providing that they 
are able to recognise the similarity across both situations and understand that an analogy 
is needed then, children should be able to use their prior knowledge to facilitate 
subsequent problem solution.  
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1.3 Analogy 
 
 
Analogical reasoning is one of the most commonly used cognitive processes which is 
used to promote learning, and features heavily in the transfer of knowledge and 
inference across different situations, concepts and domains. It permits the exploration of 
new, novel situations and facilitates problem solution and creative thinking. There is 
consensus that analogy involves a number of key processes.  First, one must encode 
(represent) the conceptual meanings from the base problem, so that it is available to 
solve the target problem. Second, one needs to obtain an analogy to access the 
appropriate representation from the base problem, then the mapping/application of the 
base to the target problem.  Finally, there is a need to implement the learned solution to 
solve the target problem. In order to successfully achieve analogical thinking all of these 
components must be present (Siegler, 1989; Gick and Holyoak, 1983 and Novick and 
Holyoak, 1991). 
 
Over the past few decades there have been a number of cognitive processes investigated 
throughout the analogy literature. These have included surface and structural similarity 
(Gentner, 1983, 1989), access and inference (Singer-Freeman, 2005) and mapping and 
transfer (Gentner, 1983; Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989). Many of the early 
studies consisted of adult participants which have been an important source of influence 
for models of analogical development in children. In spite of Piaget’s (1952) suggestion 
that young children are incapable of such ability, researchers began to explore 
children’s analogical reasoning and revealed that there is little doubt that preschool 
children show an emerging ability to reason with analogy, but the processes at which 
they are able to do so remain unclear. It is the purpose of this thesis to unravel some of 
the processes by which children are able to reason with analogy, and given that 
capabilities have been evidenced very early in life, it is important to address issues 
relevant to a wider question about analogical reasoning; that is, why do particular kinds 
of problem present difficulties to young children. 
 
For many years theorists have investigated children's ability to reason analogically. 
Some argue for a global change in cognitive processing which postulates that preschool 
children do not possess the cognitive structures to enable them to reason in this way 
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(Piaget, 1964), where others argue that changes in knowledge representation are 
sufficient to enable analogical thinking, and children of this age can, if they have the 
appropriate knowledge required for such a task (Goswami, 1989 and Gentner, 1989).  
 
To investigate these claims researchers have tested young children’s analogical ability 
traditionally using classical analogy tasks, “classical” because of its similarity to certain 
items in IQ tests.  Goswami (1992) praised this kind of test as a pure measure to test 
children’s analogy, provided that test items concern relations that are thoroughly 
familiar.  Goswami believes that instructions for this kind of test make it clear to 
children that an analogy is required.  One example in her investigations was giving the 
analogy bird: nest :: dog: ?, where the correct solution was a picture of a dog house or 
kennel.  The children had to use the relation linking bird and nest (lives in) when 
considering what should go with dog.  As the relation between the first two terms is 
provided, Goswami claims the requirement to use an analogy is considered obvious.  
However, as Goswami’s research has shown success on classical analogical tasks, as a 
test of relational reasoning, is conditional on particular circumstances such as using 
overtly familiar relations such as ‘lives in’.   
 
The majority of early research began with reliance on the classical tasks, but the 
conclusions led to a different kind of task – the problem analogy. In problem analogies 
a child is presented with a problem to solve and receives training in the form of a base 
problem. Children must then use the information from the base problem to solve a new, 
similar target problem (Goswami, 1992). Thus, children are expected to transfer the 
information learned from the base- to the target -problem. For example, Holyoak, Junn 
& Billman (1984) told 4- and 6- year-olds and 11- and 12-year-olds stories, such as a 
genie who transferred jewels from one bottle to another by rolling his magic carpet into 
a tube, or by using his magic staff as a hook/drag object (base problem). Children were 
then presented with a target problem which required them to transfer gumballs from one 
plate to another using one of five object choices. Children were expected to choose the 
cane to hook and drag the bowl toward them in the magic staff story, and in the magic 
carpet story children were expected to choose the paper and roll it up like a tube and 
transport the balls through it into the bowl. Holyoak et al’s (1984) genie problem is 
summarised in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Holyoak, Junn and Billman’s (1984) Genie Problem 
 
  
Story Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 A genie possessing jewels in the 
wrong bottle 
 
Balls in the wrong bowl 
 Resources provided Another bottle, magic carpet 
Another bowl, sheet of paper, walking 
stick, hollow cardboard tube, scissors, 
string, tape,  
Constraints & 
Requirements 
Must not drop or lose jewels 
 
 
Must not drop or lose balls 
 
Multiple solutions to be tried 
Solution Principle 
or Path 
Auxiliary task Genie commands magic carpet to roll itself into a hollow tube 
 
Rolls sheet of paper to form a hollow tube 
Key sub-goal attained Tube placed to extend from the wrong bottle to the other bottle 
 
Tube placed to extend from one bowl to the 
other &/OR proceed directly to use 
available cardboard tube &/OR pull bowls 
nearer with cane 
 
Goal state 
Solution criteria satisfied Jewels rolled through tube to the 
other bottle safely 
 
Balls transferred to the other bottle safely 
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Holyoak et al (1984) found that preschool children could only use analogy when 
presented with the magic staff story. They suggest that this may have been due to the 
high surface similarity between base- and target -problem. This suggests that children 
may only be able to solve analogous problems when the base and target are high in 
surface similarity i.e., the staff and cane was more perceptually similar in both function 
and likeness than the magic carpet and the piece of paper which required additional 
action to transform it into a tube. It seems that surface features play a key role in the 
retrieval, but not necessarily the application and implementation, of the base analogue. 
 
A further explanation for children’s performance may have been due to the task itself, 
not necessarily a deficit in analogical ability.  For example, the staff condition required 
children to simply choose the most appropriate object and use it to solve the problem.  
The magic carpet condition required children to physically make a tool to solve the 
problem, thus adding an extra cognitive load in memory, and requiring children to adapt 
their pre-existing knowledge of a tool to aid application of the base analogue.  
 
To examine whether or not the children in Holyoak et al’s study found the task itself 
difficult Brown, Kane and Echols (1986) explored the solution using three target 
conditions all based around the genie problem.  They found that children could only use 
analogy in low perceptual similarity (rolling), when presented with an explicit cue, 
suggesting that young children benefit from surface similarity or a hint. However, 
giving children an explicit cue diminishes spontaneous analogical ability.  Analogy 
requires a person to solve a novel problem by using a previous example. In real life, 
although we may be presented with surface similarity, very rarely would there be 
someone there providing a hint as to which previous example would be relevant.  
 
Again, using the story mapping task, but this time with no (or little) surface similarity, 
Brown and Kane (1988) found 4- and 5-year-olds used analogy without any prior hints, 
and although 4-year-olds needed practice in the tasks they too were able to use analogy.  
They concluded that children of this age were able to use analogy without surface 
similarity, cues or hints.  However, because the study did not have a control condition (a 
no base problem condition) it is uncertain whether or not children were using the base 
problem to solve the target problem through analogy.  It could be that children's 
performance with analogy was high because the tasks were too simple and did not 
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require a base problem to solve them. Children did not need to adapt objects in order to 
solve the target problem.  
 
In spite of children’s success with problem analogies above classical analogies, research 
has found that young children’s performance is still low in some cases. It has been 
argued that this may be due to a reliance on verbal stories (Goswami, 1992).  This has 
resulted in a change to using simple picture analogues (Chen 2003). Unlike the original 
story analogues, children can see the pictures while trying to solve the problem which 
reduces the cognitive load involved in the encoding stage of analogy. Children do not 
need to rely on memorising the features in the story. Furthermore, because visual 
stimuli engage children, theorists have suggested that visual presentations play a 
significant role in problem-solving, because conceptual meanings, spatial relations, and 
structural configurations can be displayed clearly and economically (Chen, 2003), again 
reducing cognitive load.  
 
According to Pedone, Hummel and Holyoak (2001) the use of visual presentations 
foster a richer conceptual-base that provides effective source analogues, which make 
spontaneous access easier by reducing cognitive load during the representation and 
mapping process. Through the use of visual stimuli, the relations are effectively 
illustrated to aid children in the inference and access of relations from the base to the 
target problem. With this in mind, it seems that visual analogues, as oppose to verbal 
analogues, offer the best method of obviating some of the problems previously 
mentioned.  
 
However, although the move to picture analogues has increased young children’s 
performance, the increase is not dramatic. This may be due to the static nature of 
pictures. Furthermore, because they do not reflect the action element presented in target 
problem, children have to transform the conceptual idea from the base analogue into 
concrete action which makes mapping of any relations difficult. Therefore, if children 
were presented with real-life physical problems in both the base and the target problem, 
this should improve the mapping and subsequent accessing of relations. There is also 
evidence that asking people to produce analogies rather than to passively recall 
analogies leads to better analogical retrieval (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000). 
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To-date there is not a study that has presented such measures to children. Video 
analogues would give the desired effect of real-life physical problems and guide 
children’s real-life problem solving from the base to the target problem. This would also 
create structural alignment of relations to further guide children’s performance. 
Moreover, given the dynamic and explicit nature of video displays in today’s 
technology-based classroom it would be extremely beneficial if children are able to take 
what they learn from videos and utilize the knowledge in their everyday problem 
solving. Therefore, to provide a more ecologically valid representation of real-life 
problems, it was decided that the present study would adopt the use of video analogues.   
 
Based on a similar premise to Holyoak et al (1984), figure 2 illustrates an example of a 
video analogue presented to children.  
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Figure 2: Video Analogue Number Four – The Stick Task 
 
 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 A woman and child are kicking a ball 
through a long play tunnel in the garden. The 
ball gets stuck in the middle of the tunnel 
 
The child is presented with a long 
translucent tube. There is a sponge stuck in 
the middle of the tube 
 Resources 
provided Two twigs off a tree 
 
Two long attachable sticks, short stick, 
football, sponge, sellotape 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
 
Needs to retrieve the ball 
 
The child needs to retrieve the sponge 
 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
 
Auxiliary task 
 
Woman needs to adapt an object 
 
Child needs to adapt an object 
 
Key sub-goal 
attained 
Woman attaches the two sticks to create a 
long object 
 
Child selects the two identical sticks and 
attaches them to create a long object 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
Woman pushes the ball out of the tunnel 
with the long stick 
 
Child pushes the ball out of the tube with 
the long stick 
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Each of the video analogues lasted approximately 2 minutes, and included three key 
steps: an initial state, solution path and a goal state. Presenting visual actions across 
both the base and target problems should help children to map the appropriate relations.  
It is clear so far that, in spite of the evidence that suggests that preschool children can 
utilise analogy, its use in younger children is not stable. The following section outlines 
some of the reasons why this should be the case.   
 
 
1.4 Why do young children find analogy difficult?  
 
 
Piaget (1976) argued that pre-operational children do not have the appropriate cognitive 
structures available to allow them to use analogy. Piaget claimed that since analogical 
reasoning requires an understanding of higher-order relations, an understanding that 
does not appear until formal operations, young children may find analogy difficult. For 
example, in a traditional classical analogy, or a : b : : c : d task, the first item is related 
to the second (lower-order) as the third item is related the fourth, for example, human : 
legs :: bird : wings (read as ‘human is to legs as bird is to wings). Two simple 
relationships exist with this analogy, creature and limbs. A single higher-order 
relationship draws out the similarity across both sets of terms (higher-order), that is, 
means of locomotion. Similarly in problem analogies, the distinction is between 
reasoning about the relations (higher-order) and the objects (lower-order) within the 
problem.  
 
According to Inhelder and Piaget (1958) reasoning with higher-order relations requires 
the development of mature cognitive structures which facilitate reasoning across all 
knowledge domains. In particular, Piaget argued for an age-related shift in analogical 
reasoning ability where children not yet in the formal operations stage of development 
were thought to reason successively about relations between pairs of terms (for example 
between terms a and b, or between c and d), whereas children in the formal operations 
stage were able to draw out similarities across pairs of terms (for example between a 
and b, and c and d). Early reasoning, argued Piaget, was limited to simple relationships 
within elements of the problem whereas mature reasoning was characterised by the 
noticing of higher-order relations across problem elements.  Therefore, according to 
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Piaget, the ability to reason using analogy is not present in preschool children. The 
finding that young children tend to perform disappointingly on classical analogy tasks 
was taken as evidence for this theory (Piaget, Montangero & Billeter, 1977).  
 
Piaget et al (1977) presented five-year-olds with picture-based classical analogy tasks.  
They asked children to sort sets of pictures into pairs, this measured children's ability to 
see relations between a and b terms and c and d terms (lower-order relations).  Children 
were then asked to sort the pairs into sets of four (higher-order relations). If children 
were unable to sort the pictures correctly, they were presented with three alternative 
pictures (counter-suggestions) from which to choose the desired higher-order relations. 
Children performed very poorly on analogical reasoning tasks. Five-year-old children 
were unable to recognize the relations between the pictures. Instead of sorting the 
pictures by causal relations or relational similarity, they used a variety of different 
strategies, these included similarity of appearance, by association and by causal 
connections.  
 
Despite his findings, Piaget has been accused of underestimating young children's 
analogical reasoning ability, in that some children in the concrete operational stage 
could use higher-order relations to solve analogies. In particular, Piaget’s tasks have 
been criticised on the basis that his tasks test abilities other than analogical reasoning, 
for example, his use of mathematics. This raises questions about children's 
understanding of the mathematical relations held within the task. Without exploration of 
the children's knowledge of relations within the task, it cannot be concluded that 
children's difficulty lay in a lack of ability to recognise and apply higher-order relations. 
The difficulty of the younger age group could have been due to a lack of relational 
(mathematical) knowledge. This oversight has urged contemporary theorists to consider 
the role of knowledge in analogical reasoning.  
 
Goswami (1992) argued that understanding the knowledge of relations between items 
within a term (i.e. A and B; or C and D) represents a degree of knowledge necessary for 
problem solution. In addition to relational knowledge some noticing of relational 
similarity across terms is necessary for analogy to occur. It is the noticing of these 
relations, Goswami argued, that children find difficult.  However, if children possess the 
knowledge of relations across the a and b terms, and knowledge of how these relate to 
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the c and d terms, then providing performance factors do not intervene, children should 
find no problem in solving analogous tasks.  
 
Gentner (1989), like Goswami, argued that if a child has knowledge of a particular 
domain then they should be able to transfer that knowledge onto an analogous problem. 
Gentner’s Structure Mapping Theory (1983) proposes that people maximise the 
relational similarity between the base and target problem by mapping systems of 
attributes across the problem, using higher-order relations such as causal reasoning, 
rather than utilizing lower-order relations such as smaller than or attributes such as 
colour.  Gentner’s theory is based on the Systematicity Principle: that there must be 
some kind of correspondence between elements in two situations.  Gentner’s theory is 
more concerned with the path of change, and how children progress through a shift in 
relational knowledge.  Gentner argued that adults focus on relational structure which 
guides the mapping process through the presence of higher-order relations which guide 
the mapping of lower-order relations (Gentner and Toupin, 1986), whereas children, fall 
back on appearance of objects before the encoding and noticing of mappings and 
correspondences.  
 
Gentner and Toupin (1986) suggested that young children’s poor performance with 
analogy could be due either to a competence deficit (as suggested by Piaget, 1954) or 
because children lacked the appropriate knowledge of relations.  A competence deficit 
suggests that younger children lack the processing skills to map whole systems of 
relations with the failure to use systematicity reflecting a limitation of competence. This 
interpretation suggests that younger children have insufficient familiarity with the 
higher-order relations used in the task.  So even if they were intellectually able to use 
systematicity in mapping, they are unable to demonstrate this ability. According to this 
explanation, the difference between younger and older children is a novice-expert shift 
(Gentner and Toupin, 1986). Gentner argues that children will rely on the matching of 
objects before the matching of relations across the base- and target problems, and as a 
child’s knowledge grows, so too will their ability to rely on relational matching.  
 
Evidence for this domain-knowledge account indicates that the relational shift will 
occur at different times in different domains. Moreover, it generally occurs initially in 
domains that are most familiar to young children. This is supported by studies that show 
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young children’s ability to use relations have used familiar domains (Campione & 
Brown; 1985; Crisafi & Brown, 1986). For example, Gentner (1988) found that very 
young children could interpret metaphors with body parts as the base domain. Children 
were presented with pictures of familiar objects such as trees and asked questions like, 
“If the tree had a knee where would it be?’ Children as young as 4 could accurately map 
the familiar relations among body parts, even when the task was made more difficult by 
turning the tree upside down or by adding misleading details.Similarly, Crisafi and 
Brown (1986) found that providing base problems were included extremely familiar 
objects and activities, preschoolers could learn to do difficult combination problems by 
analogy.  
 
In an attempt to reduce the amount of processes involved in understanding and inferring 
relations in classical analogies, researchers have turned to problem analogies. However, 
in spite of eradicating the need to infer relations, problem analogies require the child to 
access the relations from the base problem to solve the target problem relations. In the 
classical analogies, children are told that they can use the information from the first 
three terms, and failure is a matter of not knowing the relations, but in the problem 
analogies, children are not told that they can use the information from the base problem, 
so they have to notice the relationship between the base and the target and then access 
this information to solve the target problem. Therefore, young children find relational 
access in problem analogies difficult.  
 
A further obstacle that affects children’s ability to reason with analogy is Mental 
Representation. A representation is a physical or mental construct that stands for some 
other physical or mental construct (Leslie, 1987). Mental representations are of interest 
in analogy because before children can solve analogical problems, they must be able to 
form representations in order to represent conceptual meanings and relations from the 
base problem to enable transfer to the target problem. Research suggests that children as 
young as 4 years of age are able to form mental representations and use them to solve 
problems (Chen, 2003). This coincides with the age to which children have been shown 
to use analogy in problem analogies. Therefore, representation may impact upon 
children’s ability to encode the base problem.  
 
Representations can be constructed from a child’s past knowledge, the task itself or 
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surrounding environment.  Once a representation is formed children need to be able to 
retrieve it from memory at the correct time to lead to recognizing the relations between 
the two problems to solve the analogy. However, because children are not explicitly told 
that they will need to use the information (representation) they have learned from the 
base problem, this often leads to a failure to access the appropriate  knowledge to solve 
the target problem (Singer-Freeman, 2005).  With the added processes surrounding 
representation, representation alone may be insufficient to facilitate problem solution. 
The present study aims to explore representation as a possible facilitator and/or 
constraint of the encoding stage of analogical problem solving. 
 
As previously mentioned transfer is an important process in analogy, which affects 
children’s ability to use knowledge from a base problem or the a:b terms when 
attempting the target solution or selection of the d term. Transfer is often an obstacle for 
young children, even when children are presented with multiple trials, training or 
practice. Research has highlighted two main concepts of transfer: (1) transfer is seen as 
symbolic representation of the problem domain (Brown, 1989 and Gentner, 1983) 
which suggests there should be an overlap between the representations of the two 
problem domains, so the elements can be mapped across each domain, for example, 
through high surface similarity (2) transfer according to Greeno, Moore and Smith 
(1993) is concerned with the activity of the problem solver, in that the activity carried 
out within the problems must be similar across domains.  
 
One reason behind children’s difficulty in using transfer in analogy may be due to the 
use of verbal base analogues and physical target problem. This creates a lack of 
structural similarity between the problems. If this is correct, then the matching of both 
base and target problem to include an action component to make relational similarity 
more explicit should improve children’s transfer both within and between tasks in the 
present study.  
 
 
1.5 Brief overview of the chapters 
 
 
Chapter 1 has outlined the importance of cognitive development and the issues that have 
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arisen, and also remain in relation to the processes involved in cognitive development. It 
expressed Piaget’s stage theory and the limitations of such a theory in the understanding 
of how children progress from one stage to another. In contrast, it illustrated Siegler’s 
knowledge-based approach which highlights a less rigid approach which demonstrates 
children’s variability in their development. Chapter 1 also introduced the microgenetic 
methodology. This method of analysis allows for the observation of variability and 
change over time. Since strategy change in analogical reasoning has not received a great 
deal of attention it was decided that analogy and its surrounding strategies would be the 
focus of this thesis, through the use of microgenetics.  
 
The second half of chapter 1 provided a definition of analogy and why it continues to 
prevail in both the cognitive and developmental literature today. It presented a 
discussion on the different types of analogy that have been studied in the past. The two 
dominant types are the traditional classical analogies, and the more recent problem 
analogies. This chapter also discussed a number of contributing factors to children’s 
failure to use analogy. These included the understanding of higher-order relations, 
relational knowledge, mental representation and transfer. It was the intention of the 
current thesis to address these issues. Predictions relating to each component will be 
laid out in the literature review.  
 
The intention of the literature review in chapter 2 was to provide a brief overview of 
some of the well established approaches to analogical reasoning of the last 50 years. 
The purpose is also to provide some criteria to create the current experiments, in 
particular with regard to creating strategy choices. Each of the scholars whose work is 
presented in this chapter considers children’s ability to use analogy and the constraints 
children face when using analogy.  The works mentioned are presented as an overview 
of the key points rather than as an exhaustive historical description. This chapter 
outlines the knowledge-based approach of Goswami (1989) and Gentner (1983, 1988 
and 1989). Following the theoretical approaches a more detailed description and 
evaluation of current research relevant to the field of analogical problem-solving is 
given. In particular, it exhibits the research of Chen (2003); Singer-Freeman (2005) and 
Tunteler and Resing (2002). Chen (2003) explored visual analogues which provide a 
break from the more traditional studies that use verbal analogies. It was expected that 
the use of visual stimuli would increase children’s interaction with the tasks, which in 
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turn would increase the likelihood of successful analogical problem solving. Singer-
Freeman (2005) highlights the importance of the issue of memory access and relational 
inference in children's ability to use analogy. These issues were discussed at some 
length and incorporated within the methodology. Tunteler and Resing (2002) explored 
children’s spontaneous use of analogy, and provided us with explanations of preschool 
children’s analogical ability through the use of a microgenetic study.  The latter end of 
chapter 2 presents the theoretical predictions of both the cross-sectional- and the 
longitudinal study presented in this thesis. It provides an overview of the expectations 
of the thesis and breaks down these expectations into manageable hypotheses.  
 
Chapter 3 presents information on the research setting, my experience at the schools, 
ethical consideration and rationale. Chapter 4 presents study 1; the classical analogy 
study. Here, data from children in both schools were presented as one large data set of 3, 
4 and 5 year-olds. Children’s performance with the 8 classical analogy tasks was 
discussed. Children’s performance over two separate occasions, 30 weeks apart, were 
presented, and alternative strategy choices were discussed in relation to previous 
research findings. 
 
Chapter 5 presents study 2, the cross-sectional problem analogies. It looked at 3- and 4-
year-olds from a local infant school. Children’s performance with six analogical 
problems was discussed in attempt one and two, 30 weeks later. This chapter also 
explored the differences in strategy choices across the classical analogies and problem 
analogies. Chapter 6 introduced the microgenetic study – study 3. A different set of 4- 
and 5-year-olds were tested, from a different infant school. Children were presented 
with the same tasks, but at weekly intervals over the same thirty week period. The main 
aim of this chapter was to examine whether the data revealed specific performance 
factors, patterns of behaviour and change through the use of a microgentic methodology. 
Children’s variability of strategy choices was discussed. Included in this chapter were 
seven case studies. The case studies provided detailed notes on children’s intra-
individual and inter-individual change. It explored children’s behaviour session-by-
session, which offered insight into each child’s progress over the 30 week observation 
period. To understand why children displayed certain patterns of behaviour, each child’s 
performance was examined in relation to their knowledge of the base problem, strategy 
usage and pattern, strategic change and explanation. The general discussion and 
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conclusion at the end of this chapter discusses the facilitators and obstacles that children 
face when solving problems and analogical problems. Chapter 7 presents the general 
discussion for all three studies.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2.1 Literature review  
 
Holyoak, Junn & Billman (1984) suggested that “under optimal circumstances children 
as young as 4 years old can make substantial use of analogies to solve problems” 
(Holyoak, Junn & Billman; 1984, p.2052).  But having concluded that they can, 
researchers have disagreed over why they need “optimal circumstances” or, putting the 
issue the other way round, “What makes analogical problem solving difficult in spite of 
a capability for analogical reasoning?” 
Reeves & Weisberg (1994) reviewed analogical problem studies and found consensus 
(p 382) about the kind of information processing demanded by such tasks.  The agreed 
list of processes is encoding of the stories or other base analogues and target analogues; 
retrieval of a base analogue from the story on presentation of the target; application or 
mapping of the base to the target problem and abstraction. The result of abstraction is 
often referred to as a schema that is, an overall concept that links the target problem 
with the analogy. Thus, young children need to work through a number of cognitive 
processes to solve problems using analogy.  
In spite of agreement about what kinds of information processing are involved, there is 
considerable debate about why analogical reasoning can be difficult. There are at least 
four points of view: (1) Lack of knowledge about key relations in spite of a 
predisposition to look for relational similarity (e.g. a fragile understanding of the 
relation between height and reaching things would impede the use of experience of 
standing on chairs to notice the similarity with standing on a rung of a ladder). (2) 
Focusing on object properties and appearances instead of relational properties (e.g. 
failing to notice the usefulness of a ladder because it is so much thinner than a chair and 
does not have four legs. (3) Access in memory (e.g. failing to keep enough relationships 
in memory at the same time when considering solutions to a problem). (4) Losing track 
of goal structure when executing a plan or following a solution principle (an example 
would be difficulty with tasks requiring an auxiliary problem, because of getting side-
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tracked pursuing the sub-goal and then failing to keep the critical goal in mind (making 
a tube by rolling up paper, might sidetrack someone wanting to transfer balls between 
two containers).  
 
The account emphasising basic knowledge of relations is referred to by Goswami (1992) 
and subsequent investigators (e.g. Richland et al., 2006) as the “relational primacy 
hypothesis”.  Goswami and colleagues have proposed a relational primacy hypothesis, 
arguing that analogical reasoning is fundamentally available as a capacity from early 
infancy but, that children’s analogical performance increases with age due to the 
accretion of knowledge about relevant relations (Goswami, 1992, 2001; Goswami & 
Brown, 1989). 
 
Goswami (1992) argued that the most important developmental marker of analogical 
reasoning is relational knowledge which is equated to the child’s growing conceptual 
knowledge. Furthermore, she proposed that knowledge shifts within specific domains 
rather than on a more global level as Piaget believed. For example, a five-year-old child 
may solve a simple pictorial problem using analogy that involves shape change and 
pattern change (from circles to squares and stars to stripes), but they may be unable to 
solve a problem based on proportions (i.e., ½ to ¼), because such relations are not in 
their knowledge-base. Strong evidence exists to support Goswami’s claim, revealing 
that children as young as 3-years-old can reason analogically if they have adequate 
domain knowledge to evoke relational similarity among relations (e.g. Holyoak, 1984; 
Goswami, 1989; Chen and Siegler, 2000).  
 
Despite this strong assumption that knowledge is the key to analogical ability, young 
children have been shown to possess the relational knowledge, but still fail to apply it to 
solve the problem (Goswami and Brown, 1989). Their ability to utilise relational 
similarity is dependent on the difficulty of the relations within the analogy. Therefore, if 
the relations are already part of the child’s conceptual knowledge then recognition of 
their similarity should not provide any problems for children’s analogical reasoning 
(Goswami, 1992). After all, how can children create higher-order relations if they do not 
understand the relations on which the higher-order relations are based?  
 
Goswami's (1989) hypothesis is based on the notion that children are predisposed to 
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look for some kind of similarity – termed the “relational similarity constraint”. 
This is a constraint on cognition which she argues is evidenced in infants and what 
experience builds on.  Through her theory she offers an explanation of the source of 
development, and in particular, it is the lack of knowledge about relations in specific 
domains that makes analogical reasoning difficult.  To try to address the children’s poor 
performance with analogies, Goswami used very familiar relations like LIVES IN (bird, 
nest) for the a:b part of the analogy, and simple pictorial tasks (pattern and shape change) 
where familiarity can be assumed.   
 
Goswami's hypothesis contradicts Piaget’s assumptions of an age-related shift, and 
argues that previous findings of children's failure to apply higher-order relations are a 
result of relational difficulty and not lack of cognitive structures to allow higher-order 
thinking. Goswami (1992) does, however agree that some children at this age may not 
develop the ability to recognize relational similarity, and those that do may not 
necessarily use it to solve analogies. She does insist however, that if the relations are 
already part of their conceptual knowledge, then this should allow children to recognise 
the relationships within the analogy and use them to solve problems. Furthermore, 
children that do not possess the relational knowledge will resort to other kinds of 
reasoning strategies, such as perceptual or associative ones.  The main difference 
between Piaget’s account and the knowledge-based account is that the latter do not 
predict a shift due to maturation through qualitatively different stages, but that when a 
child’s knowledge increases (through experience – quantitative change) so does the 
ability to reason analogically, therefore, this could occur at any time. Furthermore, this 
ability will be different according to the task/domain because of its reliance on 
knowledge (of that domain).  
 
To investigate the importance of relational knowledge Goswami and Brown (1989) 
created a pictorial version of the traditional classical analogy (a:b::c:d) task and 
presented it to 3, 4 and 6 year-olds.  The task included the use of simple objects i.e., 
playdoh and apples, and were based on physical causal relations such as melting, 
breaking and cutting, which were familiar to children of this age. Children were 
presented with a multiple-choice analogy task with five possible responses. The five 
distractors were chosen in relation to different solution strategies. These included an 
appearance map (e.g. a round ball for the apple) that was perceptually similar to the c 
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term, an associative of the c term (e.g. a banana for the apple), an incorrect object with 
the correct causal transformation (e.g. a cut cake), and the correct object with an 
incorrect causal transformation (e.g. a bruised apple). Children were asked to choose 
the correct picture to finish the pattern, requiring them to realise that analogy was 
needed.  Children received feedback after each problem in that they were told whether 
the answers were correct or incorrect.  To ensure that children had causal relational 
knowledge they were tested independently for their knowledge of the relations given. 
Here children were presented with three pictures of the chosen transformation i.e., 
cutting (a cut apple, a cut cake, cut playdoh) and had to choose the picture of a knife. 
 
Goswami and Brown (1989) found over 90 per cent of the 4-and 6-year-olds succeeded 
in solving at least 62.5 per cent of the analogies successfully.  The 3-year-olds were less 
successful, with only 50 percent solving a number of analogies. Goswami and Brown 
found that successful analogical performance was related to the knowledge of causal 
relations, in that those who were able to understand the causal relations between a and b 
and the c and d terms were more likely to use analogy to solve the task. This supports 
Goswami's relational knowledge hypothesis and contradicts Piaget's claim that children 
are unable to reason by analogy until they have reached the formal operational stage of 
development. 
 
Goswami and Brown (1989) also revealed that the most frequent error in 3- and 4-year-
olds was the lower-order relation (correct object, wrong causal transformation – the 
bruised apple), supporting Piaget’s theory.  This suggests that children understood that 
a causal transformation was needed, but they did not always choose the most 
appropriate. They further suggest that children may have thought any causal relation 
involving the appropriate object was a sufficient response which requires no use of 
relational similarity. A final suggestion as to why children continued to choose this 
erroneous strategy is a reliance on perceptual similarity. Children’s incorrect 
transformation choices shared high perceptual similarity with the c term and therefore, 
children were drawn to the object’s similarity and not the desired relational similarity. 
However, the authors argue that this does not provide a complete explanation of the 
children’s incorrect choices, because if children were relying wholly on similarity then 
children would have chosen the cut apple and the bruised apple equally frequently, 
which they did not. Therefore, further investigation is needed to explore the reasoning 
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behind children’s choices i.e., when children are not using analogy, what else are they 
using?  
 
Goswami and Brown concluded that 3-year-old children are able to solve classical 
analogies when they have the knowledge of causal relations.  They further explain that 
children's failure in early Piagetian analogies is not due to an inability to reason about 
higher-order relations, but to the difficulty of the actual tasks and the relations within 
the tasks. However, Goswami and Brown do not explain why children who possess 
relational knowledge on simple tasks are unable to use analogy to solve analogical 
problems. 
 
Gentner and Ratterman (1991) argued that children will fail to use analogy because of a 
reliance on surface similarity. Gentner argues that the account emphasising immature 
focusing on objects and properties instead of relations is referred to as the” relational 
shift” hypothesis (Gentner and Rattermann, 1991; see also Rattermann & Gentner, 
1998).  Gentner and Rattermann (1991) accept that knowledge of the relevant relations 
is essential, but very young children will attend primarily to featural similarity between 
objects and will reason on the basis of perceptual features rather than on the basis of 
relational similarity.  They believe that a shift - the relational shift – will then occur so 
that children can and will reason on the basis of relational features. For example, a shift 
from recognising the similarity between a round, green ball and a round, green apple; 
to similarity based on common relations between objects such as apple on desk and 
book on bureau and finally to similarity based on common higher-order relations 
(relations between base and target problem), -  the sun melts snow and causes snow to 
change to a puddle and the flame melts candle and causes the candle to change to a 
mound.  Rattermann and Gentner (1998) argue that because knowledge of the relevant 
relations is central, the relational shift will be domain specific in nature. They suggested 
that the relational shift occurs at different ages for different domains, depending on the 
child’s knowledge of that domain. However, subsequent research has failed to find a 
relational shift.  
 
To examine why children choose surface features above relational features, even in 
simple problems where relational knowledge is assumed, Richland et al (2006) used 
scene analogies to look at 3- and 4-year-olds, 6- to 8-year-olds and 13- and 14-year-olds 
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children’s ability to map relations with different levels featural and relational stimuli. 
Relational complexity was varied using matched problems that required mapping of the 
same relation on one or more than one occasion. Featural stimuli were varied by using 
similar and dissimilar objects in the target problem. They showed children pairs of 
pictures including familiar relations (e.g., chasing) and asked them to select a 
corresponding object between the base and target problem. If children are reasoning 
analogically, they should select the object based relational similarity, and not featural 
similarity. Richland et al. found that 3- and 4-year-olds were distracted by the object 
matches and performance was extremely poor using relational similarity. With regard to 
complexity of the relations 3- to 4-year-olds and 6- to 7-year-olds performed less well 
with the task when the relational structure was more complex. Richland et al. (2006) 
concluded that knowledge accretion alone is not enough to account for the development 
of analogical ability. Rather, they suggest that children must also have sufficient 
inhibitory control (to featural similarity) to successfully reason analogically. 
 
To examine the effect of surface similarity further, the present study incorporated a 
number of featural distractors in both classical analogies and the problem analogies. The 
present classical analogy study presented children with simple pictorial analogies based 
on Goswami and Brown’s (1989) study where children were presented with a card game, 
and children had to try to ignore object matches and select cards base on their relational 
attributes.  Similarly, in the problem analogies, children will face a number of object 
matches and featural strategies. Children’s preferences across both types of analogy 
problems will be compared and any shift in relational reasoning will be monitored.  
 
One of the accounts emphasising access and memory highlights limits on children’s 
working memory capacity that affect their ability to process multiple lower and higher 
order relations simultaneously (Halford,1993).  This has been labelled “the relational 
complexity hypothesis”.  Halford’s theory categorizes relations by the number of 
sources of variation that must be processed in parallel. Halford suggested that on 
average, at the age of two, children can process binary relations, and only at the age of 
five can they process ternary relations. Halford’s theory suggests that two year olds are 
able to perform very simple analogy problems, but not problems that require multiple 
relations. To examine children’s ability to process higher and lower-order relations, and 
multiple relations, problem analogies in the present study included two levels of 
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complexity. Half of the tasks required an auxiliary task, where children had to select and 
adapt an object (i.e., the rolling up of a piece of paper analogous to the rolling up of the 
magic carpet in Holyoak et al’s (1984) study). The other half did not require on 
auxiliary task, children simply had to select an object to solve the target problem. If 
children perform better on tasks requiring no auxiliary task then relational complexity is 
an obstacle in children’s analogical problem solving, and that the added need to adapt 
an object places too much on children’s memory capacity.   
 
Prior to Richland et al. (2006) the measurement of relational knowledge had been 
difficult because of the reliance on traditional classical analogies, where relational 
inference is required (Singer-Freeman, 2005). Here children have to recognise the 
relational similarity themselves because the relationship between the a- and b-terms is 
not specified. If children fail to infer the correct relation between the a- and b-terms, 
they will be unable to apply the relation to the c-term and may select the incorrect 
answer (Singer-Freeman, 2005). To add to this difficulty, children must have 
knowledge of the relations between a and b and c and d in order to apply the relational 
knowledge needed to solve the problem (Goswami and Brown, 1989). Children also 
need to understand what is expected of them, that is, they must be clear about the goal 
of the task. It is therefore understandable why preschool children find analogy difficult, 
because of the amount of cognitive processes needed to be activated.  
 
In her study, Singer-Freeman (2005) attempted to explain why children, even though 
possessing the relational knowledge, rely on less effective strategies. Two-year-olds 
were presented with classical analogy tasks that were adapted from her problem 
analogies which ensured relations across both were the same. She also presented some 
of the children with information about the relational change in the a:b terms. Singer-
Freeman stated that better performance on classical- than problem-analogies would 
suggest that children find access difficult. Whereas, better performance on problem- 
than classical-analogies would suggest that relational knowledge or relational inference 
is problematic. By providing children with hints, Singer-Freeman attempted to 
counteract the effects of access and inference. However, she found that children did not 
benefit from being told about the relational change in the classical tasks (23 per cent 
correct). Children who received no hints or prompts used analogy on 24 per cent of 
occasions. This is similar to previous research with older children (Holyoak et al, 1984) 
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and adults (Gick and Holyoak, 1980). Singer-Freeman argued that classical and problem 
solving tasks may measure different abilities and that non-analogical task factors such 
as task difficulty may be responsible for performance on these tasks by this age group.  
 
From her study, Singer-Freeman (2005) concluded that there are three elements that 
may limit analogical reasoning in young children. First, an inability to make relational 
inferences, which requires the child to realize that the link between a and b can be 
applied to c and d to solve the analogy. Secondly, a lack of relational knowledge, which 
requires that the child have information about higher-order relations upon which the 
analogy solution depends. And finally, a lack of task clarity, which allows the child to 
understand the aim of the task. 
 
A major flaw in this study, as reported by Singer-Freeman, was that a distinction was 
not made between relational inference and relational knowledge. Without such a 
distinction it is not known to what extent each affected children’s performance. 
Therefore, a measure of these two important factors need future consideration before 
any firm conclusions can be made about these processes as a limiting factor to 
children’s analogical problem solving. Furthermore, Singer-Freeman’s finding that 
children did not benefit from hints suggests that children at this age may not have the 
cognitive competencies to reason by analogy. Older children and adults benefited 100 
per cent from hints in Holyoak et al (1984). So, could it be that preschool children do 
not understand the concept behind analogical problems and such a deficit prevents them 
benefiting from a hint? 
 
Another explanation as to why children in Singer-Freeman’s study performed poorly 
with analogy is that, 2-year-old children may not have understood the relations within 
the experiments. For example, 2-year-olds may not know that items can be stretched, 
therefore, according to the knowledge-based approach, without such knowledge 
children will rely on alternative strategies, of which they did. Despite Singer-Freeman 
including the figures of children’s alternative strategy choices (i.e., identity match) she 
did not explore these further. This is a very large data set on 76 per cent of (non-
analogical) trials that remain unexplored. If children’s actions surrounding analogy were 
explored, this might inform us about children’s capabilities at this age. Therefore, the 
present thesis explored children’s alternative strategy use by monitoring alternative 
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strategy use. This should tell us why children are not choosing analogy above other 
problem solving strategies.  
 
To explore Singer-Freeman’s suggestion that children perform differently on classical- 
and problem –analogies, the present thesis has incorporated the use of classical and 
problem analogies. The classical analogies in study one were compared with the same 
children’s performance on the problem analogies in study 2. Comparing strategy 
choices across both types of analogy should tell us about the affects of access and 
inference on children’s ability to use analogy.   
 
As well as access and inference, a further obstacle that children face when attempting to 
use analogy is representation. Chen’s study highlights the importance of representation 
in the encoding stage of analogy. Without this, children have no point of reference and 
are unable to search for an analogous situation in mind. Once a representation is formed 
children need to be able to retrieve this representation from memory at the correct time 
to lead to recognizing the relations between the two problems to solve an analogy. As 
well as examining the effect of representation, Chen’s study was one of the first to use 
visual analogues. Chen (2003) presented children of 4 and 5 years with pictures of Peter 
Rabbit trying to solve the problem of reaching an apple at the bottom of a container. To 
obtain the out of reach apple, Peter had to attach two sticks together and push the apple 
through he bottom. Children observed the pictures and had to obtain a soft toy from a 
container by adjoining two sticks to solve the target problem. There were three 
conditions - control, hint and no hint. The results revealed that children given a hint 
about using the information in the base problem to help them solve the target problem, 
performed better than those in the no hint and control conditions (62 percent, 44 percent 
and 21 percent, respectively). Results also revealed that those able to understand the 
base problem performed better than those who could not. In analogical performance, 62 
per cent of the children who represented the base problem solved the target problem, 
with only 35 per cent solution in those unable to represent the base problem, thus 
highlighting the importance of representation in analogical reasoning. Chen’s study 
revealed that 5 year-olds performed better overall, and differences were particularly 
evident in the no hint condition, suggesting that younger children had more difficulty in 
accessing the information in the base problem.  
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However, even the ability to represent the base is not enough to guarantee solution. 
Therefore, representation is not sufficient for accessing the base it merely helps in the 
understanding of the base problem. Although Chen’s study revealed differences 
between 4- and 5-years-olds, it did not report the processes involved in these differences. 
The study also failed to acknowledge the different strategies children may utilize whilst 
progressing through the tasks. The authors simply concentrated on those who could 
solve analogies and those who could not. Furthermore, Chen’s study did not account for 
a lack of relational knowledge. Despite presenting younger children with easier relations, 
she failed to acknowledge the fact that the poor performance in 4- and 5-year-olds may 
have been due to a lack of relational knowledge. Similarly, children’s good performance 
in the control condition suggests that children may not require the relations presented in 
the base picture. They concluded that young children find representing and accessing 
base information difficult, but their capacity to do so appears to develop in their early 
years.  
 
The present problem analogies (study 2 and 3) incorporated Chen’s idea of 
representation by asking children to explain what happened in the base problem. 
Children will be specifically asked to describe (represent) the problem, the goal, the 
obstacle and the solution. This should help children to think aloud and allow them to 
recognise the relations across the base and target problems. Asking children to represent 
the base problem helps children at the encoding stage of analogy. It encourages children 
to take note of what is occurring in the base problem. It provides structure, a structure 
that repeats itself in the target problem. As well as helping children to encode the 
information in the base, representation, in study 3 where children have to represent each 
trial, should also facilitate the accessing stage of analogy. If children are able to hold in 
mind the information from the base problem and receive repeated exposure to this 
information, this should ease access when they are faced with a similar target problem. 
Therefore, it is predicted that children able to represent the base problem should 
perform better with analogy, as representation facilitates the accessing of the base 
problem.  
 
As discussed earlier, Siegler (1996; 1998) argued for the importance of change in 
children's cognitive development. However despite the obvious advantages of the 
microgenetic method in explaining cognitive change, to date there has only been one 
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study that has used the microgenetic method to explore problem analogies. Tunteler and 
Resing’s (2002) study examined 4-year-old children’s spontaneous analogical transfer 
from story problems to physical problems. Children were presented with 12 base stories 
and 12 physical target problems and a set of 14 objects in order to help solve the 
problems. Children had to use the information from the story to solve the physical 
problem, which involved a number of actions such as pulling, rolling up and combining 
two items. The problems could either be solved in an analogical or non-analogical way. 
The analogical solution involved solving the physical problem by using the same 
solution as presented in the story. Thus, the child had to choose an object with the same 
function as presented in the story, but with a different appearance. The non-analogous 
choice meant that children were not choosing or adapting the objects. Once this 
quantitative data was gathered, children were then asked why they had chosen a 
particular object. This provided the experimenters with information about the nature 
(analogical versus non-analogical) of children’s problem solving activities (Tunteler and 
Resing, 2002).     
 
Results showed that 4-year-old children did show spontaneous analogical ability 
(correct on 30 percent of the trials). Despite the children in this study not needing 
explicit hints, they revealed that children required some form of practice in order to 
solve the problem. They also found that children did not select the same object on all 
tasks, but their performance varied throughout the trials. The variability in performance, 
according to Tunteler and Resing (2002), is evidence of a developmental change in 
analogical ability. Previous microgenetic studies have shown that the use of one strategy 
is often characterized by inconsistent use (Siegler and Jenkins, 1989). These studies 
suggest that children often have available to them many strategies, but they only 
become consistent over time and utilization. The use of different strategies other than 
analogy in Tunteler and Resing’s study indicates that children do not always recognize 
analogy as the best strategy to use. They may use other strategies and then eventually 
use analogy, they may even alternate between both (as suggested in the Overlapping 
Waves Theory). This suggests that analogy use in 4-year-olds is not fully developed and 
children tend to use multiple strategies in their attempts at solution. Along with verbal 
reports of the base problem children in Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) study were asked 
about their object choices. Following the target problem children were asked to explain 
their object choices. Their choices were coded in a similar way to the pre-task 
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descriptions – analogous or non-analogous responses. Tunteler and Resing found that 
the majority of descriptions were non-analogous and included descriptions based on the 
object’s attributes.  
 
In spite of this important finding, Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) did not explore 
variability further, they simply reported the data as analogical versus non-analogical and 
as in previous research, they only examined children’s analogical competence.  This 
was probably due to the fact that the objects chosen were not coded or defined which 
makes any assumptions about children’s alternative strategy use impossible. On a 
methodological point, the use of verbal story analogues is also of concern. As explained 
earlier, verbal stories produce an extra cognitive load with a reliance on memory. 
Furthermore, Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) concentrated more on spontaneous 
analogical ability rather than on the actual process of change during analogical 
performance as the microgentic method would suggest. Tunteler and Resing’s study 
found that children needed a certain amount of practice before using analogy. However, 
they failed to explore the effects of practice and what children in the study were doing 
before they began to use analogy and what form their actions/practice took, i.e., what 
factors surrounded practice (correct/incorrect practice with the tasks or multiple 
successes with the problems). Siegler (1989) argued that such factors would have a 
significant affect on children’s performance. In addition, the authors did not report why 
children improved from trial 1 to 2, performed worse on 3 then increased analogical 
performance in trials 4, 5 and 6. It is unclear whether children found session 3 more 
difficult than the other sessions, or whether they simply reverted back to earlier non-
analogical strategies, as Siegler (1981) would suggest. The authors suggest that 
variability may have been due to a period of developmental change in analogical 
performance. However, they do not examine variability within children’s performance 
which would go some way in answering this question. To alleviate some of these 
problems there is a need to explore children’s individual performance across repeated 
sessions which would reveal the specific processes of how and when analogical 
problem solving develops.   
 
Finally, Tunteler and Resing concluded that the data does not support a strong structural 
view, based on the finding that 30 per cent of the children in their study were able to 
solve the problem in an analogical way. However, because the specific object choices 
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were not based on any particular strategy i.e., perceptual or relational, it is difficult to 
conclude that children were not performing in line with the structuralist’s viewpoint on 
alternative strategic choice. Among other things, Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) study 
raises the issue of a reliance on memory because of the prevalence of verbal story 
analogues.  
 
Study 3 of the current thesis aimed to address some of the key issues omitted from 
Tunteler and Resing’s research. Like Tunteler and Resing’s study, it will use the 
microgenetic methodology to monitor children’s change in strategy use. It will monitor 
children’s object selection over multiple trials over a period of thirty weeks. Presenting 
children with multiple trials should indicate to them the importance of the base analogue 
in the target problem and help them to access the information from the base problem. 
Sweller and Copper (1985) argued that children need a number of examples in order to 
become proficient at solving problems. Moreover, by presenting children with the same 
task on numerous occasions will not only monitor any change in their overall 
performance, but it will also provide them with a problem scheme (Singer-Freeman, 
2005) which may facilitate both the accessing and application of relations onto the 
target problem. Since children will receive practice with problems, this should provide 
children with a hint to use the relations from the base analogue to solve the target 
analogue. Multiple trials should also inform us about variability of strategy choices; that 
is, do preschool children use analogy or any other strategies consistently or do their 
choices vary. If analogy is not consistent at an age where research has found it to be 
present, why not, and what factors surrounding its use impede their ability to utilise 
analogy?  
 
Since multiple trials in study 3 were presented children with practice, there is a need to 
have a no practice condition. Although practice has been shown to decrease error rates 
and improve performance over time (Sternberg, 1977), it has also been accused of 
affecting the measurement of true analogical ability. By monitoring the effect of 
practice and no practice will not only provide a baseline of children’s analogical ability 
it will also increase the likelihood of children’s access of the base problem in the 
absence of a hint.  Multiple trials will also provide information on children’s ability to 
transfer analogy from one problem to another – both within- and between- the same 
problem. It appears that the use of multiple trials has many benefits. Incorporating a 
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microgenetic study should answer some of the important questions surrounding 
children’s difficulty with analogy.  
 
It appears that there are a number of factors concerning a child’s failure to solve 
analogical problems. The introduction and literature review highlights the importance of 
the microgenetic methodology to monitor children’s strategy change over time; how the 
use of verbal analogues may not produce optimal conditions due to their effect on 
memory capacity and the importance of relational knowledge in children’s analogical 
reasoning. It also acknowledges the amount of cognitive processes needed to use 
analogy – encoding, retrieval/access, mapping/transfer and implementation/ abstraction. 
The current thesis does not intend to cover all these processes. Two of the processes 
will be examined in the problem analogies – encoding and access. Asking children to 
represent the problem analogies should help children in the encoding stage. 
Encouraging children to think about the relations in the base, by describing them, 
children should find the encoding stage straight forward. Success with the first stage of 
analogy can only benefit later stages of retrieval and access once they receive the target 
problem. The use of multiple trials in the microgenetic study should help children to 
access the base problem in the absence of an explicit hint. Since previous research has 
found that a hint to use the base information has not increased performance with 
analogy, the present problem analogies do not provide children with an explicit hint. It 
relies on implicit hints provide by the use of a microgenetic methodology. The 
microgenetic study presents children with multiple trials which allow them to practice 
the problems in the hope that they will notice the relationship between the base and 
target.  
 
The present thesis is made up of three studies. Study one presents children with classical 
analogies based on Goswami and Brown’s (1989) picture tasks. Children will receive 
the tasks on two separate occasions 30 weeks apart. Study 1 aimed to examine 3,- 4- 
and 5-year-olds analogical reasoning ability using classical analogies. Using simple 
picture cards takes the need for understanding relational knowledge away. Children 
simply follow the change in pattern and shape. However, because Richland et al (2005) 
argue that if children are distracted by featural similarity, they ignore relational 
information presented in a and b and simply look to object matching/surface similarity. 
Gentner and Ratterman (1989) argue that as knowledge grows, children will shift from 
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surface similarity to relational similarity. Therefore, the classical analogies will look for 
a relational shift that predicts a high level of object-match responses, dropping with age 
and an increase in relational responding with age. The classical analogies also address 
Singer-Freeman’s notion of relational inference by comparing the level of performance 
with their performance on problem analogies in study 2. If children perform better on 
problem analogies compared to classical analogies, then relational inference affects 
children’s performance. If children perform better on classical analogies then access 
plays a larger role in children’s difficulty with analogy.  
 
Children’s performance on the classical tasks in study one will be compared to 
performance on problem analogies in study two. One of the key aims of study 1 and 2 
was to create a bridge between classical and problem analogies by incorporating the 
strategies used in previous classical analogies (Goswami and Brown, 1989) and 
building the problem analogies around these strategies. In spite of the efforts of Singer-
Freeman (2005) who tried to examine the extent to which classical and problem 
analogies measure the same ability, researchers (Holyoak, Junn and Billman, 1984; 
Singer-Freeman and Goswami, 2001) have agreed that comparing both types is 
problematic. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is not to treat classical and problem 
analogies the same, but to simply measure the similarity in strategy use on both types of 
analogy. If children’s strategy choice is similar across both types of analogy, then it can 
be concluded that children of this age use similar strategies for both, and this may be 
due to the fact that similar reasoning abilities are needed for both types, despite their 
distinct differences. 
 
Study 2 presents children with problem analogies on two separate occasions, 30 weeks 
apart. The aims of this study were the same as that of study 1; the only difference was 
that children received problem analogies, and not classical analogies. Another question 
this study hoped to answer was the influence that representation has on analogical 
problem solving. Since representation should help the encoding stage, and get children 
to think out loud about the relations in the base problem, this should help to facilitate 
the use of analogy. As in Tunteler and Resing’s study, children were asked to explain 
why they had chosen their particular strategy to solve the problem. This should inform 
us of how children came to choose a particular strategy and whether or not they used 
relational knowledge (from the base problem) to solve the target problem.  
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Following study 2, it was apparent that 3-year-olds found problem analogies of this kind 
too difficult. Therefore, it was decided that study 3 would examine 4- and 5-year-olds 
only. Due to the success of the microgenetic methodology in monitoring change over 
time it was decided that study 3 should incorporate this methodology. Study 2 looked at 
two points in time, the microgenetic study monitored performance on a weekly basis 
over a time span of 30 weeks. As well as this study answering questions on how well 
children progress due to practice with analogical problems, it also monitors any change 
in strategy use over time. As set out by Siegler the microgenetic will highlight the path, 
rate, breadth, variability and source of change. The use of multiple trials not only 
increases the likelihood of success with analogy, but also allows us to monitor intra- and 
inter-individual change. For example, do children use the same strategy on the same 
problems or do they vary in their strategy choice or do different children use different 
strategies on the same tasks. As well as the group data from the microgenetic study, 
study 3 presented data from 7 case studies. The aims of the case studies include the 
plotting of individual strategy change; reasons behind children’s decisions to change 
strategy both within and between tasks; the effect of practice, knowledge of relations, 
representation and feedback on children’s strategy choices and the effect of strategic 
variability on children’s success with analogical problems. The children chosen for the 
case studies represented 4.5-year-olds at the start of the trials. Thus, children fell in the 
middle of the age cohort. Choosing children of the same age eliminates age factors 
between their performances, and since the group data found no significant age 
differences between 4- and 5-year-olds, it seemed appropriate to select children of the 
same age.    
 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to understand what makes analogical problem 
solving difficult in spite of a potential for analogical reasoning? To answer this question 
the thesis presents different analysis and methodologies in 3 separate studies. The aims 
of each are presented below: 
 
Study 1 – classical analogies  
• To examine any age differences in 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds performance on 
classical analogies.  
• To monitor the existence of a relational shift from surface similarity to relational 
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similarity. This will tell us whether children show a preference for one type of 
solution.  
• To compare children’s performance with problem analogies in study 2. This aim 
should help us to understand whether both types measure the same reasoning 
skills. 
• To understand the effect of access and inference on analogical reasoning.  
 
Study 2 – problem analogies 
• To examine any age differences in 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds performance on 
problem analogies.  
• To monitor the existence of a relational shift from surface similarity to relational 
similarity. Is it the same shift found in classical analogies? 
• To explore the effect of relational complexity on children’s ability to solve 
problems  
• To compare children’s performance with classical analogies in study 1. 
• To explore the effect of access and inference on analogical reasoning. Is one 
more detrimental than the other to children’s success with analogy? 
• To understand the effect of representation on encoding and feedback on 
subsequent trials on analogical problems.   
 
Study 3 – microgenetic study  
• To examine 4- and 5-year-olds’ performance on repeated exposure to problem 
analogies.  
• To monitor change in strategy use over time (path, rate, breadth, variability and 
source of change). 
• To explore the effect practice has on children’s ability to access and transfer the 
base problem to the target problem.  
• To explore the effect of relational complexity on children’s ability to solve 
problems.  
• To explore the effect of repeated representation and feedback on analogical 
reasoning. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3.1 Research setting  
 
 
Two schools in the vicinity of the university gave access to children who could 
participate in the study.   Statutory inspections give considerable background 
information about individual schools.  At the time of the research, the most recent 
inspection for School 1 had been conducted in 2008.  The most recent inspection in 
School 2 had been conducted in 2006.  The agency responsible for inspections made the 
reports available to the public on the web site http://www.estyn.gov.uk. 
  
School one is situated in the authority of Rhondda Cynon Taff in south east Wales. The 
village is in a semi-rural location and all pupils come from the village. The school’s 
intake is economically disadvantaged with many less able and few able pupils. Ten per 
cent of pupils receive free school meals. Thirteen pupils have been identified as having 
special educational needs (SEN); none of which have been statemented. No pupil 
speaks Welsh as a first language and very few come from an ethnic minority 
background. The head teacher has led the school since 1998, and works alongside four 
full-time teachers. The school has undergone instability in staffing during the last four 
years. The school age range is from three to seven years of age, with 55 full time pupils. 
The inspection concluded that the overall quality of educational provision for children 
in the nursery and reception was appropriate to their needs and children are making 
good progress towards the desirable outcomes for children’s learning. The nursery 
received ‘very good’ and reception ‘satisfactory’ on all key subjects. The school 
received a grade 2 on 69 per cent of their key skills which is well above the UK 
average.  
 
School two is situated in the authority of Caerphilly County Borough Council in south 
east Wales. The village is in a semi-rural location and the majority of pupils come from 
the village, but a number attend the school from outside the catchment area. The 
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children’s families are neither prosperous nor disadvantaged in social and economic 
circumstances. The school age range is from three to eleven years of age. This year 
(2006) there are 142 pupils including 24 children who attend the nursery part time. 
Children in the nursery enter on a part-time basis after their third birthday. One hundred 
per cent of participants are of white ethnic origin and speak English at home. At this 
time (2006) sixteen per cent of pupils receive free school meals.  Twenty per cent of 
pupils are on the school’s register of special educational needs (SEN), which is in line 
with the national average. Two pupils have statements of SEN. Pupils representing the 
full range of abilities attend the school.  
 
The inspection concluded that children in the nursery and reception make good progress 
and achieve good standards, with no important shortcomings, in using the key skills of 
speaking, listening, reading, writing, numeracy and information and communications 
technology (ICT). Sixty-three per cent of lessons, pupils’ standards of achievement 
were judged to be grade 2 or above. This nearly matches the Welsh Assembly 
Government’s target for 2007 that 65 per cent of standards should be grade 2 or above.  
 
 
3.2 Experience at the school  
 
School one had two full time members of staff for the nursery and reception. The Head 
mistress was one of them. The staff and student numbers was small, with 89 children in 
all, and four members of staff.  The layout of the school was also small, with no extra 
classroom space for me to use. Therefore, I set up experiments in the central room 
which led to each of the three classrooms. Before the research began I met with the 
Head mistress to explain the experiments and what I wanted to do with the children. 
The headmistress introduced me to the children who told them that I would be coming 
in to school over the next week to play games with them. I was given a list of their 
names and ages. Over the next week I visited the school to get to know the children and 
learn their names. I played card games and board games with them so I was familiar to 
them once trials started.  
 
The location of the experiments in the school meant that I had to set up from scratch 
each day, and every break time and lunch time I had to dismantle the pendulum problem 
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for health and safety reasons. All children in the nursery and reception class were 
included in the experiments, but only 34 of the 39 children at the school were included 
in the final analysis. Session 1 took 5 days to complete from Monday to Friday. Session 
2, 30 weeks later also took 5 days. Three of the children I had collected data for in 
session 1 had left the school by session two, so their data could not be used.  
Since my time at school 1 was shorter than at school two I felt like a researcher. 
Although the school was very accommodating to my needs, my time with them was 
shorter and felt less intimate. The children treated me as if I was a researcher rather than 
a teacher. This was probably due to my lack of continuous contact with them. School 
two was a completely different experience because the school and teachers were 
familiar to me because I had carried out experiments for my undergraduate dissertation 
there. There were two full time members of staff; an LSA for the nursery and a qualified 
teacher for the reception class. Both members of staff were very friendly and 
accommodating, and provided me with my own room next door to the nursery and 
reception classroom. The pendulum problem took place in the school hall to allow me to 
have appropriate space to carry out the task effectively. Before I started I explained the 
basis of my research with both members of staff. They provided me with a list of 
children’s names and ages and introduced me to the class as a new member of staff.  
They informed me of the children that may not be suitable for the experiments due to 
specific learning difficulties. However, to ensure that no child felt excluded all children 
took part in the experiments, but only 30 children were included in the final analysis.    
 
It was decided that I would visit school two on a Monday so that I did not clash with 
other external teaching staff. However, on a number of occasions when children were 
absent on that day I would call the school to see if the child in question had returned, 
and visit later in the week at the school’s convenience. Only on two occasions during 
the 30 weeks did this not work out and I had to ensure that these children were seen 
twice (Monday and Thursday) in the following week.  
 
Before the experiments started I visited the school for a few weeks so the children could 
get use to me. I sat in their classroom and played with them and took part in their school 
activities inside the classroom and playground. This enabled me to learn all their names 
and them to believe that I was another member of staff. Children were use to external 
staff coming into the school once a week for reading and SEN, so they treated me as one 
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of those teachers.  When experiments began children were happy to come next door 
with me to the ‘games room’. I explained to the children before we started that the 
games were to help them in their classroom activities and help the teachers to create 
new ways of teaching them. All children enjoyed coming to the games room and were 
enthusiastic throughout the thirty weeks.     
 
Although the schools provided me with two completely different experiences, both were 
accommodating. My time at school one was shorter than at school two, so I felt like a 
researcher, whereas in school one because I was there for half of the academic year, I 
felt like a member of staff. At the end of my time at school two the children were going 
on a day trip and were one member of staff down. So, they asked would I accompany 
them. I was delighted and thought it was the least that I could do as they had been 
tremendous over the few months that I spent with them.  
 
 
3.3 Ethical consideration  
 
 
Informed consent was gained from every child's parent or guardian, Head teacher and 
classroom staff in both schools. All parents/guardians who received letters agreed for 
their children to take part in the research. I provided them with my contact details if 
they wanted more information other than that presented in the letter of consent. Parents 
and teachers were assured of that all details used in the writing and gathering of data 
would remain anonymous, any names would be changed. Since all experiments were 
recorded all parties were assured that the tapes would only be seen by the experimenter 
and a moderator and once the research was completed all tapes would be destroyed.   
 
The aim of the research was explained to the teachers and what I was trying to achieve. 
School two was very interested in the outcome of the results and asked could they 
incorporate any of the tasks I had used to help children’s problem solving in the 
classroom. I explained that if they thought that any child should be withdrawn from the 
study for whatever reason that this was their right.  Staff and parents were also given the 
choice if they wanted a copy of the results they could contact me and I would provide a 
summary of the results.  
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3.4 Rationale  
 
Analogy enables children to develop an understanding of abstract phenomena from 
concrete reference, which can benefit subsequent cognition. As children develop, 
analogy becomes more beneficial later on in their academic career with children often 
finding the learning of science to be an especially challenging task. At such an age 
children may not be developmentally ready to learn complex concepts, and often resort 
to rote learning individual instances rather than transferring understanding to other 
situations. Using analogies as explanatory devices can be a useful way to teach science 
(Glynn, 1997), and explain scientific concepts (Dagher, 1995). However, despite its 
popularity, analogy in the classroom remains a difficult phenomenon. Children are 
expected to understand the processes involved in analogy to enable them to use their 
previous experience and transfer information to a new problem. Often, children do not 
understand that they can use previous knowledge or they are unable to transfer the 
appropriate knowledge to the new situation. Therefore, pinpointing when children’s 
analogical ability first emerges would allow schools to emphasise the importance of 
analogy in learning, discovery and problem solving and encourage the introduction of 
analogy and learning by example earlier in the child’s school career, which would be 
beneficial to its use later on. 
 
Analogy continues to be an integral part of cognitive developmental research because it 
provides a way of reproducing past learning to solve novel problems which enables the 
development and application of existing memory structures. It seems natural in adults 
especially in situations requiring expertise, but much more difficult in younger children. 
This is because the application of transfer from old to new is something that develops 
over time.  Therefore, the use of analogy is often (prematurely) used in classroom 
learning situations to both increase the likelihood of future transfer in problem solving, 
and to monitor developmental progress of such a sophisticated cognitive skill (Goswami, 
1992).  
 
Research on analogical reasoning has considerable relevance for teachers and assistants 
working with the Foundation phase. The Foundation phase includes problem solving 
within the creative development section of art, craft and design. Here it states that 
children should be encouraged to use a variety of materials and objects for 
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experimentation and problem solving. The Foundation phase indicates that the 
curriculum framework includes the whole child and caters for the development their 
skills across the curriculum, building on their previous learning experiences, knowledge 
and skills; this is a key factor in children’s problem solving. However, they do not 
address problem solving as an important phase within the framework. They assume that 
this is implicit throughout the curriculum and underlies many of aspects of a child’s 
experiential activities during play. However, the Foundation phase does not include 
explicit, guided problem solving activities. Care needs to be taken that children are not 
simply left to create their own problem solving activities without adult guidance. The 
microgenetic framework has provided evidence that even the earliest institutional 
experiences need adult guidance, not just adult supervision. The present microgenetic 
study should support this assumption and provide clear evidence that with guidance and 
practice, children begin to use higher-order skills beyond their expected capabilities 
within the foundation phase.   
 
Previous research from Pine and Messer (2003) reported that children often develop 
‘naïve theories’ based on erroneous principles. In their block balancing tasks, they 
found that children were affected by previous knowledge/experience that all things 
balance in the middle, which often resulted in task failure. This notion of naïve theories 
can be applied to reasoning with analogy. The ideas within the theories can be counter 
intuitive and can hinder formal learning (Driver and Erickson, 1983). They also raise a 
number of questions regarding assessment, failure and educational intervention. For 
example, does the child understand a principle of a task just because they are successful 
in solving that task? If a child fails a task, is it because have a naïve theory and simply 
chooses an alternative strategy based on this erroneous knowledge? Finally, some 
children may possess a theory that is resistant to change. This is particularly relevant in 
analogical reasoning. A child might select a strategy that solves a problem, but this 
strategy may not be the analogous strategy. This would result in children being able to 
solve the problem, but not understand the concept of analogy.  
 
To ensure that children’s problem solving behaviour was monitored appropriately. 
Children’s alternative strategies were examined. Children’s knowledge was also 
monitored in relation to analogy and general problem solving abilities, with and without 
experience. Children’s strategy choices were followed over time to shed light on 
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strategy development and change.  It is hoped that the present thesis will go some way 
to providing teachers, educators and policy makers evidence that providing children are 
guided in their use of new skills, children are capable of abilities only thought to exist in 
older children. And since learning from experience plays a large role in the whole span 
of the school curriculum, it is hoped that learning through analogy will be placed in the 
foundation phase as a key skill that needs to be guided and scaffolded throughout the 
early years, so children can reap the rewards of this important skill.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Study 1 
 
4.1 - Classical Analogies  
 
 
The aim of the classical analogies is to confirm 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds’ use of analogy 
by examining their performance on classical analogies. Previous research with children 
of this age has found that they rely on surface similarity rather than relational similarity, 
and children’s use of relational similarity increases with age. Observing children within 
this age cohort should demonstrate important differences and transition points. 
Furthermore, since children are presented with the same tasks 30 weeks later, allows us 
to monitor changes in strategy use or a relational shift over a 6-month time frame. 
Observing children’s performance at two different points in time will also highlight 
within-child differences. Furthermore, children’s performance on classical analogies 
will be compared with their performance on problem analogies in study 2. This will also 
allow for the exploration of the role of access and inference in analogical reasoning 
tasks.  
 
The classical analogies require children to look at the relations in the a and b terms and 
then notice the relations in the c and d terms, then extract the higher-order relation to 
solve the task (shape change and pattern change). Children have a choice of five 
responses (d, e, f, g and h). These include responses based on higher-order relations, 
lower-order relations, surface similarity and irrelevant distractors.  
 
It is expected that 5-year-olds will perform better (select the correct response d) than 4-
year-olds, and 4-year-olds better than 3-year-olds. It is also predicted that 3-year-olds 
will perform to a similar degree in session two, as 4-year-olds in session one, and 4-
year-olds at a similar level as 5-year-olds, in session two.  As well as measuring 3-, 4- 
and 5-year-olds performance on classical analogies, study one examines if a relational 
shift exists. If this is the case, it is expected that children will initially show a preference 
for object-matching based on surface similarity, but by their second session, thirty 
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weeks later, each age group should show a shift towards relational similarity. It is 
expected that some 4- and 5-year-olds would already show an ability to use analogy in 
session one, but by session two, the majority of choices would reflect relational use, in 
particular, analogical use. Thus, 3-year-olds are expected to move away from surface 
similarity by session two and show a preference for relational similarity. Children’s 
strategy choices are explored and coded, so that they could be used and compared with 
their performance on the problem analogies in study 2.  
 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
Sixty-four 3.5- and 4- and 5-year-olds from schools one and two were observed on two 
separate occasions over a thirty week period. Children were placed into three age groups; 
seventeen 3-year-olds (Mean=43.5 months, Range = 40-47 months); thirty-two 4-year-
olds (Mean = 52.5 months, Range = 48-57 months) and fifteen 5-year-olds (Mean = 
61.5 months, Range = 58-65 months). There were 35 females and 29 males. The tasks 
were carried out in a quiet room at their schools. Each child received 8 classical card 
tasks at session one and the same 8 tasks thirty weeks later.   
 
 
 4.2.2 Materials and Procedure  
 
 
The eight classical problems were based on Goswami and Brown’s (1989) study where 
children were presented with a card game. The cards depicted various patterns, for 
example blue circle with balloon faces: blue square with balloon faces: blue circle with 
balloon faces and birds: blue square with balloon faces and birds. The cards were 
modified to include brightly coloured stickers to suit the younger children and make 
them more interesting. These included circles, squares, rectangles and diamonds of 
different colours that had a variety of stickers which included teddy bears, flowers, 
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hearts, dolphins, faces and birds to form the different patterns. The analogy can be seen, 
for example, in the ‘a:b’ pair, a circle and a square, both with a blue background, both 
containing balloon faces. The relations here are different shape (circle and square) and 
same pattern (both have balloon faces). To solve the analogy the child must combine the 
simple-relations to extract the relational similarity to map to the ‘c’ term (by comparing 
the ‘a’ term with the ‘c’ term). The shape remains a circle, but the pattern has changed 
to include birds. Therefore, the relational similarity is identity of pattern with shape 
change. The cards were placed on a board which was separated with two rectangles on 
each side. The rectangles on the left were numbered “1” and “2” those on the right “3” 
and “?”. The three cards were placed on the board. Children were told to look at the 
pretty patterns on the cards, the experimenter pointed to each card to ensure that the 
child looked at each of the cards. The child was then told the cards show a pattern and 
asked which card they thought was needed from the 5 choices on the table to complete 
the pretty pattern. The child then had to select the appropriate card to complete the 
sequence and place it on the “?”.  The child had a choice of five cards. The five choices 
presented to the child were: (D) correct shape, correct pattern –higher-order relation; (E) 
correct shape, wrong colour and pattern: lower-order relation; (F) wrong shape, correct 
colour and pattern: lower-order-relation (G) a repeat of B and (H) a repeat of C: object 
identity match (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3:  Diagrammatic Representation of the Classical Analogies  
                                                                      Pattern & shape change 
 
                                                        
                                   A      B                               C        D                
                                                                        
                                                     Same pattern & different shape                                                   Same pattern & different shape 
                                 
 
Distractor cards 
 
           E                                  F                                 G                                        H 
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4.2.3 Error Analysis   
 
 
Where the correct card was not chosen, the distractor cards allowed for choices at the 
following levels: 
  
Level 0:  Wrong shape, colour and pattern (card E in Figure 3).   
Relational complexity would predict that this distractor would be a very 
infrequent choice. 
Level 1:   A repeat of the b term from a:b part of the analogy item or a repeat of 
the c term from the c:d part of the analogy item (card G and H in Figure 
3). Relational shift would predict that Level 1 errors would decrease over 
time. 
Level 2:   Wrong shape, correct colour and pattern (card F in Figure 3).  
Reliance on appearance matching would be expected to decline across 
the ages according to Gentner’s relational shift hypothesis.   
 
According to Singer-Freeman (2005), one difficulty children are faced with in classical 
problems is a lack of understanding the goal structure. Therefore, to make sure that each 
child understood what was expected of them they were presented with 2 practice trials. 
Stimuli consisted of the same relations as those in the experimental trials, but the cards 
were black and white with stripes and dots, as opposed to brightly coloured cards and 
stickers. Children received feedback in the practice trials so they were aware when they 
had chosen the correct card. Children had a choice of 4 distractors in the practice trials: 
D. Correct shape, correct pattern; E. Correct shape, wrong pattern; F. Wrong shape, 
correct pattern; G. Wrong shape, wrong pattern. Following the two practice trials, 
children were presented with the eight experimental trials.  
 
 
4.3 Results 
 
The eight classical tasks were simple card tasks requiring children to choose the most 
appropriate card to complete the pattern.  Children's card choices were summed and the 
means are presented in tables 1-3.
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Table 1: Average Number of Correct Choices in Each Age Group at Session 1 and 
Session 2 (maximum possible = 8) 
 
________________________________________________ 
Session 1 Session 2______ 
3-year-olds (N=17) .82 (.951)  1.94 (1.6) 
4-year-olds (N=32) 1.16 (1.43)  2.22 (2.84) 
5-year-olds (N=15) 2.27 (1.48)  3.80 (1.42) 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average Number of Level 1 Errors in Each Age Group at Session 1 and 
Session 2 (maximum possible = 8)  
 
________________________________________________ 
Session 1 Session 2______ 
3-year-olds (N=17) 5.65 (2.42)  4.82 (2.40) 
4-year-olds (N=32) 3.66 (2.74)  3.31 (2.58) 
5-year-olds (N=15) 3.20 (2.33)  2.27 (1.48) 
_____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Average Number of Level 2 Errors in Each Age Group at Session 1 and 
Session 2 (maximum possible = 8)  
 
________________________________________________ 
Session 1 Session 2______ 
3-year-olds (N=17) 1.53 (2.06)  1.24 (1.64) 
4-year-olds (N=32) 3.19 (2.91)  2.47 (2.84) 
5-year-olds (N=15) 2.53 (2.58)  1.93 (2.43) 
_____________________________________________ 
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Overall, the most prevalent strategy used in both sessions was error strategies and not 
the correct choices. Children relied heavily on level 2 errors (48 per cent) followed by 
level 1 errors (28 per cent), with slightly less correct choices (24 per cent). These 
figures were explored by strategy and age over each of the sessions, and then both 
sessions were compared.  
 
Making Level 1 errors is interpreted by Goswami and Brown (1989) as a strategy of 
“object matching” rather than inferring a relation. Level 2 errors showed awareness of 
the requirement to choose a card which had not already been presented, but failure to 
infer the relation.  One way of interpreting Level 2 errors is that the training with black 
and white cards had been effective, thus children knew what was expected, but failed to 
infer the correct relation. 
 
 
 4.3.1 Session one results 
 
 
The most prevalent strategy choice overall in session one was the level 1 error (52 per 
cent) followed by level 2 error (31per cent) and then correct choice (17 per cent). A chi 
square analysis revealed significant differences between the strategy choices χ2(2, N = 
64) = 27.930; p<.05. Since the preferred strategy was the level 1 error, this indicates 
that 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds were relying on surface similarity and not relational 
similarity.   
 
To examine differences by age group, a chi-square was carried out. Overall age 
differences revealed a significant difference across age group and strategy χ2(4, N = 64) 
= 25.434; p<.05. To explore age differences on each strategy, three separate chi-square 
analyses were carried out. Results revealed significant differences between 3-, 4- and 5-
year-olds for all three strategy choices; correct choices χ2(2, N = 64) = 11.871; p<.05; 
level 2 errors χ2(2, N = 64) = 8.330; p<.05 and level 1 errors χ2(2, N = 64) = 20.795; 
p<.05. Percentages reveal that 5-year-olds chose correct choices significantly more than 
4- and 3-year-olds (28 per cent, 15 per cent and 10 percent, respectively). Although all 
three age groups chose the level 1 error strategy more than any other strategy, 3-year-
olds chose it significantly more than 4- and 5-year-olds, χ2(2, N = 64) = 20.795; p<.05. 
 57 
Four- and five-year-olds chose level 2 errors to a similar degree compared to 3-year-
olds. This suggests that at 4-years of age, children are beginning to use relational 
knowledge, whereas 3-year-olds continued to rely on surface similarity.  
 
 
 4.3.2 Session two results 
 
 
The most prevalent strategy choice overall in session two was the level 1 error (43 per 
cent) followed by correct choices (32 per cent) and level 2 errors (25 per cent). A chi 
square analysis on the overall strategy choices mentioned above revealed a significant 
difference χ2(2, N = 64) = 27.410; p<.05. Table 1 reveals that 5-year-olds chose more 
correct choices than 4- and 3-year-olds (48 per cent, 28 per cent and 24 per cent, 
respectively) whereas, 3- and 4-year-olds still preferred the level 1 error strategy (60 per 
cent and 41 per cent, respectively).  
 
Overall age differences revealed a significant difference across age group and strategy 
χ2(4, N = 64)  = 26.727; p<.05. To explore age differences across each strategy, three 
separate chi-square analyses were carried out. Results revealed significant differences 
between 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds for all three strategy choices; correct choice χ2(2, N = 
64) = 14.880; p<.05; level 2 errors χ2(2, N = 64) = 6.237; p<.05 and level 1 error χ2(2, 
N = 64) = 21.134; p<.05. Three- and four-year-olds choice of the level 1 error strategy 
was still the dominant choice however, 5-year-olds preferred analogy over any other 
strategy choice χ2(2, N = 64) = 14.880; p<.05. Four-year-olds chose the three strategies 
to a similar degree, whereas 3-year-olds chose significantly more object matches than 
any other strategy χ2(2, N = 64) = 49.440; p<.05. This suggests that almost half of all 5-
year-olds were choosing the correct choice.  
 
 
 4.3.3 Comparison across sessions one and two 
 
 
In session one, children’s performance with correct choices was low; with only 17 per 
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cent of choices consisting of correct choices. However, this increased by 15 per cent to 
32 per cent in session two. This increase occurred across all three age groups; 3-year-
olds performance with correct choices was significantly different from session one to 
session two (10 per cent to 24 per cent, respectively), χ2(1, N = 17) = 6.945; p<.05. 
Four-year-olds use of correct choices also increased from session one to session two (15 
per cent to 28 per cent, respectively), χ2(1, N = 32) = 5.007; p<.05. This suggests that 
children improved in their use of correct choices over the 30 week period. Five-year-
olds showed the largest increase in correct choices (20 per cent) in session two χ2(1, N = 
15) = 8.489; p<.05. 
 
Table 2 illustrates a decrease in 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds use of level 1 errors and level 2 
errors across sessions. However, the most significant changes occurred in their use of 
correct choices (table 1) which showed an increase in session two, suggesting that over 
time children’s reliance on relational similarity significantly improved. The decrease in 
level 2 errors and increase in correct choices in session two, compared to session one, 
indicates that children may have recognized the need for relational similarity. Here 
children took their reasoning one step further by not simply relying on one aspect of the 
task (the a:b terms), but taking into account the c:d terms to create the appropriate 
correct choice. This could be explained in terms of maturation (children being 6 months 
older), and children’s understanding that all terms need to be included to complete the 
pattern. 
 
It was predicted that 3-year-olds would perform to a similar degree in session two as 4-
year-olds in session one. Similarly, 4-year-olds would perform to a similar degree in 
session two as 5-year-olds in session one. The figures reveal this was only the case for 
4-year-olds in session two (28 per cent) and 5-year-olds (28 per cent) in session one. 
This suggests because 4-year-olds are now 5-year-olds, that 5-year-olds perform at this 
level with tasks of this kind. Interestingly, 3-year-olds chose more correct choices in 
session two (24 per cent) than 4-year-olds in session one (15 per cent). However, the 
difference was not significant χ2(1, N = 64) = 2.580; p>.05. The results show that, as 
with 4- and 5-year-olds, 3-year-olds chose correct choices to a similar degree in session 
two as 4-year-olds in session one.  
  
 59 
It was expected that the majority of 5-year-olds would move away from a reliance on 
surface similarity to relational similarity in session two. This was the case. By session 
two, 5-year-olds increased their reliance on relational similarity (level 2 errors and 
correct choices) to the extent that this was the preferred choice (72 per cent). This 
suggests that over the thirty week period, 5-year-olds dominant strategy was relational 
similarity. That is, children’s solution of the classical tasks included the understanding 
of relational similarity, and not basic surface similarity.      
 
 
4.4 Discussion  
 
 
The results showed that children as young as 3 years of age were able to solve classical 
analogies using simple patterns. In session one, 3-and 4-year-olds’ choice of correct 
choices was low, they preferred level 1 errors and level 2 errors. Although 5-year-olds 
chose significantly more correct choices than 3- and 4-year-olds, only just over a quarter 
of their responses were correct. As predicted, 3- and 4-year-olds chose a similar amount 
of correct choices across both sessions (around a quarter), and their use of correct 
choices increased significantly from session one to session two. This highlights 
maturation of relational similarity for the 3-, and 4-year-olds over the 30 week period. 
Children’s performance with correct choices improved significantly in each of the age 
groups by session two. The biggest increase was made in 5-year-olds, where they were 
solving almost half of all analogies using correct choices. However, children’s choice of 
this strategy was considerably lower than children in previous studies (Goswami and 
Brown, 1989 and Singer-Freeman, 2005). For example, children in the present study did 
not perform as well as those in Goswami and Brown’s (1989) study. They found 3-year-
olds solved around half of all analogies using correct choices, and 4-and 6-year-olds 
solved almost two-thirds of analogies successfully.   
 
Gentner’s (1989) theory indicates that children rely on surface features (level 1 errors) 
significantly more than the level 2 errors or correct choices.  The present study found 
that 3-year-olds performed more in line with Gentner’s theory with a preference for 
level 1 errors. Four-year-olds performed more in line with Goswami and Brown’s 
suggestion, in that they used level 2 errors and level 1 errors to a similar degree. By the 
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age of 5-years, children moved away from these lower-order preferences to rely on 
relational similarity. Five-year-olds chose significantly more correct choices than three- 
and four-year-olds in both sessions. The difference in strategies over age indicates the 
presence of a relational shift with age, with children initially relying on surface 
similarity then relational similarity (lower-order) then higher-order relations.  
 
Children’s performance with correct choices may support Singer-Freeman’s suggestion 
that children could either be failing to complete the pattern correctly, because they did 
not possess the appropriate relational knowledge, or because of a failure to infer the 
relations across the terms. It is likely that children in the present study were affected by 
an inability to infer relations and not due to a lack of relational knowledge. Relational 
knowledge was assumed to be part of children’s conceptual knowledge because they 
were simple patterns and shapes. Inference meant that children in the a:b terms and use 
them to complete the pattern. However, children in the present study were distracted by 
the object-match distractors. This supports Gentner and Ratterman’s suggestion that 
even when children possess the knowledge of relations, they do not infer the relations to 
complete a problem, but rely instead on surface similarity at the expense of relational 
similarity. This has implications for children’s ability to infer relations in tasks of this 
kind. Therefore, future research could reduce the surface similarity of card c, but as 
previous research has found, this would provide further difficulties for children. It 
seems that without a hint preschool children are influenced by object matches, even on 
simple pattern/shape change analogies. Therefore, future research needs to provide 
children with training on classical analogies that can teach then to inhibit their reliance 
on surface similarity.  
 
The prediction that children would initially show a preference for surface similarity and 
lower-order relations (level 1 and 2 errors) in session one and move to relational 
similarity (correct choices) in session 2 was supported to a degree. This was particularly 
the case with 3- and 4-year-olds. However, whilst children’s reliance on surface 
similarity decreased and relational similarity increased in session two, 3- and 4-year-
olds still chose more surface similarity strategies overall. This is in line with Gentner’s 
(1989) suggestion that children will rely on surface similarity before relational 
similarity. Five-year-olds significant increase in their use of correct choices in session 
two supports Gentner and ratterman’s (1991) relational shift in that they were relying on 
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relational similarity over surface similarity.  
 
An important consideration in the younger children’s inability to move away from the 
level 1 error is feedback. If children chose the incorrect card there was no explicit 
feedback to suggest that they had chosen incorrectly, because they simply place the card 
on the board to complete the sequence. Therefore, children may continue to use the 
same incorrect strategy on subsequent attempts, assuming that they are correct. This 
may have some affect on children’s ability to show a relational- or any kind of shift in 
strategy use because they believe that the card chosen has completed the sequence 
therefore see no reason to change their first choice. Thus, future research may introduce 
feedback (positive and negative) to classical analogies.  
 
If performance with analogy is a result of age then was expected that 3-year-olds would 
perform on a similar level in session two, as 4-year-olds in session one, and 4-year-olds 
in session two would perform to a similar degree as 5-year-olds in session one.  
Although there were differences between 3- and 4-year-olds, the differences were not 
significant. Also, 4- and 5-year-olds selection of correct choices was exactly the same 
across sessions one and two. This indicates that 4.5 to 5-years of age is an important 
transition period in the use of analogy. Future research would benefit from 
concentrating on children of this age over a long period of time to see when children’s 
analogy develops.   
 
An alternative explanation for the improvement observed from session one to session 
two between the different age groups is a practice effect. Children may have 
remembered the tasks, and with practice (now 16 trials) were able to understand the 
pattern, and therefore selected the correct response accordingly. However, this was 
unlikely as 6 months had passed, and when asked if they could remember the task from 
their previous attempt, all but three children, said they could not.  
 
In spite of children’s improvement with relational similarity over the 30 week period, 
their reliance on surface similarity remained the dominant strategy in 3- and 4-year-olds, 
and only by the age of 5-years did analogy become the dominant strategy. However, 
this was only in half of all 5-year-olds, the other half were relying on level 2 errors and 
the level 1 error strategy, suggesting that the ability to reason with analogy although 
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present in children of this age is not part of a 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old’s repertoire 
consistent strategies and its use is unstable.  
 
In summary, since the most frequent choice overall was the level 1 error, suggests the 
majority of children were failing to take the a:b part of the analogy into account. These 
findings are in line with Gentner’s (1989) suggestion that children will rely on surface 
similarity before relational similarity and supports Gentner and Ratterman’s (1991) shift 
between children of 4-and 5-years of age. This was supported in that the 5-year-olds in 
this study moved away from surface similarity toward relational similarity on their 
second attempt 30 weeks later. Therefore, it can be concluded that 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds 
in the present study with classical analogies were able to use analogy, but this was not 
always the preferred strategy. Five-year-olds chose the correct choice more than both 3- 
and 4-year-olds. The findings confirm previous research that suggests analogy is present 
in pre-school children, but they face a number of obstacles. Obstacles include relational 
inference and feedback from the incorrect choice. If children were told their choice was 
incorrect, maybe they would choose another strategy which would lead them to the 
correct solution. Therefore, future research could provide multiple trials to allow 
children to explore additional card solutions.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Study 2  
 
 
5.1 Problem Analogies - Session 1 
 
 
The results from the classical analogy tasks supported previous research (Goswami and 
Brown, 1989, 1991) that suggests some pre-school children can, in fact, solve classical 
analogy tasks using analogy. However, this was not the most common strategy used. 
Overall, children preferred level 1 errors which supports Gentner’s (1989) suggestion 
that children rely on surface similarity before relational similarity. The results confirm 
previous explanations that suggest classical analogies may be too difficult for pre-
school children due to difficulty in inferring relations. The following study presents 
children with a set of problem analogies based on the same strategy choices in study 1.  
 
Study 1 concluded that children’s difficulty with analogy in classical analogies may 
have been as a result of inference (Singer-Freeman, 2005). This led children to choose 
alternative strategies. However, these strategy choices were not selected at random. If 
they were, children would have selected level 1 and level 2 errors equally. Children did 
not; they preferred the object match (level 1 error) based on surface similarity. By 
session 2 children began to move away from surface similarity to relational similarity, 
which suggests a shift in their ability to use relational similarity. However, in spite of 
children performing better with analogy in session two, performance was still low.  
 
Study 2 presented problem analogies to the same group of 3-year-olds and seventeen of 
the 4-year-olds used in study 1, from school one. Analogies were presented in video 
format so children could benefit from real-life action based analogues. As well as 
examining 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance with analogy and alternative strategies, 
study 2 compares children’s strategy choices with their choices in study 1. Comparing 
performance should tell us more about the issues of inference and access. Based on 
Singer-Freeman’s findings (2005), it was expected that children’s performance with 
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problem analogies would be better than their performance with classical analogies; that 
is, they would choose more correct choices due to the fact that they do not need to infer 
the relations because they are already presented in the base problem (one less cognitive 
process). If this is the case then it can be concluded that children find inferring relations 
difficult. However, if children find problem analogies more difficult than classical 
analogies, evidenced in poor performance with analogy, then it can be concluded that 
children find accessing relations more difficult than inferring relations.  Children were 
presented with six tasks at week 1 and the same tasks at week 30, six months later. 
Children’s results from both sessions were explored individually and later compared 
across session and with their performance on the classical analogies. It is expected that 
children’s use of analogy would increase over session 1 and 2 in problem analogies. If 
strategy choices are similar across problem- and classical-analogies then it can be 
concluded that children use similar strategies on both types of analogy, and problem 
analogies and classical analogies require the same analogical reasoning skills.  
 
As in study 1, the existence of a relational shift was also monitored across session 1 and 
2. Since Gentner and Ratterman’s (1989) original studies were based on problem 
analogies – it was hoped that the use of simple problem analogies would reveal a 
relational shift in 3- and 4-year-olds. Another aim of study 1 comes from the 
introduction of a pre- and post-task that was not presented in the classical analogies. 
The pre-task involved asking children to describe what occurred in the base problem to 
represent the initial goal, solution path and goal state, and the post task required 
children to explain their strategy choices.  
 
Previous research has indicated that the initial [encoding] stage is essential if children 
are to be successful in their solution of an analogous problem.  Following results from a 
number of studies (Mandler, 1992; Spencer and Schutte, 2004), it was expected that 
children in the present study would have the ability to represent the base problem. 
Furthermore, providing children can access this information, this should have a positive 
effect on children’s ability to transfer the relations to the target problem. According to 
Chen and Daehler (1992) representations increase positive transfer and decrease the 
probability of negative transfer. Therefore, if children can represent the base problem, 
but not solve the target problem this may suggest that children are not accessing the 
relations. However, if they can represent the problem and solve the target problem, then 
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this indicates they are able to use their representations of the base problem to solve the 
analogous target problem. Children’s representational ability was monitored and 
examined in relation to its influence on analogical reasoning.  
 
The post task involved asking children why they had chosen their particular strategy.  It 
has been suggested that when children offer an explanation of their own actions, it 
encourages them to reflect on their behaviour which can only help on subsequent 
attempts (Siegler, 1989). According to Siegler (1989) reflection helps children stop and 
think about their actions, and often causes them to alter their behaviour accordingly. 
Therefore, any change in object choice on subsequent problems may occur due to such 
reflection. Cheshire, Ball and Lewis (2005) demonstrated that self-explanation was 
positively associated with analogical development. Cheshire et al. (2005) suggested that 
self-explanation supports on-line meta-cognitive processing which guides children to 
focus on the goal of the task. Children’s ability to reflect on their choices was examined. 
 
To examine the effect of relational difficulty, tasks in the problem analogies were 
placed into 2 types of problems: problems needing an auxiliary task and problems 
without an auxiliary task. Children were presented with 3 of each types; six in total. 
Tasks with an auxiliary task required children to both select and create an analogy based 
object with adaptation, for example, rolling up paper to create a tube-like transportation 
object, so were relationally difficult for children. The problems without an auxiliary 
task simply required children to select an object to solve the target problem (see 
appendix 1 for the 6 problem analogies). 
 
Unlike previous research with analogy study 2 did not present children with an explicit 
hint. The relations were made explicit across the base and the target problem. For 
example, something is out of reach and a long hooked object is used to retrieve the item. 
The children had to notice the relations in the base problem in order to use the same 
relations in the target problem. If children were able to recognize the relations in the 
base- and target-problem, then this should lead to children to select the analogy based 
object with adaptation. If not, as in study 1, children would choose objects based on 
level 0, level 1 or level 2 errors. All strategy choices were examined.  
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It was expected that children would perform better in the tasks without auxiliary task 
compared to those that need an auxiliary task, in line with Holyoak et al (1984), because 
of the added notion of requiring an auxiliary task (to create an appropriate object based 
on analogy). Since previous research has suggested that representation improves with 
age it was also expected that 4-year-olds would represent more base problems than 3-
year-olds, and both age groups’ representational ability should increase over session.  
 
The presentation of the problems requiring an auxiliary task and no auxiliary task was 
counterbalanced to neutralise practice effects and effects of fatigue. It was expected that 
children would perform better on the problems needing an auxiliary task when 
presented with problems without an auxiliary task first, because receiving the problems 
needing an auxiliary tasks first provides less opportunity for transfer. Problems without 
an auxiliary task should allow progressive alignment of relations, meaning that children 
will perform well over trials due to practice, simply getting used to what they have to do, 
a form of “learning to learn effects” (Brown and Kane, 1988).  
 
To ensure that choosing the analogy based object with adaptation was a measurement 
for children’s ability to access relational knowledge from the base problem, half of the 
children were placed into a control condition. Those in the control condition did not 
receive the base problem, but received the same target problem of object selection. It 
was expected that some children in the control would be able to solve the problem 
despite not receiving the video analogue in the problems requiring no auxiliary task 
because the relations should be familiar to 3- and 4-year-olds. However, it was 
predicted that children would choose more analogous strategies in the video condition 
than in the control condition because they had been exposed to the analogous base 
problem, particularly, in problems needing an auxiliary task. However, if children 
choose the analogy based object with adaptation equally across both conditions it can be 
agreed that children did not require a base analogue for the tasks and children simply 
chose the most appropriate object for the job regardless of the presence of a base 
analogue. A difference was expected across problem type, however. Problems needing 
an auxiliary task should present children with extra difficulty in choosing the analogy 
based object with adaptation which may result in alternative object choice. Age 
differences were also explored in relation to the differences across condition. Since 4-
year-olds performed better with analogy than 3-year-olds on the classical analogies, it 
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was expected that 4-year-olds would outperform 3-year-olds performance with analogy. 
A difference in performance was also expected across session, in that session two will 
include significantly more analogical responses than session one. 
 
Finally, it was expected that those in the video condition would be more likely to 
provide analogical feedback in the post-task interview. That is, those in the video 
condition are more likely to explain their strategy choices in relation to the video 
analogue, whereas children in the control condition are more likely to rely on 
perceptual-based answers, based on the perceptual aspects of their chosen object, 
because they have no video to refer to (providing, of course, that children use analogy 
based object with adaptations). 
 
To recap, study 2 aims to examine 3- and 4-year-olds strategy choices during a set of 6 
problem analogies. As well as comparing children’s performance with classical 
analogies in study 1, it also explores the effect of access and inference on analogical 
reasoning. Since classical and problem analogies have strengths and weaknesses in 
these processes, children’s performance across the two will be compared. Furthermore, 
children’s strategy choices will be compared across session one and two to monitor the 
existence of a relational shift. Finally, the problem analogies will explore the effect of 
representation and feedback on children’s ability to access the information from the 
base- to solve the target problem.  
 
 
5.2 Methodology  
 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
Thirty-four, 3- and 4-year-old children from school one completed the problem tasks to 
allow later comparisons across each experiment. Children were randomly allocated to 
one of two conditions, with 17 children in each; control (no video) and video condition. 
This eliminated any confounding variables that may have arisen from using children 
from different schools.  
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5.2.2 Materials and procedure 
 
The stories within the analogues were based on similar solution principles to those used 
in previous research (Brown, Kane and Echols, 1986; Brown and Kane, 1988; Holyoak, 
Junn and Billman, 1984): hooking and dragging, rolling up, combining two items and 
transporting. Other relations included gripping and swinging (see appendix for all six 
problem analogies).  
 
The materials consisted of 6 problem analogies made up of 6 base problem video 
analogues and 6 real life target problems, a set of 6 objects per task, a laptop displaying 
the video analogues, a stop watch and video recorder. All trials were recorded onto 
blank tapes for later analysis. The six video analogues and target problems were based 
on the same principles, in that something was out of reach and needed to be retrieved or 
something needed to be transferred to another location that was out of reach. Each video 
analogue lasted approximately 3 minutes. After video presentation children in the video 
condition were given a real-life action problem to solve. Children were then presented 
with the target problem and encouraged to select an object, they had 150 seconds to 
solve the problem. This was the standard time given to children in previous problem 
solving tasks (i.e., Brown, 1989). The relationship between the base and target problem 
was not made explicit, that is children were not given a hint that they should use the 
information in the video to solve the problem. It was hoped that children would access 
this information spontaneously, or by means of implicit cues presented in the video and 
object choice and transfer it to the target problem to allow successful solution using 
analogy.   
 
Children in the control condition received the same target problems as those in the 
video condition, but no video presentation or any other form of base problem. The 
control condition was used to determine children’s ability to solve the problem without 
prior relational knowledge from the video analogue, but just practice with the problem 
itself. Children received six consecutive analogues at session one and six at session two, 
thirty weeks later. Children in the video condition received six consecutive analogues at 
session one and six at session two, thirty weeks later. This group’s performance was 
monitored for their ability to use the information from the base to solve the target 
problem and to assess any alternative strategy use.  
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Children in the video condition were asked to watch the video carefully no further 
instructions were given in relation to the video. Once children had watched the video 
they were tested on their representational ability. Children were asked to explain what 
they saw occurring in the video display. Their ability to form a representation of the 
base problem was then recorded and analysed to see if children had understood the 
relations in the base problem and this was later used to see if children had transferred 
this knowledge to solve the target problem. The children’s descriptions needed to 
include the scenario, problem and solution to reveal a full representation of the video 
content.  
 
Any aspect of the video analogue which the child failed to express was prompted to see 
if they had included all the information. For example if they had not mentioned the 
problem they were asked “what problem is the lady in the video faced with?”, their 
answers were subsequently coded. Children’s responses were coded on a level from 0-2. 
Children who gave no response or irrelevant information were level 0 responses, if 
children were able to obtain information regarding the actor’s solution- or problem -
only they were level 1 responses, those able to access both components from the video 
were level 2 responses. It was expected that most children would show an ability to 
form a representation of the base, again with four-year-olds out performing three-year-
olds. Children's ability to form a representation of the base problem should predict their 
success on the target problem solution.  
 
Following their description children were then presented with the target problem and 
told that they were going to play a game. For example, in task one, children were told 
that they had to retrieve the toy that was placed on the table out of reach. They must 
remain sitting on the seat at all times and they could use anything to help them on the 
table. As in the classical task, children in the problem analogies received no explicit 
feedback during or after the problem. However, children gained implicit feedback if 
they were able to solve the problem successfully. The same instructions were given to 
those in the control condition. 
 
Success with analogy in the target problem required the child to select an object from 
the table that had the same perceptual attributes and function as the object used in the 
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video. The child's action and selection of object was recorded. Children were also asked 
after the problem why they had selected the object and how they came to choose the 
object and solution.  The purpose of the post-task interview was to collect verbal 
statements to back up their actions and find out the rationale behind their choice of 
object and solution. This ensures that their choice was not a guess and to examine 
whether they had used the base problem to help solve the target problem. It was 
uncertain if children would use an analogical description in their post-task explanation. 
Therefore, explanations were explored both separately and overall in relation to all three 
aspects of the task (explanation of base problem, strategy choice during target problem 
and explanation of object choice). For example, if children were able to form a 
representation of what happened in the video and apply relational similarity across the 
problems then they should be able to solve the analogous problem. Alternatively, 
children may reveal an adequate representation of the base problem and may be able to 
see the relationship between the video actions and the problem at hand (i.e., the actor is 
unable to reach something, so they must use a long hooked object to enable retrieval), 
but still fail to solve the problem. This difficulty could lie in a number of performance 
factors relating to the complexity of analogical mapping, for example, difficulty in the 
transfer or access of knowledge, or that children are not aware what is expected of them, 
they may not realise that they need to seek relational similarities. These possibilities are 
discussed in relation to the results. 
 
Figure 4 depicts an example of a task without an auxiliary task (toy retrieval task) using 
the same format as the traditional classical analogies. This highlights the similarity in 
strategy choice across terms a:b::c:d.  
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Figure 4:  An Example of a Problem Analogy as Presented to those in the Video Condition   
 
                            Base problem              Target problem 
 
            Enables retrieval   
                                               
                                                      
                                     
             Problem (out of reach)                 Problem (out of reach)    
  & solution (long/hooked object)                                    & solution (long/hooked object) 
 
 
E                      F                         G                  H                      I 
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Appendix 1 has diagrams which summarise the six problems – a “snake” problem, a 
“gripper” problem, a “toy” problem, a “stick” problem, a “pendulum” problem, and a 
“roll up” problem (the last three problems included an auxiliary task that required 
children to create an object).  The diagrams have a column summarising what the 
children saw on a video.  They watched a video of a person following a solution path to 
solve a problem (the base problem).  The mapping of that solution path on to the 
solution path of the corresponding target problem is represented by the alignment of the 
columns. The toy problem was an instance of a problem which did not include an 
auxiliary task.  The children watched a video of an old woman faced with the problem 
of retrieving her scarf.  Her scarf was out of reach.  The solution path she followed was 
to use her umbrella as a hook to drag the scarf nearer.  After watching the video, the 
children attempted to retrieve a plastic toy which had been placed on a table out of reach.  
The children could see six objects which they could consider for use as a resource to 
reach the toy.  The first step towards satisfying all the solution criteria would be to map 
one of the six objects (a long hooked water pistol) on to the umbrella in children’s 
memory of the base problem.  Children who satisfied all the solution criteria took this 
step and then turned the pistol round to use it as a hook just like the way the old lady 
had held her umbrella with the handle furthest from her for use as a hook.   So they not 
only mapped the water pistol on to the umbrella, but also adapted it to meet more 
solution criteria (both hooking and dragging) for attaining success.   
 
In problems with an auxiliary task, both mapping from the video to the target problem 
and adapting the analogy based object involved further encoding and adapting.  In the 
roll up task, for instance, rolling a car mat had to be encoded as a way of making a 
transportation object on the path to solving a problem.  Then, for the target problem, 
children had to remember what they encoded about the use of the car mat and make the 
mapping from the car mat to a sheet of paper.  Adaptation of the sheet of paper meant 
rolling it into a tube, not just turning it round (see further in Appendix 1). 
 
Of the six objects provided for each problem, five were distractors as far as adaptation 
was concerned.  Choosing them would obstruct any path towards satisfying solution 
criteria for the problem.  Their status as distractors was similar to the kinds of distractor 
devised for classical analogy problems. The way distractors can lead to obstruction or 
deviation from a solution path is summarised in figure 5.
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Figure 5:  Categorising Children’s Attempts at the Toy Problem 
 
 
Toy Problem Relation between choice of object and criteria for analogy based solutions 
       
Solution criteria 
met Long hooked water pistol Long stick 
 
Short toy golf 
club 
Scarf 
 
Same toy as toy 
out of reach 
Plate 
       
Choosing an 
object 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Remembering the 
video 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Maybe Maybe 
Mapping length 
 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Mapping shape 
 
Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
Adapting the 
object 
 
Yes (handle 
as a hook) 
No (handle for 
holding) 
No No No No No 
Category of 
attempt 
Analogy 
based 
choosing and 
adapting 
Analogy based 
choosing but 
not adapting 
Choosing 
optimally for 
length but not 
shape 
Choosing 
optimally for 
shape but not 
for length 
Choosing at level 1 Choosing at level 0 
 
Note: the object used in the base problem was an umbrella which the person adapted for hooking and reaching by turning it round 
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During the experimental sessions an alternative strategy was created by the children in 
both conditions. Here children selected the analogy based object with adaptation, but 
did not use it analogically to solve the problem. Therefore, children chose the correct 
object, but failed to adapt the object analogically (they failed to use the relational 
knowledge presented to them in the base problem). For example, in the toy retrieval 
problem, children selected the water pistol but turned it around to hold the handle rather 
than using the handle as the hook/drag function. Although children still managed to 
solve the problem using this strategy they took almost twice as long to retrieve the toy. 
This strategy choice was assigned a category in itself as it did not fit the criteria for the 
analogy based object with adaptation or any level errors. Since this strategy included the 
analogy based object, but failure to adapt the object, K is referred to as analogy based 
object but without adaptation. 
 
Children’s post descriptions were coded to assess children’s choice of object and 
attempt at solution. Children’s level 0 for no response, irrelevant information, and 
preference centred (liked it), because the responses were not related to the video in any 
way; those who expressed perceptual preference such as it was the biggest/longest/hole 
through it – level 1 response. Children who expressed that something needed to, for 
example, go through the long pipe to reach (goal-oriented), or mentioned the video, but 
not the relations, were level 2 responses. Children who mentioned the actor or the 
objects in the video, but did not mention that they used this information were level 3 
errors (implicit analogy). Finally, level 4 responses - when a child explained that they 
had used the information in the video to solve the problem and they understood the 
relationship between the target and base problem (analogy).  
 
 
5.3 Results  
 
Table 4 presents children’s strategy choices across age group and condition. The figures 
reveal almost identical patterns of problem solving behaviour across condition and age. 
The similar performance on all strategies suggests that 3- and 4-year-olds use similar 
strategies to solve problem analogies regardless of whether or not they received a base 
analogue and show no preference for one strategy over another. Children did not select 
level 0 errors. Therefore, they are not included in analysis/tables. 
 75 
 
 
 
Table 4: Strategy Choices by Age and Condition 
 
 
                                   3-year-olds                4-year-olds 
 
Strategy                                    Video          Control           Video         Control  
 
No solution attempt      19    22                24             13     
Level 1 errors         2             6                    4              6 
Level 2 errors       27                30                 24            31 
Analogy based object without adaptation    25                27                 24            31 
Analogy based object with adaptation    27          15                 24              19   
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Table 4 reveals some differences in three-year-olds performance between the video and 
control condition. Three-year-olds who received the video were using the analogy based 
object with adaptation more than those who had not received the video analogue (27 per 
cent and 15 per cent, respectively). To explore age differences a chi square analysis was 
carried out. It revealed a significant difference in 3-year-olds choice of the analogy 
based object with adaptation between the video and control condition χ2(1, N = 17) = 
2.622; p<.05. This suggests that 3-year-olds need and use the action relation in the base 
problem to enable them to solve the problem using the most appropriate strategy (the 
analogy based object with adaptation).  The same percentage of 3-year-olds in the 
control condition (27 per cent) selected an analogy based object without adaptation 
because they did not receive the base problem. Children understood that the problem 
needed a long item to retrieve something out of reach. The fact that children in the video 
condition showed a similar percentage suggests that children from both conditions did 
not choose their objects based on relational similarity. The preference of 3-year-olds, in 
the control condition for analogy based object but without adaptation and level 2 errors 
(above the analogy based object with adaptation) indicates that they were relying on 
strategies based on lower-order relations. A similar pattern occurred in the four-year-
olds video- and control- conditions (24 per cent and 19 per cent, respectively), but a chi 
square revealed no significant difference χ2(1, N = 17) = .477; p>.05. A chi square 
analysis was carried out to compare the difference between 3- and 4-year-olds use of the 
analogy based object with adaptation χ2(1, N = 17) = .139; p>.05, no significant 
difference was found. Similarly, no significance was found between 3- and 4-year olds 
choice of the analogy based object with adaptation in the control condition χ2(1, N = 17) 
= .565; p>.05. 
 
Table 4 revealed very little difference in 4-year-olds selection of the analogy based 
object but without adaptation strategy between the video and control conditions (24 per 
cent and 31 per cent) 2(1, N = 17) = 1.220; p>.05. Similarly, differences between age 
and condition for the level 2 errors failed to reach significance. This suggests that 3- and 
4-year-olds chose level 2 errors to a similar degree regardless of whether or not they 
received the base problem, and since children’s strategy choices, in the video condition, 
were similar for both 3- and 4-year-olds suggests that children of this age do not show a 
preference for any particular strategies over another.  
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Four-year-olds in the video condition chose no attempt response significantly more than 
those in the control   χ2(1, N = 9) = 3.995; p<.05. It is not clear why those who had 
received the base problem chose not to make any attempt at selecting an object to solve 
the problem. One explanation could be that they may have realised that they could not 
reach the item and saw no point in selecting an object to help them solve the problem. 
However, this does not explain why more children made this assumption in the video 
compared to the control condition. Children’s low choice of the analogy based object 
with adaptation may have been a result of the use of problems needing an auxiliary task. 
The effect of an auxiliary task was explored next. Table 5 presents children’s choices by 
age, condition and presence of auxiliary task  
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Table 5: The Percentage of Children’s Strategic Choices by Age and Condition and Problem Type 
 
 
     
                        Without auxiliary task                           Auxiliary task 
 
             3-year-olds           4-year-olds          3-year-olds                  4-year-olds 
 
Strategy            Video     Control         Video     Control_ __ Video    Control        Video     Control______ 
 
No solution attempt              4           19  18           4          33         26          30 21 
Level 1 error               0             0    0         0            4 11            7 12.5  
Level 2 errors                        13            7  15   13          42 52          19 50  
Analogy based object without adaptation   33           44  30   50               17 11                 33 12.5 
Analogy based object with adaptation        50  30    37          33            4    0          11   4 
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Table 5 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds, in both the video and the control conditions 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the problems without an 
auxiliary task than in those needing an auxiliary task.  Also a significant difference 
was found in the children’s choice of the analogy based object with adaptation 
between 3- and 4-year-olds in the video condition on the problems without an 
auxiliary task (50 per cent and 37 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 17) = 3.438; p<.05. 
This difference suggests that 3-year-olds are performing better with the analogy based 
object with adaptation than 4-year-olds. It may be that 4-year-olds do not rely on the 
video for the problems without an auxiliary task, but instead may try their own 
strategies to solve problems using internal knowledge such as the need for a long 
object, so they make their choice based solely on that premise. The use of analogy 
decreased significantly in problems needing an auxiliary task. In the video condition, 
4-year-olds performance with analogy on problems needing an auxiliary task was 
significantly better than 3-year-olds with an auxiliary task (11 per cent and 4 per cent, 
respectively) χ2(1, N = 17) = 3.532; p<.05. This suggests that 4-year-olds are able to 
use the base information in the problems needing an auxiliary task more than 3-year-
olds, but this strategy choice remained low, 3-year-olds preferred level 2 errors and 4-
year-olds preferred analogy based object  but without adapting. 
 
Table 5 shows that 3-year-olds in the video condition chose the analogy based object 
with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task than in problems 
needing an auxiliary task (50 per cent and 4 percent, respectively): χ2(1, N = 8) = 
53.678; p<.05. Thus, 3-year-olds benefited more from the base problem in the 
problems without an auxiliary task. The same was found in 4-year-olds (37 per cent 
and 11 percent, respectively; χ2(1, N = 9) = 53.678; p<.05.  
 
Similarly, 3- and 4-year-old children in the control condition chose the analogy based 
object with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task than in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Three-year-olds chose the analogy based object 
with adaptation on 30 per cent of the problems without an auxiliary task whereas the 
same children failed to use the analogy based object with adaptation on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task. This indicates that the problems without an auxiliary task 
do not necessarily require a base problem, but problems needing an auxiliary task do. 
Four-year-olds showed the same pattern (33 per cent and 4 percent, respectively). 
This suggests that children in the control condition performed quite well with 
problems without an auxiliary task- but not those requiring an auxiliary task. This 
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suggests that they may possess the knowledge required to solve the problems without 
an auxiliary task, but not to create an object, so require a base problem to help them 
with the auxiliary task.    
 
Table 5 reveals the high performance with strategies other than the analogy based 
object with adaptation. Three-year-olds choice of the analogy based object but 
without adaptation strategy between the video and the control condition (17 per cent 
and 11 per cent, respectively) was not significant χ2(1, N = 17) = 1.495; p>.05. Four-
year-olds choice of analogy based object but without adaptation featured more in the 
video than in the control condition (33 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively). A chi 
square analysis revealed significant differences between condition χ2(1, N = 17) = 
11.293; p<.05. Probably because the analogy based object with adaptation was 
presented in the video condition, it was just 4-year-olds did not transfer the action 
element. 
 
To find out whether the differences in children’s choice of level 2 errors in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task were significant between video and control 
condition a layered chi square analysis was carried out across condition and age. The 
results revealed significant differences in 4-year-olds choice of level 2 errors between 
conditions χ2(1, N = 17) = 21.263; p<.05 (19 and 50), but not in 3-year-olds χ2(1, N = 
17) = 2.007; p>.05 (42 and 52). This indicates that when the older children were 
faced with the problems needing an auxiliary task and no base problem, they turned to 
level 2 errors more than those who received the base problem. Conversely, when 3-
year-olds were faced with the problems needing an auxiliary task they relied on level 
2 errors to a similar degree regardless of whether or not the received the base problem. 
Further evidence of children’s difficulty in the problems needing an auxiliary task 
comes from the finding that both 3- and 4-year-olds were less likely to attempt the 
hard problems. This is evident in the higher percentage of the no solution attempt this 
type of problem. 
  
Table 5 shows that level 1 errors were low in problems needing an auxiliary task, but 
were non-existent in problems without an auxiliary task. Therefore, no analysis was 
carried out due to similar use across age and condition in problems needing auxiliary 
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tasks. This suggests that children understood that the level 1 error object choice could 
not be used successfully to solve the easy problem (could not reach - too short and no 
function). Furthermore, in the case of those in the video condition, they were not 
distracted by level 1 errors. Since children’s choice of level 1 error appeared in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task only, suggests that because children were finding 
solution of these problems difficult they may have been looking for surface similarity 
from cues presented in the base problem. However, since a similar amount of 
responses were made in the control condition suggests that children were selecting 
this object regardless of whether or not they had seen the item in the video. However, 
due to the low use of level 1 errors it can be assumed that this was not 
stable/dominant strategy of children of this age in problems of this kind.   
 
 
 5.3.1 Order effects  
 
 
It was expected that children would perform better on the problems needing an 
auxiliary task when presented with the problems without an auxiliary task first. 
However, results revealed that children performed significantly better overall with the 
analogy based object with adaptation when they received the problems needing an 
auxiliary task first (of the 42 per cent overall use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation - 26 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 17) = 3.014; p<.05. 
Overall analysis did not support the prediction that children presented with the 
problems without an auxiliary task first. Order of presentation did not seem to affect 
children in the video condition when presented with problems without an auxiliary 
task first; this made very little difference to children’s performance on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task (7 percent and 9 per cent).  Similar results were found in the 
control condition (5 percent and 0 per cent). This suggests that children were not 
transferring what they had learned from the problems without an auxiliary task to 
those needing an auxiliary task.   
 
No predictions were made for performance on the problems without an auxiliary task 
due to order effects because of the simple nature of the problems. It was expected that 
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children would perform well on them regardless of the order in which children 
received them. However, of interest, those presented with problems needing an 
auxiliary task first performed significantly better on the problems without an auxiliary 
task than those who received the problems needing an auxiliary task first χ2(1, N = 
17) = 11.636; p<.05 (57 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively).  The findings indicate 
that children receiving the problems without an auxiliary task first were not 
necessarily benefiting from practice with the problems needing an auxiliary task; 
whereas the presentation of the problems needing an auxiliary task first improved 
performance with the analogy based object with adaptation in both conditions. It is 
unclear why this was the case. It may be that children were more motivated to do well 
after they had failed to solve the problems needing an auxiliary task. This finding is at 
odds with Seligman’s (1974) learned helplessness and current teaching practice.  
 
To determine why performance on the problems needing an auxiliary task was not 
benefiting from the problems without an auxiliary task first, children’s alternative 
strategy use was explored. If children were selecting incorrect strategies in the 
problems without an auxiliary task, this may explain why they were not transferring 
the analogy based object with adaptation onto the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
Table 6 presents the findings by order. 
 
Table 6 reveals that children in the video condition who received the problems 
without an auxiliary task first relied on the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy and level 2 errors on a number of responses in the problems 
without an auxiliary task (37 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively). 
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Table 6: The Percentage of Children’s Strategic Choices by Order, Problem Type and Condition 
 
     
 
       Without Auxiliary first     Auxiliary first     
                  
                   Without auxiliary         Auxiliary                Without auxiliary       Auxiliary   
              
Strategy                                Video    Control       Video     Control       Video      Control            Video      Control________       
 
No solution attempt     7    29  23     33    19        0                 43      17 
Level 1 error      0                0                     7               5                      0               0                     5            17 
Level 2 errors                 23              5                   43              47                     0             14                    29           53            
Analogy based object without adapting 37            52                   20              10                    24            43                    14           13               
Analogy based object with adaptation  33            14                    7                 5                    57            43                     9              0        
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Since these children only used the analogy based object with adaptation with correct 
action to solve the problems without an auxiliary task on 33 per cent of responses 
suggests that two thirds of the responses were incorrect (non-analogous) and would 
not benefit their performance on the problems needing an auxiliary task. Therefore, if 
children’s analogical ability was to transfer (or improve) onto the problems needing 
an auxiliary task then it would be expected that children’s performance in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task would match (or better) the 33 percent correct 
responses in the problems without an auxiliary task. This was not the case, only 7 per 
cent of responses were analogous (the analogy based object with adaptation) in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. This suggests that children were not benefiting 
from receiving the problems without an auxiliary task first and children were finding 
tasks in the problems needing an auxiliary task more difficult than those in the 
problems without an auxiliary task even when they had practice with less difficult 
analogies.  
 
 5.3.2 Representation 
 
Overall, 41 percent (42/102) of children who received the video analogue described 
both the problem and solution to the problem. This finding suggests that over half of 
the children were finding representation of the base information difficult. It seems that 
children were able to describe the solution to the problem (36 per cent), but not the 
problem and solution. Overall results showed that 46 per cent (22/48) of 3-year-olds 
and 37 per cent (20/54) of 4-year-olds descriptions included both the problem and 
solution to the problem. A chi square analysis revealed no significant difference in 
children’s representational ability across age χ2(2, N = 17) = 1.668; p>.05, suggesting 
that children in both age groups represented the problem to a similar degree.  
 
Of the 41 percent who correctly represented the base problem, 71 per cent (30/42) of 
the correct representations were in the problems without an auxiliary task. Chi square 
analysis revealed significant differences in children’s ability to represent the base 
problem across paradigm χ2(1, N = 17) = 13.114; p<.05. This indicates that children 
found the tasks in the problems without an auxiliary task significantly easier to 
represent than the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
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Table 7: The Percentage of Children’s Descriptions of the Base Analogue in the Video Condition as a Function of Problem Type and Age 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     Without Auxiliary tasks  Auxiliary task____________________________  
      3-yr-olds     4-yr-olds                 3-yr-olds 4-yr-olds 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
No response/Irrelevant     8         22                37.5            11  
Problem only             4                 7                    0   0 
Solution only                 21             19                  37.5               67 
Problem and solution        67             52                 25  22 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7 shows that both 3- and 4-year-olds found representation easier in the 
problems without an auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary 
task. To explore whether differences in paradigm extended across age, chi square 
analysis was carried out on 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds separately. Chi square 
analysis revealed significant differences in 3-year-olds’ representational ability 
between the problems without an auxiliary task and problems needing an auxiliary 
task χ2(1, N = 8) = 11.089; p<.05 (67 per cent and 25 per cent, respectively). 
Significant differences were also observed in 4-year-olds between the problems 
without an auxiliary task and problems needing an auxiliary task χ2(1, N = 9) = 6.289; 
p<.05 (52 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively). This reiterates the difficulty faced 
by both age groups in representing the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
Interestingly, 3-year-olds represented more base problems than 4-year-olds in both 
problem types. However, only in the problems without an auxiliary task were 
differences significant between 3-and 4-year-olds χ2(1, N = 17) = 4.669; p<.05. This 
indicates that 3-year-olds were able to represent more problems without an auxiliary 
task than 4-year-olds, but 3- and 4-year-olds found problems needing an auxiliary task 
equally as difficult to represent.  Table 7 also reveals that both age groups relied more 
heavily on representing the solution only in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
However, the results reveal that 3-year-olds relied on solution and no response 
/irrelevant information equally, whereas 4-year-olds relied on solution only 
significantly more than 3-year-olds χ2(1, N = 17) = 17.380; p<.05 (67 per cent and 
37.5 per cent, respectively).   
  
To explore the benefit of representation on children’s ability to solve the target 
problem, children’s representational ability and solution on the target problem was 
matched. Of the 41 percent (42/102) correct representations, 40 percent were used to 
solve the target problem. Thus, just under half went on to use this information to solve 
the target problem.  
 
Children who represented the base problem were more likely to solve the target 
problem (40 per cent) than those who did not represent the base problem (15 per 
cent) χ2(1, N = 17) = 15.674; p<.05. This suggests that children benefited from being 
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able to represent the base problem. However, not all children who represented the 
base analogue went on to solve the target problem.  Eleven correct representations (26 
per cent) were followed by the level 2 errors strategy in the target problem and 11 (26 
per cent) were followed by analogy based object but without adaptation. 
.   
Since there were no differences in representational ability between 3- and 4-year-olds, 
no age differences in children’s ability to use the representation in the target problem 
were predicted. The figures reveal that 24 per cent of the 3-year-olds who gave correct 
representations went on to solve the target problem with the analogy based object with 
adaptation and 17 per cent of 4-year-olds. However, the differences did not reach 
significance χ2(1, N = 8) = 1.503; p>.05. Although the figure was low, both 3- and 4-
year-olds used the representation in the target problem to a similar degree. Children 
were able to form a representation and use it to solve the target problem more in the 
problems without an auxiliary task (50 per cent) than in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task (17 per cent) χ2(1, N = 17) = 24.442; p<.05. 
 
These findings highlight the fact that children's lack of representational ability may 
explain why children performed poorly on the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
However, this does not explain why some children unable to represent the base 
problem, were able to solve the target problem (35 per cent- 9/26 responses). As 
indicated at the beginning of this sub-section, the majority of 4-year-olds in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task represented the solution only (67 per cent). If 
representing the solution only (one transformation) is related to recognising just one 
aspect (transformation) of the base problem, then it would be expected that children’s 
performance on the target problem would only include one transformation (level 2 
errors). This occurred in 33 per cent of 4-year-olds problems needing an auxiliary task. 
However, 67 per cent of 4-year-olds who represented the solution only used strategies 
other than level 2 errors. This suggests that children were not basing their selection of 
objects on their representation.       
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5.3.3 Post task descriptions 
 
 
It was expected that the majority of children who used the analogy based object with 
adaptation would explain their object choice in relation to the base analogue (those in 
the video condition), and thus, choose the analogous description. However, the most 
common explanation overall was the no preference/irrelevant information (48%) 
followed by a perceptual-based explanation (39%) and not the expected analogy 
description (2%).  Children who explained their choices with irrelevant or no 
preference descriptions, used descriptions such as ‘I liked it’ or ‘because I wanted to’. 
The perceptual preference included descriptions such as ‘because it’s big’ or ‘it’s the 
longest’. The goal oriented description indicated that children chose their objects 
based on the fact that they knew that they had to select an object to reach the desired 
goal, but did not understand why they had chosen their particular strategy.  
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Table 8: Percentage of Descriptions of Object Choices by Condition 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Description of object choices  _____Video__________      Control_____________ 
No Preference                             56                        39               
Perceptual Preference            27                  51                   
Goal-oriented              12                        10              
Analogy                         5                                   0 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 shows that the most common explanation from those in the video condition 
was the no preference/irrelevant information description (56 per cent), whereas, 
children in the control condition preferred the perceptual explanation (51 per cent). 
Children in the control condition chose significantly more perceptual explanations 
than those in the video condition χ2(3, N = 17) = 18.473; p<.05.  This suggests that 
children knew that to solve, for example, the toy retrieval task they needed something 
long, but because the children in this group did not receive the relations from the base 
problem, they were unable to select the analogy based object with adaptation (correct 
object and correct action). Therefore, children explained their choices based on the 
perceptual attributes of the object (length). This was expected as children could not 
explain their choices in relation to a base analogue, so they explained why they 
thought that a particular object was the most appropriate for solving the problem. 
Children in the video condition showed a preference for the no preference strategy 
χ2(3, N = 17) = 11.314; p<.05.   
 
In spite of there being more analogical explanations in the video condition than the 
control condition, figures were low. Therefore, further analysis on age, condition and 
paradigm with regard to post-explanations were unable to be analysed. It is evident 
that overall children were unable to express their reliance on the base problem. 
However, this does not mean that they did not use analogy, it could simply be that 
they were unable to verbalise it at this age. 
 
 
 
5.4 Discussion  
 
 
Study 2 set out to explore children’s strategy choices in a set of six problem analogies. 
It was expected that due to the use of simple visual analogues, children would show 
an ability to use analogy. A quarter of responses, in the video condition, were 
analogical. Children showed no preference between the choice of the analogy based 
object with adaptation, analogy based object but without adaptation and level 2 errors. 
This supports Goswami’s suggestion that if children are unable to extract the analogy 
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based object with adaptation, then they will rely on alternative strategies equally, that 
is children will not show a preference for any particular strategy.  
 
Reasoning behind children’s choice analogy based object but without adaptation may 
have been a reliance on one relation (transformation) only i.e., the object’s length, or 
surface similarity, in that children saw that the actor in the video used a long hooked 
object to solve the problem, but was unable to transfer both the correct object and 
function which was needed to solve the problem analogically. For those who had not 
received the base problem, it could be that they simply chose the correct object 
because they recognised that this was the most appropriate for solution (because of its 
length).  
 
Of interest was children’s lack of reliance on the level 1 error strategy. Gentner, 
argued that if children do not possess the knowledge of relations then they would 
show a preference for surface similarity (object matching). Although this was the case 
in the classical analogues, in the problem analogues children only selected this 
strategy in the problems needing an auxiliary task. This supports the assumption that 
children did not possess the relational knowledge in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task. This may be because unlike in the classical tasks, where children received no 
feedback regarding the accuracy of their strategy choices, and the object match was 
simply another card that could complete the sequence, in the problem analogies 
children knew that they could not reach an item using a scarf or ball (level 1 error), so 
did not choose that particular strategy. Therefore, children’s lack of level 1 errors may 
be an artefact of the task differences across the classical- and problem-analogies.  
Therefore, comparing performance on level 1 errors across classical- and –problem 
analogies may not be feasible. This highlights the fact that problem analogies and 
classical analogies look at different things.  
 
Since children in the control condition were able to solve the target problem with the 
correct strategy, it can be concluded that children may not need the base problem to 
solve problems without an auxiliary task because they have the knowledge that to 
solve a problem that requires you to retrieve something out of reach you need to select 
a long hooked object. This was evident, for example, in children’s reliance on the two 
longest objects in the toy retrieval task. Children chose either the stick (level 2 errors) 
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or the water pistol.  It is only when children in the control condition had to create their 
own object in the problems needing an auxiliary task, did they find the tasks more 
difficult to solve. This was supported by the significant difference in children’s choice 
of the analogy based object with adaptation between the problem without an auxiliary 
task and problems needing an auxiliary task in the control condition. Therefore, 
children were unable to rely on their basic knowledge (i.e., that a long object will 
solve the problem), but needed the relations from an analogous problem to allow them 
to solve the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation. This is 
evidence that the base provides children with appropriate relations when relations are 
not part of a child’s existing knowledge-base. The results show no specific object 
preference.    
 
The results showed very small age differences. Three-year-olds in the video condition 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation more than those in the control 
condition. This suggests that 3-year-olds may need the base analogue to enable them 
to choose the analogy based object with adaptation because they do not have a wide 
repertoire of strategies available to them. Four-year-olds performed similarly across 
conditions suggesting that 4-year-olds solved the problems using the analogy based 
object with adaptation to a similar degree regardless of whether or not a base was 
present. This supports the notion that 4-year-olds may have more strategies available 
to them to solve the target problem. Therefore, not receiving the base problem did not 
cause them to choose the analogy based object with adaptation any less than those 
who received the base problem. Similarly, 3- and 4-year-olds across both conditions 
showed no preference for one strategy over another. Again, suggesting that regardless 
of the presence of a base problem, 3- and 4-year-olds showed no strategic preference 
in the present tasks.     
 
The prediction that children would perform better on problems without an auxiliary 
task than problems needing an auxiliary task was supported. This occurred for both 
age groups and across both conditions. Children’s good performance, in the video 
condition on the problems without an auxiliary task, may have been due to children’s 
understanding of the relations in the base problem. That is, because children 
understood that the actor in the video could not reach the item without the use of a 
long object, a gripper object or tube-like object, children were able to benefit from 
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this information when presented with a similar scenario in the target problem. The 
poor performance on problems needing an auxiliary task in those in the video 
condition suggests that despite children receiving the required base problem they were 
unable to use the analogous information to solve the target problem (as they had done 
in the problems without an auxiliary task). Inability to create the objects in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task could reside in the fact that either children could 
not access the relations from the base problem in order to transfer them to solve the 
target problem, or children did not possess the knowledge of relations. The former 
suggestion is evident in the lack of significant difference between conditions in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Therefore, even those who received the base 
could not use it to solve the problem (thus, they could not access the information).  
 
The suggestion that children may have failed to create the objects presented in the 
analogous problem due to a lack of relational knowledge was supported by the high 
performance on problems without an auxiliary task compared to problems needing an 
auxiliary task. The relations presented in the problems without an auxiliary task were 
straight forward, and children as young as 2 years of age have succeeded in choosing 
the correct object to retrieve an out of reach item (Brown, 1986). Also, Holyoak et al 
(1984) found the majority of children in their study were able to transport jewels from 
one location to another. Therefore, it can be assumed that these relations are part of a 
3- and 4-year-old’s conceptual knowledge. However, attaching two items to make a 
long object, attaching a clip to create a pendulum and rolling up a piece of paper to 
create a transportation tube may not be part of children’s conceptual knowledge at this 
age. The findings support this. Almost half of all responses in the problems needing 
an auxiliary task were level 2 errors, a third of which were in the video condition. 
Thus, receiving the base did not decrease the likelihood of choosing level 2 errors.  
 
Children’s preference for level 2 errors suggests a problem of transfer, in that children 
failed to transfer all of the information from the base to the target problem. For 
example, since children were selecting a level 2 error, and not the function choice 
(short hooked object), suggests that children were aware that they needed a long item 
to retrieve the item out of reach. This understanding also explains why children in the 
control condition were able to choose the correct object, and conversely, why they 
chose the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. 
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The finding that 3-year-olds, in the video condition, chose the analogy based object 
with adaptation more in the problems without auxiliary task than 4-year-olds, suggests 
that 4-year-olds were not relying on the base problem to the same extent as 3-year-
olds. This may have been due to 4-year-olds understanding what they needed to solve 
the problem, so took no notice of the relations in the base and target problems and 
simply relied on their own problem solving strategies. Despite the overall preference 
for level 2 errors in the problems needing an auxiliary task, 4-year-olds in the video 
condition preferred the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. This 
suggests that 4-year-olds were using information from the video, but they were not 
transferring all relations (for example, the length and correct function), either because 
of a lack of relational knowledge or again, a problem of access.      
 
The prediction that children who received the problems without an auxiliary task first 
would perform better on the problems needing an auxiliary task was not supported. 
Performance using the analogy based object with adaptation in problems needing an 
auxiliary task was similar regardless of order. This indicates that children were not 
benefiting more from receiving problems without an auxiliary task first. Furthermore, 
because of the lower figures in the problems needing an auxiliary task suggests that 
their lack of ability was due to more than receiving the problems needing an auxiliary 
task first. Despite no prediction being made for performance on the problems without 
an auxiliary task as a result of order, interestingly, children performed better on the 
problems without an auxiliary task after they had received the problems needing an 
auxiliary task first. It is unclear why this occurred. One explanation may be 
motivational factors. For example, because children did not perform very well on the 
problems needing an auxiliary task, this may have motivated them to try harder. Or it 
could simply be that those in the hard-to-easy condition were better able to solve the 
problem regardless of the order in which they received, thus revealing a cohort effect. 
Just under half of children were able to form a representation of the base problem, but 
only half of these children were then able to use this information to solve the problem. 
Therefore, children have a low rate of representational ability at this age. This could 
explain why children find analogy difficult. However, it could simply be that children 
could not verbalise what occurred in the base problem.  
 
As predicted, the results revealed a difference in representational ability between the 
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two problem types. Children’s lack of ability to represent the problems needing an 
auxiliary task also affected their ability to solve the target problems. However, it is 
uncertain if this is an effect of a lack of representational ability or relational 
knowledge (due to relational difficulty). Since children performed better on the 
problems without an auxiliary task regardless of whether or not they received the base 
problem suggests that children’s difficulty lay in a lack of relational knowledge. Of 
interest was 3-year-olds representational ability in the problems without an auxiliary 
task. They represented more base analogues than 4-year-olds. This may have been due 
to 3-year-olds systematically going through everything to understand what was 
occurring. Whereas, 4-year-olds may have recognised what was occurring, but felt no 
need to repeat it to the experimenter.  Four-year-olds tended to represent the solution 
only. Reasoning behind 4-year-olds representation of the solution only may support 
the Gestalt assumption that we view the problem as a whole and not the details. 
Therefore, 4-year-olds in the present study saw the problem as a whole and simply 
reported the solution only. Conversely, 3-year-olds could not see the problem as a 
whole or at least not to the same extent as 4-year-olds, so they worked through the 
details sequentially to get to the same goal. Alternatively, 4-year-olds may simply 
have better reasoning skills than 3-year-olds. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that if children could see how the base problem was solved 
this could allow them to use this information to solve the target problem. Since 
children were not describing the problem that faced the actor may suggest that the 
children were not interpreting the solution to a problem at all, but in fact, they were 
witnessing someone using an umbrella, in the case of the toy retrieval task, to retrieve 
a scarf and not take any notice of the actor having to use an object because the scarf 
was out of reach. This may result in children not understanding the relationship 
between the base and target problem i.e., that they were both faced with a problem 
that required an object to retrieve an out of reach item, and therefore would not 
choose the analogy based object with adaptation. On the other hand, just because 
children were not describing both the problem and solution does not mean that they 
did not know that the actor was faced with a problem of something out of reach.  It 
could simply be that children failed to express this verbally. However, to try to 
minimise this from occurring, if children only mentioned the solution, they were 
prompted further to express everything that had occurred in video analogue. In spite 
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of this, over half of the children failed to represent the base problem.  
 
A further factor worthy of note was children’s ability to solve the problem after 
representing either the problem- or solution -only. If children represented the problem 
only this would indicate that they were solving the problem without knowledge of 
relations, which would result in children choosing non-analogous objects. This is what 
happened on the three occasions that the problem only was represented. Children 
chose one correct choice with correct action, one analogy based object but without 
adaptation and one no attempt strategy. However, three occasions was not enough to 
warrant this being a particularly strong suggestion that children of this age rely on.  
 
Children who represented the solution only performed better. This suggests that those 
able to represent the solution only, may still be able to see the relationship between 
the base and target, and the solution may be enough to allow children to solve the 
problem because it presents them with solution strategies, especially in the problems 
without an auxiliary task which allow them to attempt and solve each problem. This 
was the case, in 16 correct target solutions, 7 (44%) were preceded by representation 
of the solution only. This suggests that children benefited more from representing the 
solution than representing the problem only. This may be related to seeing the end 
goal. It seems those who represented the solution and problem selected the analogy 
based object with adaptation more than those unable to represent both solution and 
problem. Thus, representation may play an important role in children’s ability to solve 
analogous problems.  
 
It appears that a large percentage of children in this study were not able to form 
representations of the base problem. More importantly, only 40 per cent of attempts that 
were preceded by representation were successfully solved using the correct object and 
correct action presented to them in the video. However, the fact that more children solved 
the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation when they represented 
the base problem suggests that representation plays an important role in children’s target 
problem solution.   Furthermore, the figures reveal that representation may be more 
beneficial in the problems without an auxiliary task due to the better performance in the 
problems without an auxiliary task. However, this could simply be that children did not 
require a base for problems without an auxiliary task and therefore, did not require a 
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representation. Alternatively, it may be that children in the present study were solving the 
target problems using the base problem, but simply were unable to verbalise the relations.  
 
Results of the post-task descriptions suggest that young children rely on perceptual 
aspects of a task to help them explain why they came to a particular decision. Thus, 
their focus is on the physical attributes of the object, and not the analogous 
explanation.  This may help to explain why so many children show a preference for 
the longest object because they look for the solution only, and do not see the relations 
between the base and target problem.  This becomes more evident in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task because children can no longer rely on a single long object. 
Children in the control condition seemed to rely more heavily on perceptual attributes, 
maybe because they had no base to refer to. However, if this was the case, then those 
in the video condition would rely less on perceptual descriptions (which they did) and 
more on analogous descriptions (which they did not). 
 
Interestingly, those who received the base problem described their choices more with 
no preference/irrelevant information. This could imply that children did not rely on 
perceptual descriptions because they implicitly used the information form the base, 
but failed to verbalise this. However, the poor performance on children’s choice of 
complex relation with correct action in the video condition suggests that they were not 
relying on the base to the extent expected. Furthermore, children of this age, 
regardless of representation, often found these problems too difficult to solve using 
analogy, and found expressing their use of analogy equally as difficult. However, 
since children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation was higher than their 
description of it may suggest that the action of extracting and using the analogy based 
object with adaptation may be easier than verbalising it in children of this age. Or it 
could be that children simply make their choices based on perceptual attributes (as 
described in the post-task description).  
Further reasoning behind asking children to explain their strategy choices, comes 
from research that suggests it allows children to explain the reasoning behind their 
strategy choice would allow children to reflect on their performance. According to 
Siegler (1995), such reflection would have a positive effect on children’s subsequent 
performance. That is, if children could explain that they had used the base problem to 
solve the target problem, then this should cause them, on the following problem, to 
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choose the correct object (and action). However, this was not the case. Only three 
children were able to say that they had used the base problem (on a total of 5 
occasions between them). Therefore, no firm conclusions can be made about the 
influence of reflection choices on subsequent problem solution.       
 
 
 
5.5 Session 2 – 30 weeks later 
 
  
 5.5.1 Results  
 
 
Session two presented children with exactly the same target problems and procedures 
as those presented in session one, but 30 weeks later. The results section followed the 
same format as that in session one. It explored the results of the target problem, 
representation of the base problem and post-task descriptions. Again, data was 
presented in percentages. The experimenter and an observer blind to the experimental 
design independently scored all participants across all three sections of the study. 
Inter-rater agreement was 98% for the verbal description of the base problem, 100% 
for the action target problem and 96% for the verbal description of object choice, 
indicating reliable judgments. 
  
Session one revealed very little difference in strategy choice across age group but 
almost identical patterns of problem solving behaviour. Here, in session two, the most 
frequent strategy used by 3-year-olds was the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy (34 per cent), whereas, the dominant choice of 4-year-olds was the 
analogy based object with adaptation (38 per cent). As in session one, a chi square 
analysis found no significant difference in the selection of the analogy based object 
with adaptation between 3- and 4-year-olds χ2(1, N = 32) = 2.261; p>.05.  
 
Overall, 3- and 4-year-olds chose alternative object choices, such as level 2 errors and 
analogy based object but without adaptation to a similar degree. Three-year-olds 
chose analogy based object but without adaptation more than four-year-olds overall 
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(34 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively) and four-year-olds were using correct 
action more than three-year-olds.  However, chi square analysis found no significant 
difference. However, 4-year-olds choice of the analogy based object with adaptation 
significantly increased from session one to session two χ2(1, N = 17) = 5.002; p<.05 
(22 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively), suggesting that they were beginning to 
move away from the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy towards an 
analogical solution.   
 
In spite of the lack of difference across age group, table 9 shows some differences 
across age and condition. Four-year-olds chose the analogy based object with 
adaptation more than three-year-olds, in both the video and control conditions. 
However, despite the difference here being larger than in session one, chi square 
analyses revealed no significant difference between 3- and 4-year-olds in the video 
condition χ2(4, N = 17) = 1.481; p>.05 (35 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively) and 
χ2(4, N = 17) = 1.553; p>.05 (43 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively). In contrast, a 
chi square analysis revealed significant differences in 3-year-olds selection of the 
analogy based object with adaptation between the video and control condition χ2(1, N 
= 17) = 4.147; p<.05 (35 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively). Four-year-olds in the 
control condition were able to solve the target problem using the analogy based object 
with adaptation more than 3-year-olds in the control condition χ2(1, N = 17) = 3.571: 
p<.05.  
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Table 9: Strategic Choices by Age and Condition 
 
                                    3-year-olds               4-year-olds_____________________   
Strategy    ___  Video  Control            Video  Control_____________  
 
No solution attempt           10             6   18   4 
Level 1 error             8    7                2             4 
Level 2 errors            13      30   13  27 
Analogy based object without adaptation   34        35   24  31 
Analogy based object with adaptation  35      22   43  34 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Only 4-year-olds increased in their use of the analogy based object with adaptation 
across condition. Of interest, the percentage of children choosing analogy based 
object but without adaptation remained the same in 4-year-olds across both sessions 
(27 per cent). These were the same children which suggests that they were not using 
any knowledge gained from their first attempt in session one to increase their use of 
the analogy based object with adaptation. Furthermore, since their use of the analogy 
based object with adaptation increased, but analogy based object but without 
adaptation stayed the same suggests that children choosing level 2 errors in session 
one were changing to the analogy based object with adaptation in session two. No 
significant differences were found across age group or between conditions in 
children’s use of analogy based object but without adaptation. This suggests that 3- 
and 4-year-olds chose this strategy regardless of the presence of a base problem. 
Children’s no object choice  also decreased in session two from 19 per cent in both 3-
and 4-year-olds in session one, to 8 per cent and 12 percent, respectively, in session 
two.  
 
Table 9 also shows differences in the use of level 2 errors between both age groups. 
Three-year-olds chose significantly more level 2 errors in the control condition than in 
the video condition χ2(1, N = 17) = 8.562; p<.05, (30 per cent and 13 per cent, 
respectively). The same occurred in four-year-olds χ2(1, N = 17) = 6.125; p<.05 (27 
per cent and 13 per cent, respectively). Of interest, is the significant difference in 3-
year-olds choice of level 2 errors between session one and two (27 per cent and 13 per 
cent, respectively) χ2(2, N = 17) = 6.125; p<.05. This indicates that 3-year-olds were 
moving away from their reliance on of level 2 errors and moved to the more 
appropriate analogy based object with adaptation.  
 
Unlike in session one, 4-year-olds in the video condition chose the analogy based 
object with adaptation significantly more than the analogy based object but without 
adaptation and level 2 errors χ2(1, N = 9) = 23.557; p<.05.This suggests that 4-year-
olds were better able to use the correct action in session two. In contrast, 3-year-olds 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation and analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy to a similar degree (35 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively). 
However, their choice of level 2 errors was much lower. A chi square analysis 
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revealed a significant difference between 3-year-old children’s use of the analogy 
based object with adaptation and level 2 errors χ2(1, N = 17) = 13.268; p<.05.  
 
It was predicted that 3-year-old’s performance in session two would be similar to that 
of 4-year-olds in session one. In particular, they should be selecting similar strategies, 
because in essence they are the same age. However, this was not the case. In session 
one, 4-year-olds in the video condition were choosing level 2 errors and the analogy 
based object with adaptation (with and without adaptation) equally (24 per cent each), 
whereas in session two, 3-year-olds were relying on the analogy based object with 
adaptation (with and without correct action) significantly more than level 2 errors 35 
per cent, 34 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively). Furthermore, at week thirty, 3-
year-olds were choosing the analogy based object with adaptation significantly more 
than 4-year-olds in session one χ2(1, N = 17) = 2.909; p<.05 (35 per cent and 24 per 
cent, respectively). Thus, 3-year-olds improved over the 30 week period which 
suggests that 3-year-olds may have benefited from their performance in session one in 
the same way as 4-year-olds benefited from their first performance in session two 
(evident in an increase in the selection of the analogy based object with adaptation; 
session one – 24 per cent, session two – 43 per cent). Although both age groups 
improved over session, 4-year-olds showed the larger increase.  
 
Session one showed that children performed better in the problems without an 
auxiliary task compared to problems needing an auxiliary task. Although it was 
expected that children would improve in their performance in session two, if task 
difficulty and lack of relational knowledge plays a part in children’s ability, then 
children should still choose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the 
problems without an auxiliary task. As in session one, the most frequent strategy in 
the problems without an auxiliary task was the analogy based object with adaptation 
(60 per cent), an increase of 23% from session one. The most frequent strategy choice 
in the problems needing an auxiliary task was level 2 errors (35 per cent). Only 8 per 
cent of attempts used the analogy based object with adaptation in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task, an increase of 3 per cent on session one.  
 
Children chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the problems 
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without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task (60 per cent 
and 8 per cent, respectively); χ2(1, N = 34) = 60.250; p<.01 and across conditions.  A 
chi square analysis found a significant difference across problems with and without an 
auxiliary task in the video χ2(1, N = 17) = 47.954; p<.01 and control conditions χ2(1, 
N = 17) = 27.231; p<.01. Children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation 
also differed significantly across condition within the problems without an auxiliary 
task χ2(3, N = 34)  = 3.681; p<.05. Figures revealed that children who received the 
base analogue performed better on the problems without an auxiliary task than those 
in the control condition (69 per cent and 45 per cent, respectively).  
 
Table 10 revealed that 3- and 4-year-olds, in both the video and the control conditions 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the problems without an 
auxiliary task than problems needing an auxiliary task. Four-year-olds in the video 
condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation more than 3-year-olds on 
problems without an auxiliary task, (74 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively). 
However, a chi square analysis revealed no significant difference  χ2(3, N = 9) = 
1.178; p>.05.  Similarly, no significant difference was found between 3- and 4-year-
olds on problems needing an auxiliary task (11 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). 
Thus, 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds were performing to a similar degree in the video 
condition across both problem types.  
 
As in session one, both 3- and 4-year-olds in the video condition chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task than in 
the problems needing an auxiliary task. A chi square revealed significant differences 
across paradigm in both 3-year-olds (67 per cent and 4 per cent) χ2(1, N = 17) = 
86.669; p<.05 and 4-year-olds (74 per cent and 11 per cent) χ2(1, N = 17) = 81.207; 
p<.05.  Both age groups performed significantly better in the problems without an 
auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary task. The findings 
indicate that children of this age benefited more from the base problem in the 
problems without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
Three-year-olds chose the analogy based object with adaptation on 44 per cent of the 
problems without an auxiliary task whereas the same children failed to use the 
analogy based object with adaptation on the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
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Four-year-olds showed the same pattern (50 per cent and 17 percent, respectively). 
This suggests that children in the control condition performed quite well with the 
problems without an auxiliary task, but not the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
Table 10 reveals that, as in session one, 3-year-olds chose the analogy based object 
but without adaptation strategy significantly more in the video than in the control 
condition (37 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 17) = 2.804; p<.05. 
Similarly, 4-year-olds choice of analogy based object but without adaptation featured 
more in the video than in the control condition (37 per cent and 21 per cent, 
respectively χ2(1, N = 17) = 6.217; p<.05.  
 
Three- and four-year-olds in the control condition chose level 2 errors above any other 
strategy (48 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively). To find out whether the 
differences in children’s choice of level 2 errors in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task were significant between video and control condition a layered chi square 
analysis was carried out across condition and age. The results revealed significant 
differences in 3-year-olds choice of level 2 errors between conditions (25 per cent and 
48 per cent) χ2(2, N = 17) = 11.412; p<.05 and in 4-year-olds (18 per cent and 50 per 
cent) χ2(2, N = 17) = 22.816; p<.05.  
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Table 10: The Percentage of Children’s Strategic Choices by Age and Condition and Problem Type 
 
 
     
            Without auxiliary task             Auxiliary  task 
             3-year-olds          4-year-olds          3-year-olds                  4-year-olds 
 
Strategy            Video     Control         Video     Control_ __ Video    Control        Video     Control______ 
 
No solution attempt               4            0   7           4          17         11          30   4 
Level 1 error                0            0   0         0          17 15           4   8  
Level 2 errors                0           12   7    4          25 48          18 50  
Analogy based object without adaptation 29         44  12   42               37    26                 37 21  
Analogy based object with adaptation 67  44    74          50           4   0          11 17 
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Interestingly, children’s reliance on the level 1 error strategy decreased from session 
one in 4-year-olds, but increased in 3-year-olds. However, only in the video condition 
for 3-year-olds was the difference significant across session χ2(1, N = 8) = 8.992; 
p<.05 (session 1- 4 per cent and session 2- 17 per cent). This shows that 3-year-olds 
were extracting level 1 errors from the video more in session two, than in session one.  
 
 
 5.5.2 Order effects   
 
 
It was expected that children would perform better when presented with the problems 
without an auxiliary task first. However, in session one, children performed better 
when they received the problems needing an auxiliary task first (26 per cent and 16 
per cent, respectively). Although the same was found in session one, the difference in 
session two was less pronounced (36 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively) and did 
not reach significance χ2(2, N = 17) = .814; p>.05.  Table 10 shows that when 
children in the video condition were presented with problems without an auxiliary 
task first, this made very little difference to children’s performance on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task (7 per cent and 10 per cent).  Similar results were found in 
the control condition (4 percent and 10 per cent). These results are similar to those 
found in session one. This confirms that children were not transferring what they had 
learned on the problems without an auxiliary task to the problems needing an 
auxiliary task.  
  
As in session one, those presented with the problems needing an auxiliary task first 
performed better on the problems without an auxiliary task than those who received 
the problems without an auxiliary task first (76 per cent and 67 per cent, respectively). 
However, a chi square found no significant differences χ2(2, N = 34) = 1.987; p>.05.  
The findings indicate that children receiving the problems without an auxiliary task 
first were not necessarily benefiting from practice with the problems without an 
auxiliary task.  
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Table 11: The Percentage of Children’s Strategic Choices by Order, Problem Type and Condition 
 
     
 
               Without auxiliary task first      Auxiliary task first              
      
               Without auxiliary task    Auxiliary task             Without auxiliary task     Auxiliary task             
               
Strategy                             Video    Control          Video       Control         Video     Control          Video       Control__       
 
No solution attempt    10     0  16    10       0         4        33             7 
Level 1 error        0     0   7    10       0         0        14           13 
Level 2 errors                      3     5  20    48       5        10        24           50 
Analogy based object without adaptation 20   57  50    28     19        33        19           20 
Analogy based object with adaptation 67    38   7     4     76         53        10           10 
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If children were selecting incorrect strategies in the problems without an auxiliary 
task this may explain why they were not transferring the analogy based object with 
adaptation onto the problems needing an auxiliary task. Table 10 reveals that children 
in the video condition who received the problems without an auxiliary task first relied 
on analogy based object but without adaptation and level 2 errors less. This was due 
to an increase in the use of analogy based object with adaptation from 33 per cent (in 
session one) to 67 per cent in session 2). If children’s analogical ability was to transfer 
(or improve) on the problems needing an auxiliary task then it would be expected that 
children’s performance in the problems needing an auxiliary task would match (or 
better) the 67 percent correct responses in the problems without an auxiliary task. 
However, as in session one, this was not the case, only 7 per cent of responses were 
analogous (the analogy based object with adaptation) in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task. This suggests that children were not benefiting from receiving the 
problems without an auxiliary task first and children were finding tasks in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task more difficult than those in the problems without 
an auxiliary task even when they had practice, and performed well, with less difficult 
analogies.  
 
As in session one, in the video condition, the preferred strategy on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task, when this task was presented first, was no solution. In 
contrast, those who received the problems without an auxiliary task first relied on the 
analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. 
.  
 
 
5.5.3 Representation 
 
 
Overall, 68 percent (69/102) of children who received the video analogue described 
both the problem and solution to the problem which included the appropriate criteria 
to warrant being scored on representational ability. This is a 27 per cent increase from 
session one. A chi square analysis revealed significant differences in children’s ability 
to represent the base problem across sessions χ2(1, N = 17) = 5.781; p<.05. This 
suggests that children’s representational ability improved over the 30 week period.  
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As in session one, the second most frequent description was the solution only (15 per 
cent). A reliance on solution only may affect children’s ability to solve the problem in 
that they do not see that the target problem is related to the base problem (because 
they do not recognise that they are structurally similar problems). Table 11 shows that 
solution only was more prevalent in the problems needing an auxiliary task where 
children found the relations harder to represent. Results revealed that 3-year-olds 
represented 58 per cent of the base problems and four-year-olds represented 76 per 
cent of problems. A chi square analysis revealed significant differences between age 
group χ2(1, N = 17) = 3.594; p<.05. This indicates a developmental difference in 
representational ability between 3- and 4-year-olds in session two in that 4-year-olds 
better able to represent than 3-year-olds. 
 
Representation also significantly increased for both 3- and 4-year-olds across session 
(46 per cent and 58 per cent; χ2(1, N = 17) = 2.885; p<.05, and 37 per cent and 76 per 
cent; χ2(1, N = 17) = 30.943; p<.05, respectively). This indicates that children in both 
age groups, representational ability increased over the 30 week period.  
 
Session one revealed that children represented more base problems in the problems 
without an auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary task. The 
same was found in session two, χ2(3, N = 17) = 27.997; p<.05 (92 per cent and 43 per 
cent, respectively). This supports the results found in session one and confirms the 
suggestion that the relations in the problems needing an auxiliary task may be too 
difficult for children of this age to represent. Children’s representation in both 
problems without an auxiliary task and with an auxiliary task increased over sessions. 
Children’s ability to represent problems without an auxiliary task increased by 33 per 
cent and in the problems needing an auxiliary task, 19 per cent. Chi square analysis 
revealed significant difference across sessions (without auxiliary - χ2(1, N = 17) = 
29.436; p<.05 and with auxiliary - χ2(1, N = 17) = 8.102; p<.05). 
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Table 12: The Percentage of Children’s Descriptions of the Base Analogue in the Video Condition as a Function of Problem Type and Age 
         
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Without auxiliary task     Auxiliary task 
    
3-yr-olds    4-yr-olds        3-yr-olds 4-yr-olds 
 
No response/Irrelevant 13             0                  21            11  
Problem only          0                  0                13  15 
Solution only               4             0           33                 22 
Problem and solution     83           100               33  52 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 12 shows that both 3- and 4-year-olds found representation easier in the 
problems without an auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary 
task. Chi square analysis revealed significant differences in 3-year-olds’ 
representational ability between the problems with and without an auxiliary task χ2(1, 
N = 8) = 7.261; p<.01 (83 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively). Significant 
differences were also observed in 4-year-olds between both problem types χ2(1, N = 
9) = 6.644; p<.02 (100 per cent and 52 per cent, respectively). This reiterates the 
difficulty faced by both age groups in representing the problems needing an auxiliary 
task, and confirms that the relations within the base problem were conceptually 
difficult for children to understand.  
 
As stated, children’s ability to represent the problems without an auxiliary task was 
high across both sessions. The figures were also significantly different for both 3- and 
4-year-olds across session (67 per cent and 83 per cent: χ2(1, N = 17) = 6.827; p<.05 
and 52 per cent and 100 per cent χ2(1, N = 17) = 63.158; p<.05, respectively). No 
significant differences between sessions for 3-year-olds (session one- 25 per cent, 
session two- 22 per cent) was found. However, differences emerged in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task for 4-year-olds between sessions χ2(1, N = 9) = 7.386; 
p<.05 (session one - 33 per cent, session two - 52 per cent). Thus, just over half of 4-
year-olds were representing the base problem compared to only a third in session one.  
 
Of interest is the similarity of 3-year-olds representational ability at session two with 
4-year-olds ability in session one (28 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively). Since the 
3-year-olds in session two were at similar ages as the 4-year-olds in session one, the 
similar performance suggests that this is the optimal representational ability in 4-year-
olds. However, this cross-sectional finding does not match 3- and 4-year-olds target 
problem solution. In fact, 3-year-olds were choosing the analogy based object with 
adaptation more in session two than 4-year-olds in session one. Therefore, this could 
not be due to representational ability because their performances were similar. It is 
more likely to be due to practice with tasks in session one.       
 
In relation to children’s lack of representation, 3-year-olds ability to represent the 
solution only was similar across session one and two (37.5 per cent and 33 per cent). 
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Since these were from the same children indicates that their representational ability 
remained the same 30 weeks on, in that they could only represent the solution and not 
both problem and solution. In contrast, the 4-year-olds’ representational ability 
increased significantly and the dominant representation of solution only, in session 
one, significantly decreased in session two  χ2(2, N = 9) = 40.996; p<.05 (67 per cent 
and 22 per cent, respectively). The dominant description in both 3- and 4-year-olds in 
the problems without an auxiliary task was both problem and solution. Similarly, in 4-
year-olds problems needing an auxiliary task, the problem and the solution was the 
dominant strategy. However, 3-year-olds gave problem and solution and solution only 
to a similar degree. Thus, 4-year-olds representational ability increased considerably 
in session two to include both the problem and solution.  
 
The results of children’s representational ability, indicates that two thirds of children 
were unable to represent and understand what had occurred in the base problem. 
Whether or not children were able to utilise this information to form the analogy 
based object with adaptation in the target problem was explored next. Since children’s 
representational ability improved significantly in session two, then it was expected 
that children’s use of representation on the target problems would also increase.  
 
Session one revealed that 40 per cent of children were able to form a representation 
and use this information to solve the target problem. Because more children were able 
to represent the base problem in session two, than in session one, it was expected that 
the percentage of children able to use the representation the base problem and solve 
the target problem would be greater in session two. Results revealed children who 
were able to form a representation of the target problem were more likely to solve the 
target problem. Of the 69 correct representations 51 per cent were used to solve the 
target problem. Thus, just over half went on to use this information to solve the target 
problem. This is an 11 per cent increase from session one.  
 
A chi square analysis was carried out to examine children’s target problem 
performance as a function of their base representations. Children who represented the 
base problem were more likely to solve the target problem (52 per cent) than those 
who did not represent the base problem (12 per cent)  χ2(1, N = 17) = 36.765; p<.05. 
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As in session one, this suggests that children benefited more from being able to 
represent the base problem than those who could not. However, not all children who 
represented the base analogue went on to solve the target problem.  Eight correct 
representations (12 per cent) were followed by the level 2 errors strategy in the target 
problem and 15 (22 per cent) were followed by analogy based object but without 
adaptation. Thus, just because children were able to form representations of the base 
problem, does not mean that they go on to solve the target problem using the analogy 
based object with adaptation suggesting a problem of access or transfer. However, 
considerably more children in session two were able to use the representation in their 
target solution (52 per cent and 40 per cent) χ2(1, N = 17) = 2.899; p<.05. Thus, 
children were benefiting more from their representations in session two than in 
session one.  
 
Since results reported earlier revealed differences in representational ability between 
3- and 4-year-olds, but no age differences in children’s ability to solve the target 
problem, no age prediction of whether children would use the representation in the 
target problem was made. The figures reveal that 50 per cent of the 3-year-olds who 
gave correct representations went on to solve the target problem with the analogy 
based object with adaptation and 54 per cent of 4-year-olds. These differences 
between 3- and 4-year-olds did not reach significance χ2(1, N = 17) = .321; p>.05.  
However, significant differences were found between age group and session. Three-
year-olds represented more base analogues and used them in the target problem in 
session two than in session one (50 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively)  χ2(1, N = 
8) = 14.500; p<.05. The same was found in 4-year-olds (54 per cent and 17 per cent, 
respectively) χ2(1, N = 9) = 29.894; p<.05. This suggests that both 3- and 4-year-olds 
improved in their ability to utilise their representation in the target problem over 
session.  
 
As in session one, children found the formation of representation difficult in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Children were able to form a representation and 
extract relations from the base problem and use them in the target problem more in the 
problems without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task (66 
per cent and 9 per cent, respectively)  χ2(1, N = 17) = 69.312; p<.05.  
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5.5.4 Post Task descriptions  
 
 
In session one, children were not able to express their choices using the analogous 
description. In session one, the most frequent description was the no preference 
description followed by perceptual-preference.  
 
Similarly, table 13 shows that the most common explanation from those in the video 
condition was no preference and perceptual-preference. In the control condition, the 
most common explanation was the perceptual-based explanation. As in session one, 
those who had received the base problem were unable to explain their choices in an 
analogical way. Thus, because analogical explanations were low, it was decided that 
no further analysis on age, condition or paradigm was necessary on children’s 
explanations. 
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Table 13: Percentages of Descriptions of Object Choices by Condition 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Description of object choices   Video      Control  ___________________________________ 
 
No Preference                               39             36              
Perceptual Preference   45        57                   
Goal-oriented     13        7             
Analogy                 3               0 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5.6 Discussion  
 
 
Thirty weeks on, children’s problem solving strategies changed from showing no 
preference in strategy choice to the analogy based object with adaptation being the 
dominant strategy, accounting for over a third of all choices.  This suggests that over 
time children moved from selecting less effective level 2 error strategies based on just 
one aspect of the problem/object to a reliance on the analogy based object with 
adaptation required to solve an analogous problem. Children continued to select the 
correct object but used it incorrectly to solve the problem. One explanation of 
children’s choice of analogy based object but without adaptation may have occurred 
due to fixed mental set. For example, because children know that to hold a water 
pistol, and to use it as a water pistol, they must hold it by the handle with the water 
end facing away from them.  However, if children were using the information from 
the video analogue then they should have used the water pistol in the analogous way 
that is, by holding the water end and using the handle as a hooked object. Conversely, 
if children were simply looking to solve the problem without reliance on the base 
information then this could explain the incorrect object use.   
   
The results in session two show, as in session one, no age differences in children’s use 
of the analogy based object with adaptation. Therefore, the hypothesis that 4-year-olds 
perform better than 3-year-olds was not supported even though the majority of 3-year-
olds were now 4-year-olds and 4-year-olds were now 5-year-olds. When age was 
explored across condition, results revealed similar findings to 3-year-olds in session 
one; in that, the analogy based object with adaptation was chosen more in the video 
then in the control condition. Therefore, it can be concluded that 3-year-olds need the 
base to help them solve the target problem more than 4-year-olds. Again, similar to 
session one, 4-year-olds performance with the analogy based object with adaptation 
across condition was similar suggesting that 4-year-olds used this strategy to a similar 
degree with or without a base problem, whereas 4-year-olds solve the target problem 
using the analogy based object with adaptation to a similar degree. Furthermore, 4-
year-olds in the control condition were able to solve the target problem with the 
analogy based object with adaptation more than 3-year-olds in the control condition. 
Again, suggesting the importance of a base problem for 3-year-olds. Instead of 
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selecting the most appropriate strategy or objects at random (as in session one), both 
3- and 4-year-olds chose significantly more level 2 errors in the control condition than 
in the video condition. This shows that both age groups preferred level 2 errors when 
they did not receive the base problem. Thus, children were aware that they needed a 
long item, for example, to reach the toy/ball, but did not use the function (hook and 
drag). Thus, without the relational knowledge, children will rely on level 2 error based 
on perceptual similarity (length) only. This contradicts Goswami’s (1992) suggestion 
that children will show no preference for one strategy over another when they do not 
possess the knowledge of relations (as those in the control condition were not exposed 
to the relations).  
 
However, since those in the control condition were not exposed to the relations in the 
base problem, children’s reliance on the level 2 error strategy was not related to the 
notion of lower-order relations. Instead it seems that this strategic choice was based 
on perceptual attributes of the object. For example, in the snake task, because children 
did not see that the actor in the video used a long tube to transport the bow to the 
desired location they could not transfer the relations to their tube-like snake. Thus, 
they chose the longest object (the stick) to attempt to reach the plate. Therefore, it 
seems that to select the level 2 errors strategy in problem analogies, children do not 
require an analogous base to select this strategy because it has certain physical 
attributes which would allow a child to attempt and even solve the target problem and 
once children hit on this successful strategy they are unlikely to move away from a 
reliance on surface similarity. This suggests children’s continued use of level 2 errors 
across tasks and sessions.    
 
The results of strategy choice across age and condition in session two revealed a 
number of important differences.  Children chose the analogy based object with 
adaptation more in the video condition compared to the control condition. This was 
predicted and supports the notion that children in the video condition will use the 
analogy based object with adaptation more than those in the control condition because 
they receive the relations from the base problem. However, the significant differences 
between conditions were not a function of age. Three- and four-year-olds chose the 
analogy based object with adaptation to a similar degree in the video condition.  
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As in session one, the hypothesis that children would perform better on problems 
without an auxiliary task than problems needing an auxiliary task was supported. This 
supports the suggestion that children may not possess the relational knowledge 
required to solve the hard problems. This was evident in children’s performance in the 
video condition. Despite them receiving the relations within the base problem, 
children continued failing to use this information to solve the hard problems. Again, it 
is uncertain if these children failed to solve the problem due to difficulty in accessing 
the relations, or simply because the relations were too difficult and they did not 
recognise the relational similarity between the base and target.  
 
This suggests that children who received the base problem on the problems without an 
auxiliary task were able to use the correct strategy more than those who had not 
received the base problem. Thus, it seems that optimal performance in the problems 
without an auxiliary task requires a base problem. Since no such differences occurred 
across condition in the problems needing an auxiliary task suggests that children need 
more than the presence of a base to enable problem solution of the problems needing 
an auxiliary task (i.e., knowledge of relations). The base is not sufficient, children 
need to understand the relations within the problem, i.e., a pendulum can be made 
from the clip and rope.     
 
Since performance with the analogy based object with adaptation was high on the 
problems without an auxiliary task, compared to the problems needing an auxiliary 
task, children’s poor performance on the problems needing an auxiliary task is likely 
to be due to a lack of relational knowledge. If it was a problem of access only, then a 
similar performance should have been observed between problem types. Thus, 
children’s different performance across problem types suggests a lack of relational 
knowledge because when the tasks became more difficult and children no longer 
possessed the knowledge of relations, children reverted to less effective strategies. 
However, the problem of access can not be ruled out completely because there were 
still children in the problems without an auxiliary task, despite possessing the 
knowledge of relations, failing to use the analogy based object with adaptation. This is 
likely due to not accessing the base information.  
 
Since over a quarter of children in the control condition used the analogy based object 
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with adaptation, suggests that children were able to solve the problems without a need 
for relational knowledge. However, when inspected across the problem type, the use 
of the analogy based object with adaptation in problems needing an auxiliary task 
accounted for only 4 per cent of responses. This suggests that children in the control 
condition found these problems more difficult than the problems without an auxiliary 
task. This may have been due to the fact that children of this age find choosing a 
object to retrieve an item out of reach a straightforward task that requires no base 
analogue, but when it comes to having to select an item/two items to create the 
appropriate object to retrieve the item children find it difficult without the presence of 
a base analogue. This provides evidence that relational knowledge plays a larger role 
than access.  
 
The prediction that children would perform better if they received the problems 
without an auxiliary task first was not supported. As in session one, there was no 
significant differences between receiving the auxiliary task first. Since both sessions 
found no benefit to children’s performance of receiving the problems without an 
auxiliary task first suggests that (1) success with the problems without an auxiliary 
task does not transfer to the problems needing an auxiliary task and (2) presentation of 
the problems needing an auxiliary task first has no negative effect on children’s 
analogical performance.    
 
The findings here confirm the suggestion that children were not benefiting from the 
presentation of problems without an auxiliary task first.  Six months on, children’s 
performance across both orders remained similar on the problems needing an 
auxiliary task which indicate that the problems needing an auxiliary task proved too 
difficult for children of this age regardless of whether they had help from the 
problems without an auxiliary task first. As in session one, children’s strategy choices 
were not always consistent, but varied both between and within paradigms. To 
determine why this was the case and to explore what caused children to change 
strategies across the different tasks children’s strategic variability was explored next.   
 
Furthermore, the analogy based object with adaptation was the most dominant object 
choice in both 3-and 4-year-olds in the video condition. This preference changed in 
the problems needing an auxiliary task to analogy based object but without adaptation. 
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Thus, both age groups continued to use the correct object across problems needing an 
auxiliary task, but they were unable to utilise the object analogically. This also may be 
due to a lack of relational knowledge i.e., not understanding that a mat can be rolled 
up and used as a transportation object. Despite receiving this information in an 
analogous base problem – children failed to recognise the relations across the target 
problem, and thus were unable to solve the problem analogically. This is supported by 
the performance of 3- and 4-year-old children in the control condition. They chose the 
analogy based object with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task 
than in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
 
Children’s preference for analogy based object but without adaptation in the video 
condition on the problems needing an auxiliary task, suggests that they may have 
understood that the tasks required the need to use the long hooked object in the toy 
retrieval task, but they were unable to transfer the correct action from the video.  If 
children cannot access the relations then they would rely more on level 2 errors 
(perceptual) because this strategy does not require the use of analogy. It could also be 
that children do not possess the knowledge of relations. That is, they do not 
understand that a long stick could be created out of the two shorter sticks or the clip 
could be made into a pendulum. Therefore, without such knowledge children select 
the correct object but do not use it to create the analogy based object with adaptation. 
This is what occurred. Three-and four-year-olds in the video condition were selecting 
analogy based object but without adaptation. This highlights both the importance of 
the base problem and knowledge when children are faced with difficult problems to 
solve. Children’s reliance on the correct object only indicates that to enable children 
to solve the problem using the most appropriate object, children need to be presented 
with an analogous problem for which they possess the relational knowledge, so that 
they can obtain the relevant [relational] knowledge to enable successful solution (but 
even then, this is not sufficient as evident in those in the video condition).  
 
It was hoped that by asking children to represent the base problem that this would 
shed some light on children’s ability to recognise the relations within the base 
problem. If children could represent the base problem and go onto solve the target 
problem using the analogy based object with adaptation, then it could be suggested 
that children had knowledge of relations and were able to use this knowledge. This 
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occurred in almost half of children. Furthermore, because some children could 
represent the base problem, but not solve the target problem correctly, then it could be 
suggested that children find the accessing of relations from the base difficult. 
 
Children’s representational ability in the present study confirms previous findings 
(Chen, 2003) that indicate representation as an important component in analogy. 
Without it children have no mental image on which to base their solution. However, 
as the present findings have shown, the ability to form a representation of the base 
problem was not sufficient to solve an analogous problem. Children have to access 
this knowledge at the appropriate time, and access all aspects of that representation to 
enable successful target problem solution. Given that a large number of children, 
across both sessions, were unable to use the information represented suggests a 
problem of accessing this information at the appropriate time. Therefore, children’s 
lack of analogical reasoning may be as a result of not understanding that the base and 
target are related, and therefore children fail to use the appropriate information gained 
from the base problem. If this is the case then children’s lack of analogical reasoning 
in problem analogies is not due to a lack of ability to represent (encode) the base 
problem, but simply an inability to access this information.  
 
This shift in representational ability is in line with previous evidence (Chen, 2003) 
that suggests 5-year-olds are capable of representing information from a base 
analogue. This may also explain why 4-year-olds use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation increased from session one. This supports the notion mentioned in session 
one, that the difficulty of the tasks themselves may explain why children performed 
both poorly on representation and solution in the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
Representation seemed to play more of an important role in young children’s ability to use 
information from the base problem in session two than in session one (51 percent and 40 
per cent, respectively). As in session one, representation was more beneficial in the 
problems without an auxiliary task due to children’s success at both representation and 
target solution. However, this could simply be that children did not require a base for 
problems without an auxiliary task (as evident in the good performance with the analogy 
based object with adaptation in those in the control condition) and therefore, did not 
require a representation. Reasoning behind an inability to represent the base problem, 
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particularly in the problems needing an auxiliary task, may be that the tasks were too 
difficult to represent. Therefore, children were unable to notice the required relations 
which resulted in the failure to create the analogy based object with adaptation.  
 
With the findings across both sessions relating to children’s representational use and 
subsequent target problem solution, it may be that children’s difficulty in using the 
analogy based object with adaptation was more than a lack of ability in representation 
formation or knowledge. The problem may lie in children’s ability to access and 
transfer the information from the base problem and transfer this information to an 
analogous problem. This is discussed further in the general discussion. 
 
The results of the post-task descriptions were similar to session one. Despite an 
increase in children’s perceptual preference explanation, children’s analogical 
descriptions remained low. Children who received the base problem moved away 
from the no preference/irrelevant information explanation towards perceptual 
descriptions, suggesting that in session two children may have been taking more 
notice of the need for certain attributes i.e., length. However, this did not increase the 
likelihood of subsequent correct problem solution.   
 
It is evident that, even 30 weeks on, children were unable to express their reliance on 
the base problem. Instead they relied on perceptual explanations. Such reliance on 
perceptual attributes may go some way to explaining why children were performing 
better with the problems without an auxiliary task. Given that the perceptual attributes 
of the objects in the problems without an auxiliary task were simple (relying on one 
transformation), for example, the long object could reach the far away item, children 
tried to look for these easy relations in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
However, the problems needing an auxiliary task required more than understanding of 
simple perceptual attributes. Children needed to understand that, for example, 
something square and flat (piece of paper) could be rolled up into a tube-like 
transportation object. Therefore, children’s perceptual strategies may have caused 
them to select analogy based object but without adaptation more in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task compared to the problems without an auxiliary task. In this 
sense, it supports Gentner’s surface similarity.     
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In addition, it could simply be that those able to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation were using the base information, but were only able to verbalize about 
perceptual similarity (or level 2 errors). As in session one, children’s lack of ability to 
describe their choices as analogical suggests that they were not benefiting from 
reflecting the reasons behind their choices. Even 30 weeks on, children were unable to 
explain their object choices. This has implications for children’s verbal ability in 
analogical problem solving.  
 
In summary, the results of children’s performance at week two indicates that 
children’s performance with the analogy based object with adaptation increased over 
the 30 week time frame. Children’s strategic use changed both over the six problems 
and across session revealing a significant change to less effective strategies on the 
problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
 
5.7 Classical Analogies versus Problem Analogies  
 
 
One of the key aims of the present study was to compare children’s strategy choices 
across classical- and problem-analogies.  If children used the same strategies on both 
types of analogy, then it may be that classical- and problem-analogies may require the 
same cognitive skills. Table 14 presents children's strategy choices across classical- 
and problem-analogies. The results in the problem analogies include those in the 
video condition only, because those in the control condition were not presented with 
the base problem, so their strategy choices were simply problem solving- and not 
analogical -strategies. 
 
Table 14 reveals that children were choosing different strategies to solve the problems 
across the classical and problem analogies.  In the classical tasks, children were 
relying more on the level 1 error, followed by level 2 errors, with the analogy based 
object with adaptation being chosen the least.  The most frequent strategy in the 
problem analogies in both sessions were strategies other than analogy based object 
with adaptations. These included no object use and non-analogical action. Despite the 
high percentage use of these alternative strategies, children were choosing the strategy 
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more in the problem analogies than the classical analogies in session one (15 per cent 
and 25 per cent, respectively) χ2 (1) = 3.125; p<.05 and in session two (28 per cent 
and 39 per cent, respectively) χ2 (1) = 2.716; p<.05. This indicates that children 
found using analogy in classical analogies more difficult than in the problem 
analogies.  
 
Children used similar amounts of level 2 errors strategies in both classical- and 
problem- analogies. This indicates that level 2 errors are included in children’s 
repertoire of problem solving in both classical and problem analogies to a similar 
degree. This strategy is easier to compare across both types of analogy because it 
meant that children take into account only one aspect of the transformation required. 
For example, in the classical analogies children only extract the change in shape and 
not change in pattern whereas in the problem analogies children only take into 
account the length of object and not the function of the object. In the toy retrieval task 
for example, children selected the long stick which has no hooked end to drag the toy.  
 
Children’s performance on classical analogues does not support Goswami and 
Brown’s (1989) findings. They found that 3-year-olds solved half of all analogies 
using the analogous card, and 4- and 6-year-olds solved almost two-thirds. In contrast, 
the present study found that children used the analogy based object strategy on just 
under a quarter of responses. It is uncertain why analogical use was so low in the 
current study compared to Goswami and Brown’s findings, because tasks in the 
current study were based on similar simple pictorial analogues. Children in the present 
study relied more heavily on level 1 errors, and although this supports Gentner’s 
suggestion of surface similarity, it is curious why children needed to select object 
matches when they possessed the required relational knowledge (shape and pattern 
change). This supports the notion that children had difficulty recognising the relations 
across the a and b and c and d terms. Even though children are told that they can use 
all terms to select the d term, they are unable to infer the relations, so they select a 
repeat of the c term. This supports Singer-Freeman’s (2005) findings that children 
have difficulty inferring the relations across terms. This also supports Gentner and 
Ratterman’s (1989) argument that children rely on surface similarity before relational 
similarity. 
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Table 14: The Percentage of Strategic choices in Sessions 1 and 2 Across Classical and Problem Analogies  
 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________    
 
Classical        Level 1 error    Level 2 error    Analogy      Other 
 
Session one  61       24   15      0 
Session two  52                20   28   0 
 
Problem 
Session one   4        25               25    46 
Session two   5       13   39    43 
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In contrast, children’s lack of reliance on level 1 errors in the problem analogies, 
highlights how difficult it is to compare classical and problem-analogies. For example, 
the object match (level 1 error) in the classical analogies was a repeat of the b and c 
term. Given that children did not receive any feedback as to whether or not their card 
choice was correct, many continued to select this choice on subsequent trials. 
Although the object matches in the problem analogies were based on the same 
premise (repeat of the b and c object/item), the nature of the problem analogies meant 
that children would gain feedback from the task, in that if they chose the incorrect 
strategy they were aware that they had failed the task. From a methodological point of 
view, because the object matches were not the most appropriate to solve the problem 
(not analogical), for example, in the toy retrieval task the level 1 error objects were a 
head scarf and a toy hedgehog, children did not select these object choices because 
they understood that these items could not retrieve an out of reach toy. Therefore, it is 
impossible to compare children’s selection of the level 1 errors across such different 
analogous tasks. Future research could match strategies so that the required the same 
object choice and function.  
  
The evidence presented in both classical- and problem-analogies suggests that these 
two types of analogical reasoning do not use the same processes.  As suggested by 
Singer-Freeman (2005), the problem of access and inference may explain why 
preschool children do not show a preference for the analogy based object with 
adaptation, and why children use alternative strategies. For example, children that 
were unable to infer relations (presented in the classical tasks) turned to level 1 errors, 
whereas children unable to access the relations (presented in the problem analogies) 
turned to level 2 errors. This can be explained in the following way; because the level 
1 error does not require children to choose any transformation, just a repeat/copy of an 
object, children find inference more difficult than access because unlike problem 
analogies, children in classical analogies do not see the transformations across the 
terms take place. Furthermore, because children are drawn to surface similarity before 
relational similarity, this caused children to look for perceptual similarity. However, 
this only explains children’s performance on classical analogies. Even on problems 
that needed an auxiliary task, children did not turn to object matches they chose either 
level 2 errors or analogy based object but without adaptation. 
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In contrast, children are not faced with the limitation of inference in the problem 
analogies. Here, the relations are already made clear in the base problem. Therefore, it 
is the job of the child not to infer relations, but to access the relations and realise that 
they can be used to solve the target problem.  However, unlike the classical analogies, 
where children are told that they can use the a:b terms, in problem analogies children 
are not given this information.  Therefore, children are faced with the problem of 
spontaneously accessing the relations. In problem analogies children see that an out of 
reach object for example, can be retrieved with a long hooked object, but it is the act 
of accessing this information that causes difficulty. Children see the relations laid out 
in front of them and they select a object that resembles that used in the base.  
However, children may not notice that the relations should be used in the target 
problem and fail to access the appropriate knowledge.  
 
This suggests that when children are unable to infer the relations they rely on surface 
similarity because they do not take into account any relations – even lower-order 
relations. In contrast, children unable to access relations use relational similarity in the 
form of lower-order relations (level 2 errors) and non analogous action, but fail to 
access the base problem relations to create the higher-order relations needed for 
analogical reasoning. A further reason highlighted in the results section was the 
influence of relational knowledge. Before children can transfer relations from one task 
to another they must understand those relations to enable them to extract the analogy 
based object with adaptation to solve an analogous problem. Although the present 
study did not match classical- and problem analogies on their relations, only strategies, 
future research needs to match both strategies and relations before any firm 
conclusions can be made about comparisons in children’s analogical ability between 
classical- and problem-analogies. If the relations across the classical and problem 
analogies are not the same then comparison of children’s performance across both is 
not viable.  
 
In summary, children in the present study rely on surface similarity when faced with 
classical analogies, as shown in their preference for the level 1 error strategy, but rely 
more on relational similarity in problem analogies, as evident in their preference for 
level 2 errors and the analogy based object with adaptation.  
 
 128 
5.8 General discussion for study 1 and 2 
 
 
As stated in the introduction, there have been several cross-sectional studies on 
children’s analogical problem solving over the past few decades, but none of them 
have used video analogues that focus on children’s alternative strategy use. Given that 
many of the studies have found a large percentage of non-analogous responses, it 
seemed reasonable to explore their alternative strategy choices to try to understand 
why preschool children find analogy difficult, and to explore the strategies children go 
through before they begin to recognise analogy as the most appropriate strategy. 
 
Study 1 set out to examine preschool children’s use of analogy in classical analogies. 
The study presented children with eight card tasks which required them to complete 
the pattern, choosing from an analogous card and four distractor cards. The aims of 
this study were to monitor children’s alternative strategy choices as well as their 
ability to use analogy. It also set out to explore the role of inference on children’s 
ability to use analogical reasoning. Furthermore, presenting the tasks on two separate 
occasions allowed us to monitor the existence of a relational shift, as predicted by 
Gentner and Ratterman (1989).  
 
Study 2 set out to examine what makes analogical problem solving difficult in spite of 
a potential for analogical reasoning. The study employed a cross-sectional approach 
involving the presentation of video analogues over two separate sessions, 30 weeks 
apart. This made it possible to examine 3- and 4-year-olds strategies choices on a set 
of 6 problems. The overriding predictions were that 4-year-olds would choose the 
analogy based object with adaptation more than 3-year-olds, and the presence of a 
base analogue would encourage children to select the appropriate analogy based 
object with adaptation above a set of five distractor objects. Children’s relational 
knowledge was measured by presenting two types of problem analogies: problems 
needing an auxiliary task and problems without an auxiliary task. It was predicted that 
due to the relational difficulty involved in problems needing an auxiliary task that 
children would find these problems more difficult since it was assumed that the 
relations would not be part of 3- and 4-year-olds’ repertoire of knowledge.   
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Study 2 also attempted to answer questions relating to the process of accessing 
relations. Previous research by Singer-Freeman (2005) has suggested that children’s 
poor performance with analogy occurs due to a difficulty in accessing the relations 
from the base problem. Therefore, in spite of children processing the relational 
knowledge children’s failure to use this knowledge derives from an inability to access 
this information from the base. Based on Gentner and Ratterman’s (1989) research, 
the presentation of problems thirty weeks apart grew out of the need to monitor the 
proposed relational shift. Therefore, it was predicted that children would show a shift 
from a reliance on strategies based on surface similarity to strategies reliant on 
relational similarity.  
 
Finally, since children’s analogical reasoning includes an encoding process, that 
requires children to understand the base information, the present study examines 
children’s ability to represent this information. Representation was also examined to 
see whether or not it plays a significant role in children’s ability to use analogy. Along 
side this pre-task children were also asked why they had chosen their particular 
strategy. It was expected that reflecting on their choices should help them on 
subsequent problems. Their reflection involves thinking about why they chose their 
particular strategy. 
Study 1 predicted that performance with classical analogies would improve with age. 
The results show that, with age and over session, children improved in both conditions, 
indicating age-related improvements in analogical reasoning.  Furthermore, the results 
support Gentner and Ratterman’s idea of a shift from surface- to relational similarity. 
Study 1 revealed that children showed a high level of object-match responses which 
decreased with age (and over session). Children were unable to ignore relational 
similarity at the start, and preferred this choice over analogical and other distractor 
cards. This was particularly true of 3-year-olds in both sessions, whereas, 5-year-olds 
preferred analogy, and 4-year-olds chose both strategies equally. This suggests that 
the age of 4 is an important transition point in that, children are moving away from 
surface similarity towards relational similarity. Therefore, future research on a 
relational shift would be wise to monitor the existence of a shift in 4-year-olds over a 
longer period of time or over multiple trials. That way the results across a 30 week 
gap cannot be accused of being too long and children’s experience during this time go 
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unmonitored. Study 3 explores this.  
Children’s performance with analogy in classical analogies was similar to previous 
research findings (Goswami and Brown, 1989) in that analogical responses were low. 
Since the analogies were made up of simple pattern and shape changes, it was 
unlikely that children were performing poorly due to a lack of relational knowledge. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the findings in study 1 were as a result of a lack of 
relational inference (inability to perceive the lower-order relation between the first 
two terms of the analogy). This supports Singer-Freeman’s (2005) findings that if 
children cannot infer the correct relationship between the a and b terms, they will not 
be able to apply this relation to the c and d term of the analogy and thus will be unable 
to complete the analogy. This resulted in children not looking for relational similarity 
in the c:d terms, but simply completing the pattern based on surface features. 
To improve children’s inference, future research could train children to use analogy. 
There is evidence that suggests explicit training has a strong effect on preschoolers' 
analogical reasoning performance (Reubenander, et al; 1987). Reubenander, et al 
(1987) administered the TARC to non-analogical reasoners and analogical reasoners 
to examine children’s abiltiy on claasical analogies. Training was based on 
Sternberg's four processes in the development of analogical reasoning in children: 
encoding, inferring, mapping, and applying (Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). The 
researchers found that analogical performance of children who received training 
performed better than children in a control group. Training children to use recognise 
the need for an analogy should encourage them to map and apply easy relations 
presented in the picture analogues.  
The existence of a shift was also monitored in study 2. However, the experiments in 
study 2 did not provide support for a perceptual-to-relational shift. Children either 
used analogy or level 2 errors, based on lower-order relations that take only one 
transformation into account. This raises questions about whether or not a relational 
shift exists in problems analogies. It may be that the object matches in problems of 
this kind did not lead children to successful solution. Moreover, children relied on 
lower-order relations that incorporated perceptual similarity, but not the kind found in 
repeated/copied objects presented in classical analogies. Therefore, theories that 
suggest relational development follows perceptual similarity which involves a conflict 
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between relations and percepts may be questionable.  If perceptual similarity was the 
leading strategy, we should have seen a high rate of perceptual matching among 3- 
and 4-year-olds regardless of condition and problem type. In fact, children rarely used 
perceptual similarity (through object matching) across both sessions. 
 
Despite the problem analogies not finding a perceptual-to-relational shift, a shift 
occurred from level 2 errors to the analogy based object with adaptation (lower-order- 
to higher-order-relations.  Gentner’s idea of surface similarity may have been present 
in the level 2 errors and analogy based object but without adaptation strategies. For 
example, the use of the analogy based object but without adaptation may suggest that 
children used object similarity, but not relational similarity, in that they selected the 
object for its length because they had seen the actor choose something long to retrieve 
the item. So, children were taking into account the object’s perceptual attributes only 
and not its functional attributes. Therefore, since children moved away from this 
strategy to select strategies based on the analogy based object with adaptation, may 
support Gentner and Ratterman’s (1991) relational shift hypothesis.  
 
This indicates that a relational shift may be on a continuum of relational reasoning. 
For example, providing that children have the relational knowledge, they may initially 
reason with lower-order relations (one transformation) and then move to recognising 
higher-order relations (two transformations). Therefore the shift exists here, and not 
from a perceptual-to-relational shift. This may provide some support for Halford’s 
(1992) notion of a relational shift; children shift from being able to process unary 
relations (lower-order relations) to binary relations (higher-order relations). Halford 
argues that it is not the increase in knowledge that drives the relational shift, but, 
changes in cognitive capacity; to employ similarity matches children must have the 
capacity to represent and map the number of arguments necessary for a match. Over 
time children’s increase in cognitive capacity permits them to make more complex 
mappings, based on relational reasoning. The present findings support Halford's 
predicted pattern of performance in that lower-order relations preceded relational 
responding. 
 
The data from study 2 indicate that children as young as 3 years of age show an 
emerging ability to extract information from a video analogue using the analogy based 
 132 
object with adaptation to solve an analogous problem, and this ability increases over a 
30 week period.  Despite the low number of analogical responses compared to 
alternative strategies, children were able to use analogies without a hint from the 
experimenter. Unlike in study 1, where children relied on object matches (level 1 
errors), here children relied heavily on level 2 errors (lower-order relations).  
 
Children in the video condition performed on a similar level, in session one, to 
children in previous studies. For example, children in Singer Freeman’s (2005) study 
produced analogous solutions on 24 per cent of occasions, and Holyoak et al (1984) 
found 30 per cent transferred without the use of explicit hints. Children in the present 
study produced analogous solutions 25 per cent of the time.  This figure increased to 
39 per cent in session two. More in line with the findings in session two, Chen (2002) 
revealed that children chose the analogous strategy on 44 per cent of responses. The 
similar percentages across these studies suggest that children of this age perform to 
this level of ability regardless of the different tasks and medium (visual or verbal) in 
which they are presented.  
 
Children’s performance with the analogy based object with adaptation suggests that 
the lack of hint did not seem to have a negative effect on children's ability to 
recognise that the base problem could be used to solve the target problem (as evident 
in children's ability to use the analogy based object with adaptation). However, a lack 
of hint was more noticeable in the problems needing an auxiliary task.  Here 
children's use of analogy was considerably lower in both the video and control 
conditions, in both sessions. This indicates that due to a lack of hint children may 
have had difficulty in accessing the relations from the base problem. If children’s poor 
performance in the problems needing an auxiliary task was purely as a result of a 
problem of access, then there would be little difference between the problems without 
an auxiliary task and problems needing an auxiliary task. However, this was not the 
case, suggesting the increase in complexity offered by an auxiliary task affected 
children’s performance. It may be that children do not understand the relations within 
the base problem. Children cannot reason with relations for which they have no 
knowledge - children may not possess the conceptual knowledge (i.e., that a mat can 
be rolled up to create a means of transportation) needed to solve the target problem. 
This supports Goswami and Gentner’s knowledge-based approach. If children do not 
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possess the knowledge of relations, then children will turn to alternative, less effective 
strategies that do not involve relational understanding.   
 
Children’s selection of level 2 errors and the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy, provide insights about children’s relational failures. In both these 
strategies children are relying on relational features of the problem, but are failing to 
implement the correct analogical action or transformation. It was clear that children 
were able to recognise and map relations (as predicted by the relational primacy 
hypothesis) but were not fully able to avoid distractors such as lower-order relations 
and perceptual similarity. This was evident in the poor performance with analogy in 
problems needing an auxiliary task, where relational complexity was apparent. This 
supports Richland et al’s (2006) findings that relational complexity made analogical 
processing more difficult, particularly in 3-year-olds.  
 
Children in the problem analogies showed very few age differences across 3- and 4-
year-olds. In session one, in both conditions, 3- and 4-year-olds chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation, level 2 errors and all other strategies. This suggests that 
3- and 4-year-olds show no preference for a particular strategy. However, 3-year-olds 
were more likely to select the analogy based object with adaptation in the video 
condition compared to those in the control condition which indicates that 3-year-olds 
may need an analogous base problem to help them solve the target problem. Whereas, 
the similar performance in analogy between video and control, in 4-year-olds, suggest 
that they do not require a base problem to select the most appropriate object to solve 
the target problem. By session two, 4-year-olds showed a preference for the analogy 
based object with adaptation above all other strategies, whereas 3-year-olds chose 
similar figures to 4-year-olds in session one. This figure differs in strategy choice in 
4-year-olds in the video condition suggesting that by age 5, children were moving 
away from alternative strategies to the appropriate analogy based object with 
adaptation. This indicates a change in thought towards relational similarity.   
 
Children performed better on problem analogies than on classical analogies. In 
problem analogies the same children were able to use analogical strategies to a much 
higher degree. Here children were performing more in line with Goswami’s (1989) 
notion that, providing preschool children possess the knowledge of relations, they 
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should be able to utilise the relations to solve the analogous problems. Goswami and 
Brown (1989) found that successful analogical performance was related to children’s 
relational knowledge, in that those who were able to understand the causal relations 
within the base and target were more likely to use analogy to solve the task. This was 
particularly evident in children’s performance in the problems without an auxiliary 
task because here children possessed the knowledge of relations and they were able to 
extract the knowledge to solve the target problem (over a third of responses in session 
one and almost two-thirds in session two). Despite this success with the analogy based 
object with adaptation, the response rate using this strategy was not one hundred per 
cent; children were selecting alternative strategies. Thus, something other than 
relational knowledge was preventing children from selecting the appropriate analogy 
based object with adaptation. 
 
Despite children in the video condition performing better than those in the control 
condition, not all responses in the video condition were analogous. A large percentage 
selected the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. One explanation as 
to why children in the video failed to adapt the object based on analogy is that they 
may have been using the information from the base, but honing in on the object’s 
attributes only. Therefore, children choosing the water pistol used a perceptually 
similar object, but did not see the functional similarity of that object, so failed to use it 
in a relationally functional way. A further explanation may be that children were not 
using the information from the base at all, and therefore were not selecting the object 
on surface similarity or relational similarity. Previous research (Brown, 1989) found 
that children as young as 3-years of age were able to use a long object to retrieve an 
item out of reach. Since it is an accepted part of a 3- and 4-year-olds conceptual 
knowledge that a long object can retrieve something out of reach, then children in this 
study may have selected the correct object based on this knowledge only, and 
therefore, did not need the relations from the base problem. This also explains why an 
almost equal number of responses [in session one] in the control condition were the 
correct object and action.  
  
These findings have implications for previous analogical studies in that children’s 
strategy choices may not measure children’s problem solving strategies at all, because 
the tasks presented to children are not ‘analogical problems’ in the true sense of the 
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word because children can solve them without the need of an analogous problem.  
Therefore, this would cause children in the present study to select the long objects 
equally, showing no preference for any of the long objects over others. This occurred 
in session one, but not session two. In session two, children were selecting the correct 
object and action above the other [two] long strategies.  This indicates that in session 
one, children did not choose the analogy based object with adaptation because they 
were unaware of the relationship between receiving the base and target, so did not 
understand that they had to use the base analogue to help them. However, by session 
two, 30 weeks later, this changed because children preferred the analogous strategy 
over the alternative long objects. This suggests that over time children fine tuned their 
chosen strategies to incorporate the analogy based object with adaptation.   
 
Presenting children with all six tasks consecutively may have affected their 
motivation, especially if they were continually failing to solve the problem. Moreover, 
young children may have become tired because they had to concentrate for up to half 
an hour by the time each task had been completed. Tiredness could also affect their 
concentration and motivation levels. Therefore, presenting one trial at weekly 
intervals (in study 3) should eliminate tiredness and low motivation levels.  
 
To address the issue of relational knowledge, children were presented with 3 problems 
needing an auxiliary task. Because these tasks required strategies that were not made 
obvious by their appearance, and relational knowledge was not assumed, children 
needed to use the base problem in order to solve them. Children’s poor performance 
with the analogy based object with adaptation in these tasks indicated that they found 
difficultly because of a lack of relational knowledge (Goswami 1992 and Gentner, 
1989); inability to access the relations (Singer-Freeman, 2005) or an inability to 
implement the relational knowledge (evident in their choice of analogy based object 
but without adaptation).  
 
Goswami and Gentner’s knowledge-based approach suggests that if children do not 
possess the knowledge of relations then they will turn to alternative strategies. This 
explanation is likely in that, children solved significantly more problems in the 
problems without an auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary 
task, where relations in the problems without an auxiliary task were assumed to be 
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part of their conceptual knowledge. Conversely, the knowledge-based assumption 
may explain children’s ability to solve the problems without a need for an analogous 
problem. For example, children may possess the knowledge that two sticks can be 
attached to make one long stick, and do not require a hint from an analogous problem 
in order to carryout this action. It seems that the need for an analogous problem may 
come when the tasks become more difficult, as was the case in the pendulum and roll 
up tasks. Before a child, or an adult, can select the appropriate objects to create a 
pendulum they must possess the knowledge that a pendulum can be made and could 
be used to solve the problem. Conversely, the knowledge that an item out of reach can 
be retrieved using a long object is already part of a child’s knowledge- base. 
 
The notion of a lack of relational knowledge explains performance in Piaget’s studies 
because the children in his studies did not possess the knowledge of relations i.e., that 
a ship has a rudder. Similarly, this explains performance on problems needing an 
auxiliary task where children may not have possessed the relational knowledge of a 
pendulum. However, it does not explain why some responses in the problems without 
an auxiliary task were non-analogous despite possessing the relational knowledge, or 
why some children could solve the problems needing an auxiliary task and others 
could not. As stated previously, failure to use relations from the base problem may 
have been due to an inability to access the relations. However, a lack of access may 
not be enough of an explanation. Given that a high percentage of responses were 
analogy based object but without adaptation indicates that children were accessing the 
correct relations from the base, but were failing to implement the correct action. Since 
this strategy was chosen in both problem types needing an auxiliary task suggests that 
children were using the information from the base problem, but were finding 
difficulty in implementing the correct action. This suggests that the process of 
accessing the relations may be a dual process that includes both accessing and 
implementation of the correct action.  
 
The hypothesis that older children would represent more base analogues than younger 
children was supported in session two, but not in session one.  Why younger children 
were able to represent more analogues in session one is unknown.  It could be that 
older children did not feel the need to verbalise what was occurring in the video 
analogue.  If this was the case then, the lack of representation in 4-year-olds in session 
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one, should not affect their performance with the analogy based object with adaptation. 
This was not found to be the case. Four-year-olds did not outperform three-year-olds 
in their use of the analogy based object with adaptation, suggesting that the lack of 
representation did affect four-year-olds performance on the target problem. In contrast, 
in session two, four-year-olds were able to represent the base problem more than 
three-year-olds. This was also reflected in their ability to use the analogy based object 
with adaptation in the solution of the target problem – 4-year-olds performed better 
with the analogy based object with adaptation in session two.   
 
Children’s increase in choosing the analogy based object with adaptation over session 
may have occurred due to maturation. That is, the change in strategy over time was 
more likely to reflect an increase due to an ageing process, without any increase in 
task manipulation. Since children received no formal practice between the two 
performances suggests that they possessed the appropriate cognitive ability to enable 
them to use the analogy based object with adaptation. In spite of the fact that children 
may have gained experience in other areas of knowledge during this time, because 
analogy is considered to be a sophisticated domain-specific ability, any change may 
have occurred due to maturation rather than an increase in knowledge per se.    
Children’s increase in performance with analogy as a function of an increase in 
knowledge was not tested here. Unless children receive specific practice on similar 
scenarios within the classroom/home over the six month period, it was unclear 
whether or not children were able to build up their specific knowledge to warrant such 
an increase in analogical use. Therefore, no firm conclusions can be made with 
regards to the cause of change. Thus, the use of a microgenetic study, in study 3, that 
presents children with multiple trials should highlight the effect of an increase in 
knowledge on children’s analogical problem solving ability.     
The findings of a significant difference in children’s use of the analogy based object 
with adaptation between those able to represent the problem and those unable to 
represent the problem supports the hypothesis that representation facilitates analogical 
use. This is in line with Chen’s (2003) findings. In her study, Chen found that almost 
two-thirds of those able to form a representation went on to solve the target problem, 
compared to a third who were able to solve the problem without representation. The 
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present study revealed, just under half in session one, and in session two, just over 
half were able to form a representation and solve the target problem, whereas those 
without a representation solved the target problem around 15 per cent in both sessions. 
These findings suggest that representation plays an important role in children’s ability 
to select the analogy based object with adaptation. Conversely, representing the base 
information did not always lead to success in the target problem. Not all children who 
represented the base problem used the analogy based object with adaptation to solve 
the target problem. In the stick problem for example, even though the base problem 
provided children with the information to attach two items to create a long object, 
they still had to search the appropriate items and attach them, then use the created 
object to retrieve the sponge from the tube. Many children failed at this last step. 
Instead of using the object as it was presented in the base problem and as they had 
described in the base description, they used the object in a different, non-analogous 
way. Thus, children found the transformation to the target problem difficult, which 
was particularly evident in the problems needing an auxiliary task. This suggests that 
when children were faced with more difficult tasks that required them to create an 
object to solve the problem, children found the extra procedures difficult. Furthermore, 
the reliance on analogy based object but without adaptation supports the notion that 
children find the final stage (implementation) of analogy difficult. 
 
These findings are similar to those found in Chen’s (2003) study. Chen revealed that 
children in her study found difficulty in executing the new information. This was even 
the case with children who had received a hint to use the base information. Therefore, 
it seems that just because children possess the knowledge of relations (as evident in 
the level 2 error presented in the problems without an auxiliary task), can represent 
the information and even choose the correct objects, does not guarantee successful 
solution of the target problem. Children may simply not understand that they can use 
the information from the base, again indicating that children may need repeated 
exposure to tasks so they can make the appropriate links to the target problem.  
 
So, why were some children able to represent the base analogue and others not, and 
how could some of these children use this information and others not? The answer 
may lie in what exactly were children representing. Since some children were not 
describing the problem that faced the actor suggests that they may not be interpreting 
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the solution to a problem at all, but in fact witnessing someone using an umbrella, in 
the case of the toy retrieval task, to retrieve a scarf and not take any notice of the actor 
having to use an object to retrieve the scarf out of reach (representing an actual 
problem). This may result in children not understanding the relationship between the 
base and target problem. However, just because children were not describing both the 
problem and solution does not mean that they did not know that the actor was faced 
with a problem requiring the retrieval of something out of reach. It may simply have 
been that they found difficulty in verbalising the problem. If children represented the 
problem only, this would indicate that they were solving the problem without 
knowledge of relations which would result in children choosing non-analogous 
objects. This is what happened on all occasions that the problem only was represented. 
This behaviour is in line with Kurtz and Loewenstein’s (2007) notion of similarity-
based retrieval which suggests children are using a problem schema.  If children are 
using a problem schema only, they are less likely to solve the target problem, because 
the problem schema does not allow children to create a solution on which to work 
with.  They may simply see the problems are similar, but do not represent the 
appropriate information to allow a solution to appear.  
 
In contrast, if children were representing the solution only, this is likely to facilitate 
transfer using a generalised solution strategy to allow children to adapt and apply the 
retrieved knowledge from the base problem (Novick and Holyaok, 1991). Therefore, 
those able to represent the solution only, may still be able to see the relationship 
between the base and target, and the solution may be enough to allow children to 
solve the problem because it presents them with solution strategies, especially in the 
problems without an auxiliary task which allow them to attempt and solve each 
problem. This was the case, because almost half of all correct target solutions were 
preceded by representation of the solution only. Previous research suggests that 
solution and problem schemas provide optimum success, so if children are using both, 
they should perform better than those who represent the problem and solution only. 
This was found, thus, it seems that representation may play an important role in 
children’s ability to solve analogous problems in that representing the problem only is 
not sufficient to allow analogical success on target problems, whereas representation 
of solution only improves success.  However, for optimum success both problem and 
solution needs to be represented. Nevertheless, just because children represented the 
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information it did not guarantee successful transfer of relations to the target problem.   
  
Children’s low performance in utilizing the base problem was supported by children's 
post-task verbal descriptions of their choices.  Children were unable to state that they 
had used the information from the base problem, despite using visual analogues to 
lessen the cognitive load placed upon children during the analogical problem.  
However, it is possible that children's vocabulary level may have influenced the lack 
of analogical descriptions. Another explanation could be that because children showed 
a perceptual preference, it may be that children of this age can only reason (verbally) 
using surface similarity i.e., length and biggest, rather than explaining relational 
similarity. Therefore, 3- and 4-year-olds ability to both reason with and perform 
analogy tasks may be limited to simple surface similarity. If this was the case then 
children should have focused equally on the other level 2 errors strategy - the function 
of the object (e.g. the short golf club). However, this was not the case, only a small 
number of responses included the correct function object. Children seemed to have 
preferred the length, and so were distracted by the physical appearance of the object, 
which supports Gentner’s (1989) findings and the previous suggestion, that children 
may have relied solely on the need to use a long object.   
 
Children’s lack of success following feedback from their failure to solve the target 
problem was interesting. Siegler (2006) argued that children should benefit from 
feedback, and move to alternative strategies following failure. However, this was not 
always the case. Children often continued using the same incorrect strategy despite 
failing to solve the problem. Furthermore, when asked to reflect on their choices, 
children did not support their analogical choices with analogical explanations. 
  
The results of the classical analogies and problem analogies show that these types of 
problems measure different abilities. Despite the fact that children need to use 
analogical reasoning to solve them, this is where the similarity ends. Children relied 
on level 1 errors in the classical analogies – mainly because they were distracted by 
the effect of copying the c term, because they did not understand what was expected 
of them (that they could use the a and b term) and they received no feedback as to 
whether or not their choice was correct. In contrast, the problem analogies revealed 
very little use of the object match strategy, with a preference for level 2 errors. 
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However, this difference in responses may be methodologically related. Unlike the 
classical analogies, in the problem analogies children received feedback from the task, 
via solution. That is, if children fail to solve the problem then they realised that their 
choice of object/strategy was incorrect, which may encourage them to select another 
strategy on subsequent trials. Furthermore, in the majority of tasks it was obvious that 
the level 1 error object could not solve the problem, so children did not select it. 
 
In her study, Singer-Freeman (2005) suggested that if children performed better on 
classical analogies than problem analogies then access plays a significant role in 
failure to use analogy. Whereas, if children performed better in problem analogies 
than in classical analogies then relational knowledge or relational inference plays an 
important role in analogy. Children performed better in the problem analogies, 
suggesting that children were finding inferring the relations difficult. As expected, 
children preferred strategies that relied on surface similarity. Despite better 
performance in problem analogies, children’s use of alternative strategies was high. 
This was particularly the case in problems needing an auxiliary task, suggesting that 
these types of task require relational understanding.  Despite the use of problems 
needing an auxiliary task in the problem analogies, the classical analogies did not 
include a comparative problem.  Therefore, future research would be wise to include a 
similar task on the classical analogies based on similar relations. So comparisons 
across problem type can be clearly matched. The differences in children’s choice of 
the object match highlights the differences across the problem analogies and the 
classical analogies and that they require different skills, so should therefore be 
measured using different tasks and strategy choices.  
 
 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
 
  
Study 1 and 2 showed us that despite the success of some children using analogy, 
their use of the analogy based object with adaptation was unstable. Children tended to 
rely on level 2 errors to a greater degree. The largest difference in strategy use 
occurred in the problems needing an auxiliary task. This suggests that children were 
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affected by relational difficulty and the need to manipulate an auxiliary task. Previous 
research has suggested that children benefit from practice/training with analogy, 
therefore, it was decided that the following microgenetic study should monitor 
children’s performance over a longer period of time with repeated trials. This should 
not only eliminate single-trial bias, but also allow us to monitor change as it occurs 
and explore the benefits of practice with analogical problems.  
 
Finally, children’s responses in study 1 and 2 highlight the fact that comparing 
performance across classical- and problem-analogies is problematic. They are both 
affected by different reasoning skills – classical; inference and problem; access. 
Future research may need to look for more ecologically valid problems based on 
similar relational and structural similarity to examine whether children’s success on 
such problems can be compared on equal status. It is also important to note that 
analogical reasoning is affected by a number of factors that include relational 
knowledge, relational difficulty and representation to name but a few. It seems that 
when these provide are presented to children at their optimum level (i.e., simple 
relations for which they possess the knowledge), children show an emerging ability to 
use analogy. 
 
To capture and monitor this emerging ability over time, study 3 examined children’s 
ability to use analogy on a weekly basis for 30 weeks. This should provide evidence 
of why and how children improved over sessions and allows us to plot any change in 
strategy use. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Study 3 
 
6.1 Microgenetic Study 
 
Study 2 observed children's analogical ability and strategy use over two separate 
occasions, 30 weeks apart.  Findings suggest that children as young as three years of 
age were able to use analogy, and children's strategy use varied over tasks and across 
sessions in problem analogies. In session two, children relied on the analogy based 
object with adaptation significantly more in the video condition than the control 
condition, which suggests that children were benefiting from the presence of a base 
problem which provided the appropriate relational knowledge. Study 2 found no age 
differences in children’s analogical ability (in the video condition). It was concluded 
that 3- and 4-year-olds performed to a similar degree overall. Children in both age 
groups relied on all strategies to a similar degree in session one, indicating that 
children of this age show no preference for one particular strategy over another. By 
session two, children decreased in their use of level 2 errors and increased in 
analogical use. This was particularly evident in 4-year-olds.  
Due to the poor performance in three-year-olds in study one, and because four-year- 
olds showed a significant increase in analogical use from session one to two, it was 
decided that the age groups for study 3 should change from 3- and 4-year-olds to 4- 
and 5-year-olds. This increase in age selection should improve the chances of 
observing strategy change toward analogical use as it occurs. Furthermore, because 
more 4-year-olds than 3-year-olds increased in their use of analogy from session one 
to session two suggests some developmental change in their use of the analogy was 
occurring over 30 weeks in older children. Therefore, to understand what was 
developing over the 30 week period, and to observe this change in strategy use 
directly, the following study observed children's performance continually at weekly 
intervals by employing a microgenetic level of analysis.  
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In addition to observing analogical and strategy development, presenting children 
with multiple trials should answer some of the questions outstanding from study 2 
regarding the relational shift hypothesis. Since study 2 found a shift from the use of 
level 2 errors to analogy, it will be interesting to see whether a similar shift exists in 
older children over a longer period of time. Furthermore, because children’s 
performance was monitored weekly, on the same tasks, this should highlight the 
factors affecting such a shift/change in strategy use i.e., practice, feedback or an 
increase in relational knowledge.  
 
As stated earlier, before children can use relational knowledge in analogical problem 
solving tasks, they must be able to understand the relations in both the base- and 
target-problem, and co-ordinate these relations and transfer the knowledge and action 
onto the target problem towards successful solution (relational similarity). However, 
failure to seek relational similarity is not the same thing as an inability to use analogy. 
For example, children in study 2 possessed the knowledge of relations, but were not 
be able to transfer them to the target problem (access). It is hoped that the use of the 
microgenetic study will improve children’s ability to access relations from the base by 
presenting children with multiple trials. The use of multiple trials should also improve 
children’s performance on relationally difficult problems – those needing an auxiliary 
task, because children will become familiar with the problems due to practice.  
 
Unlike study 2, that allowed single snapshots of strategy use on six separate tasks, the 
microgenetic method allows for in depth analysis of children’s choices over 30 
sessions, not just during one session. Therefore, any changes within a task were 
observed, shedding light on the components within change such as children’s pattern 
of strategic behaviour, the path, rate, breadth and variability of strategic change. 
These components would in turn inform us of the source of such change in strategy. 
By observing what children do before, during and after using analogical reasoning, 
and how strategies vary both within and between tasks should enlighten us about the 
development of analogical use in preschool children. It is envisaged that the 
microgenetic method used would facilitate the taking of detailed performance notes 
which may reveal how these processes operate. 
 
The low number of responses of children choosing analogy in study 2 may have 
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occurred because an explicit hint was not given, and because of the difficulty children 
face in realising that an analogy was appropriate. It has been well established that 
presentation of more than one analogy helps children notice that an analogy is 
relevant to the task (Gholson, Eymard, Mikey and Kamhi, 1987). Therefore, multiple 
examples of the same problem may encourage children to extract a more generalized 
problem solution schema which will help children realize the relationship between the 
base- and target-problem, which should facilitate analogical use (Goswami, 1992). 
Furthermore, comparing children’s solutions within multiple trials of the same task 
may help unravel relational structure, and investigate if children are able to use failure, 
past strategy use or feedback from previous experience of the tasks, in subsequent 
trials.  For that reason, children were presented with the same six problems as those 
presented in the cross-sectional study, but rather than children receiving each problem 
once they each received five attempts at each task.  
 
Unlike the tasks in study 2, the present study did not counterbalance the presentation 
of order for two reasons. Firstly, order had no affect on children's performance in the 
cross-sectional study, and secondly, because children were monitored over the 30 
weeks any developmental changes needed to be observed under optimal conditions. 
Therefore, all children received problems without auxiliary task first. Presenting 
children with thirty trials at weekly intervals should also inform us about the 
importance of practice.  It has been well-documented that practice with analogical 
problems, facilitate success on subsequent tasks.  To measure the effects of practice 
on trials, a third condition was added - the no practice condition. Here children 
received each of the six tasks, but unlike those in the video condition who received 
five attempts at each task, they received one attempt at week one and another at week 
five.  This was repeated over the six tasks, so those in the no practice condition 
received twelve, as opposed to thirty trials.  Since the no practice condition was 
employed to measure the importance of repeated exposure to the task, it is expected 
that these children would not benefit from the practice that those in the video and 
control conditions received. As in study 2, the control condition was used to 
determine children’s ability to solve the problem without prior relational knowledge 
from a video analogue. 
 
It is expected that children would benefit from the multiple trials on each problem and 
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would show an increase in analogical use over trials. Also, by presenting children 
with multiple trials should increase children’s ability to transfer their newly acquired 
knowledge to a structurally similar task. Transfer effects have implications for domain 
transfer and transfer to relationally difficult tasks. For example, if children can build a 
schema of analogical use over trials, then this should allow them to use this new skill 
on problems needing an auxiliary task. As well as observing between-task transfer, 
the use of multiple trials will observe within task transfer. As a result, it is expected 
that children's performance on problems needing an auxiliary task should exceed 
children's performance in study 2, due to repeated exposure to the tasks which may 
facilitate transfer. Transfer across tasks will be measured by examining children’s 
performance on each of the tasks separately.   
 
In support of the findings in the study 2, it is expected that some children would be 
able to solve the problems despite not receiving the video analogue, because they 
possess the basic knowledge that to reach an out of reach item, one needs to select a 
long object. However, because children were now receiving practice on each of the 
problems this should allow children to select more appropriate objects on each trial, 
through the promotion of feedback and practice with the problem itself.   
 
Since the video condition provided children with optimal conditions (practice and 
base problem), it is predicted that, if children perform better with analogy in the video 
condition compared to the control condition, then this may be due to the presence of a 
base problem (extraction of relational similarity). If children perform better on the 
video- compared to the no practice- condition, it can be suggested that practice 
encourages children to choose the analogy based object with adaptation. Since both 
groups received the base problem, better performance in the video condition would 
suggest that practice plays an important part in children’s ability to extract and use 
higher-order relations to solve analogical problems. If children perform better on the 
control- than the no practice-condition, then it could be as a result of practice with the 
tasks themselves. In that, children may possess the knowledge that surrounds 
retrieving an out of reach item, and through trial and error children are able to select 
the appropriate strategy. Conversely, if children perform better on the no practice- 
compared to the control –condition, then practice with the problems themselves, is not 
essential.  
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The quantitative group data presented here and in study 2 make clear the choices 
children make. However, the group data will not reveal the patterns of strategy use of 
individual children. In study 2, although this data was not reported, it was evident that 
children showed variability in strategy choice, not only between children, but also 
within each child's performance across tasks. Therefore, trial-by-trial case studies 
needed to be adopted to provide an indication of the extent and form of within-subject 
variability and to shed light on the path of change (i.e., is the change qualitative or 
quantitative). Therefore, seven individual children’s performance across the 30 weeks 
were presented and discussed. It is expected that children’s case studies would reveal 
the obstacles and facilitators of strategic change and relational knowledge. Individual 
data is examined in relation to strategic pattern, usage and change across the 
observation period.  
 
Finally, with regards to children’s representational ability in their pre-verbal 
descriptions, study 2 found that just under half of children were able to benefit from 
representing the base problem. Therefore, it is expected that children able to form a 
representation of the base problem, would go on to solve the target problem using the 
analogy based object with adaptation more than those who do not form a mental 
representation of the base problem. It is also expected that multiple exposure to the 
base problem would result in improved representational ability. Similarly, children’s 
post-task interviews were also coded to explore the reasoning behind their choices. 
Children in the cross-sectional study showed a preference for perceptual attributes 
above analogy. Since children in the present study received practice and were an older 
age cohort, it is predicted that children would choose more analogical explanations 
(because of the repeated exposure to the tasks). Children’s post task descriptions are 
also monitored. Children received multiple trials which allows for multiple feedback 
from each attempt. Therefore, if children were selecting a strategy that did not solve 
the problem they would be more likely to select a different strategy on subsequent 
trials.  
 
The following results are presented in three sections; target problem, representation of 
the base problem and post-task description.  
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6.2 Methodology 
 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
Thirty, 4- and 5-year-olds were recruited from school two. These children also took 
part in the classical analogies in study one. There were fifteen 4-year-olds and fifteen 
5-year-olds, 12 males and 18 females. Children were randomly allocated to one of 
three conditions, with ten children in each; no practice, control and video condition.   
 
 
6.2.2 Materials and procedure 
 
 
Children received the same 6 problems presented in study 2. Experimenters followed 
exactly the same procedure only over repeated trials. Children in the video condition 
received six tasks consisting of five attempts at each task, lasting for a 30 week period.  
They were presented with the base analogue and the action target problem. Their 
performance was monitored for their ability to use the information from the base to 
solve the target problem, and to assess any alternative strategies used.  Children in the 
video condition were given 5 attempts at each task, to see how multiple exposures to a 
task would help or hinder performance. Children in the no practice condition also 
received the base problem, but only received two trials of each task at week 1 and 
week 5 (task 1) week 6 and week 10 (task 2) week 15 and week 20 (task 3), and so on. 
Finally, those in the control condition received 5 trials per task, but no base.  
 
 
6.3 Results  
 
  
The experimenter and an observer blind to the experimental design independently 
scored all participants across all three sections of the study. Inter-rater agreement was 
97% for the verbal description of the base problem, 100% for the action target 
problem and 97% for the verbal description of object choice, indicating reliable 
judgments. 
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Children were presented with five separate attempts at six problems. Children 
received each problem at weekly intervals over a 30 week time frame. To examine 
strategy change over time children’s strategy choices and variability within and 
between problems were explored. As well as the exploration of strategy choices, age 
differences, condition and problem type, data was also discussed in relation to the five 
dimensions of change mentioned earlier; the path, rate, breadth, variability and source 
of change.  
  
To explore whether the differences mentioned above were due to the different age 
cohorts the following section examines age differences by condition and strategy 
choices. Since findings in study 2 revealed a significant difference in children’s ability 
to use analogy across problems without an auxiliary problem, it was decided that 
analysis would explore findings based on problem type: problems with and without 
auxiliary task.  As in study 2, children performed better with analogy in the problems 
without an auxiliary task compared to problems needing an auxiliary task (57% and 
13%, respectively). A chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference in 
children’s selection of the analogy based object with adaptation between problem 
types χ2(1, N = 30) = 42.549; p<.05. This suggests that children found using the 
analogy based object with adaptation much easier in the problems without an 
auxiliary task compared to the problems needing an auxiliary task, which support a 
knowledge-based explanation.   
 
Table 15 shows that due to the difficulty faced by children on problems needing an 
auxiliary task they relied on alternative strategies. For example, the most frequent 
strategy choice in the problems needing an auxiliary task overall was the level 2 errors 
strategy (46 per cent). In contrast, children’s performance with level 2 errors in the 
problems without an auxiliary task was much lower (9 per cent). Thus, the level of 
difficulty in the problems needing an auxiliary task caused children to select a less 
appropriate strategy that did not rely on higher-order relations. Table 15 presents 
children’s performance on each of the strategies by paradigm, age and condition. 
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Table 15: The Percentage of Children’s Strategic Choices by Age, Condition and Problem Type 
 
 
     
          Without auxiliary task         With auxiliary task 
          4-year-olds                         5-year-olds                                   4-year-olds                            5-year-olds 
 
Strategy                      Video  Control  No practice    Video  Control  No practice      Video  Control  No practice     Video  Control  No practice               
 
No solution attempt                               5           20            46                  1             6             3                     8           37           33                 11           18            8  
Level 1 error         0         0              4                  0             0             0                   12            8             0                   0             6             3     
Level 2 errors         1             3              8                  7            13          28                   45          40            59                 32           58           53 
Analogy based object 
 without adaptation           19           30            13                27           21          36                   17.5        15             8                 24           14           25 
Analogy based object with 
 adaptation               75            47            29                65           60          33                   17.5         0              0                 33            4            11 
 
 
 151 
Table 15 shows that performance was better in the video condition across both age 
groups and problem type. Four-year-olds in the video condition chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation more in the problems without an auxiliary task than in 
the problems needing an auxiliary task (75 per cent and 17.5 percent, respectively). A 
chi square revealed significant differences χ2(1, N = 15) = 65.300; p<.05. The same 
was found in 5-year-olds (65 per cent and 33 percent, respectively; χ2(1, N = 15) = 
20.488; p<.05. Children’s good performance, in the video condition on the problems 
without an auxiliary task, may have been due to children’s understanding of the 
relations in the base problem or the simple nature of the tasks in the problems without 
an auxiliary task.  
 
Similarly, table 15 shows that 4- and 5-year-old children in both the control- and no 
practice -condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the 
problems without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
Four-year-olds in the control condition chose the analogy based object with 
adaptation on 47 per cent of the problems without an auxiliary task whereas the same 
children failed to use the analogy based object with adaptation on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task. The same occurred in the no-practice condition. Four-year-
olds chose the analogy based object with adaptation on 29 per cent of the easy trials 
compared to no selection of the analogy based object with adaptation on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task.  Thus, 4-year-olds in the control condition were able to 
solve the problems without an auxiliary task without a base problem. This confirms 
the findings of the cross-sectional study, in that children may possess the knowledge 
required to solve the simple tasks in the problems without an auxiliary task, but not 
the knowledge to create an object and solve a conceptually more difficult task. 
Therefore, since children in the video condition were able to use suggests that 
children of this age require a base problem to help them in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task, but even then this does not guarantee that children will select the 
analogy based object with adaptation. Four-year-olds in the no-practice condition 
seemed to benefit from practice with the problems without an auxiliary task, which is 
evident in their ability to choose the analogy based object with adaptation (29 per 
cent).   
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Children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation differed across condition 
in both age groups. Four-year-olds chose the analogy based object with adaptation 
more in the video condition, than in the control- and no practice -condition. Those in 
the control condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation more than those 
in the no practice condition χ2(1, N = 15) = 42.989; p<.01 (75 per cent, 47 per cent 
and 29 per cent, respectively). The same occurred in 5-year-olds χ2(1, N = 15) = 
23.774; p<.01 (65 per cent, 60 per cent and 33 per cent, respectively), although the 
difference between the video and control condition was less pronounced. This 
suggests that optimum performance in the problems without an auxiliary task required 
both base problem and practice because despite both age groups ability to use the 
analogy based object with adaptation in the control and no practice conditions, the 
best performance came from those in the video condition.  The similar performance of 
5-year-olds in the video- and control conditions compared to the no practice with the 
base and without the base problem, suggests that practice benefits children more than 
no practice.  
 
Five-year-olds performance in the control condition also differed significantly 
between the problem without an auxiliary task and problems needing an auxiliary task 
(60 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). Similar results were found in the no practice 
condition (33 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively). Again, this indicates that 
children found the tasks in the problems needing an auxiliary task much more difficult 
than the problems without an auxiliary task in the problems without an auxiliary task. 
This was the case for both age groups and each of the three conditions.  
 
As stated earlier, 5-year-olds performed better than 4-year-olds on the problems 
needing an auxiliary task in all three conditions. Furthermore, 5-year-olds performed 
better with the analogy based object with adaptation in the video condition, followed 
by the no practice condition then the control condition χ2(1, N = 30) = 34.077; p<.01 
(33 per cent, 11 per cent and 4 per cent, respectively). The better performance in the 
no practice condition compared to the control condition suggests that 5-year-olds 
benefited slightly more from the use of a base problem in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task than practice. Thus, when problems become more difficult the base is 
more important than practice.  
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Four-year-olds chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in the video 
condition than in the control condition χ2(1, N = 15) = 38.298; p<.01 (17.5 per cent, 0 
per cent and 0 per cent, respectively). This indicates that 4-year-olds found using 
analogy difficult when they received no practice or no base problem. Even those who 
did receive both practice and base problem found the problems needing an auxiliary 
task difficult, in that over three-quarters of children in the video condition were 
selecting alternative, less effective strategies.    
 
The results on paradigm show that children found the problems needing an auxiliary 
task significantly more difficult than the problems without an auxiliary task, but their 
performance was also dependent on the condition. For example, 4- and 5-year-olds in 
the video condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation more than those in 
the no practice and control condition. This suggests that both the base and practice is 
important in solving problems needing an auxiliary task. Level 2 errors were more 
prevalent in the problems needing an auxiliary task, providing evidence for a lack of 
relational knowledge. Furthermore, the results revealed that 5-year-olds chose the 
analogy based object with adaptation more than 4-year-olds. Thus, older children 
perform better with analogy than younger children. This supports the hypothesis that 
children in the video condition would chose the analogy based object with adaptation 
more than those in the no practice- and control-condition.  
 
 6.3.1 Error analysis 
 
Four-year-olds in the control condition chose analogy based object but without 
adaptation  significantly more in the problems without an auxiliary task compared to 
the problems needing an auxiliary task χ2(1, N = 7) = 6.452; p>.05 (30 per cent and 
15 per cent, respectively). Since children in the control condition did not receive the 
base problem, they did not have access to the relations. So therefore, were unable to 
extract appropriate information to help them solve the target problem. Thus, tasks in 
the problems needing an auxiliary task required a base problem more than those in the 
problems without an auxiliary task. Similarly, 5-year-olds choice of analogy based 
object but without adaptation in the control condition featured more in the problems 
without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary task (21 per cent 
 154 
and 14 per cent, respectively). However, a chi square analysis revealed no significant 
differences χ2(1, N = 7) = 1.697; p>.05, suggesting that 5-year-olds chose analogy 
based object but without adaptation to a similar degree across problem type.  
Differences also occurred in children’s choice of level 2 errors across problem type 
and condition. Table 16 shows that 4-year-olds chose level 2 errors more in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task compared to the problems without an auxiliary 
task in the video condition (45 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 10) = 
54.658; p<.05, suggesting that when presented with problems needing an auxiliary 
task, 4-year-olds revert back to level 2 errors. Similarly in the control (40 per cent and 
3 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 10) = 40.557; p<.05 and no practice condition (59 
per cent and 8 per cent, respectively)  χ2(1, N = 10) = 58.377; p<.05. Similar results 
were found in the 5-year-olds video condition (32 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively) 
χ2(1, N = 10) = 19.908; p<.05; control (58 per cent and 13 per cent, 
respectively) χ2(1, N = 10) = 42.219; p<.05 and no practice condition (53 per cent and 
28 per cent, respectively)  χ2(1, N = 10) = 12.968; p<.05. It seems the most common 
strategy in the problems needing an auxiliary task in each of the three conditions and 
over both age groups were level 2 errors.  
 
Five-year-olds in the no practice condition chose level 2 errors significantly more than 
4-year-olds (28 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 10) = 13.550; p<.05. 
This suggests that 5-year-olds who had not received practice with the easy problems 
relied on just one aspect of the object (i.e., its length) more than 4-year-olds. In 
contrast, 4-year-olds in the no practice condition tended to prefer the no object 
selection strategy (46 per cent). Therefore, without practice 4-year-olds found 
choosing an object (any object) difficult on the easy problems. Thus they did not 
benefit sufficiently from the presence of a base, but needed practice to increase their 
likelihood of selecting an object. 
  
Of interest in the problems without an auxiliary task was children’s alternative 
strategy use when the preferred strategy choice was not the analogy based object with 
adaptation. This was the case for both 4- and 5-year-olds in the no practice only. 
Four-year-olds in the no practice condition relied significantly more on the no 
solution attempt strategy suggesting that because they received no practice with the 
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problems, they could not improve their choice on the second attempt, unlike some 
children who did not choose the analogy based object with adaptation on the first few 
attempts, on the easy problems, but then began choosing the correct object and action. 
Children in the no practice condition did not have that luxury- they only received two 
attempts. Therefore, children were unable to benefit from repeated practice with the 
problem suggesting that 4-year-olds without practice struggled to select any object 
regardless of whether it was correct or not. In spite of the significant difference in the 
no solution attempt in 5-year-olds, in the no practice condition, the analogy based 
object with adaptation was still not the dominant choice. Children chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation and analogy based object but without adaptation almost 
equally. This suggests that although older children move to more advanced strategies 
(relational) their success with analogy is inconsistent.   
 
With regards to the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy, if children 
in the video- and no practice-condition were selecting this strategy, then it could be 
that they were using the base knowledge to select the most appropriate object, but not 
the most appropriate action. Children who relied on this strategy in the control 
condition may choose one of the long objects based on their knowledge of retrieval.  
Significant differences were found between 4- and 5-year-olds in their choice of level 
2 errors in the video condition (45 per cent and 32 per cent, respectively) χ2(1, N = 
10) = 3.569; p<.05 and control condition only (40 per cent and 58 per cent, 
respectively) χ2(1, N = 10) = 6.483; p<.05. The difference between age groups in the 
video condition suggests that 4-year-olds relied more on level 2 errors than 5-year-
olds whereas, 5-year-olds in the control condition chose level 2 errors more than 4-
year-olds. In the control condition, 4-year-olds were relying more on no attempt. 
 
Four-year-olds choice of level 2 errors differed significantly across condition χ2(1, N 
= 10) = 46.035; p<.01 (45 per cent, 40 per cent and 59 per cent). Children in the no 
practice condition relied more heavily on level 2 errors than any other condition. 
Again, with a lack of practice, children are more likely to rely on level 2 errors. In 
contrast, 5-year-olds, in the control condition relied on level 2 errors to a similar 
degree as those in the no practice condition χ2(1, N = 10) = 15.260; p<.01 (32 per 
cent, 58 per cent and 53 per cent, respectively). Children’s reliance on the level 2 
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errors in the problems needing an auxiliary task suggests that when faced with a 
difficult task that requires knowledge of relations, children rely on level 2 errors and 
not the required the analogy based object with adaptation. Finally, as in study 2, 
children’s selection of the level 1 error strategy was low. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that this was not the preferred strategy in children of this age. Instead, they 
relied on relational similarity above surface similarity.  
 
To further explore the influence of the base problem, and to examine whether 
representation facilitates children's choice of the analogy based object with adaptation. 
The following section presents children’s representation.  
 
  
 6.3.2 Representation 
 
 
In study 2, children’s description of the problem only, was low. Children preferred 
solution only when describing just one aspect of the base. The same was found here. 
Therefore, it was decided that the problem- and solution-only descriptions were 
pooled together and discussed as one strategy.  
 
Overall, 67 per cent (280/420) of explanations included the appropriate criteria to 
warrant being scored on representational ability. Of the 280 correct representations, 
60 percent (169/280) were made by 5-year-olds. Fifty eight per cent were within the 
problems without an auxiliary task (162/280). These figures indicate that 5-year-olds 
represented more base problems than 4-year-olds, and representations were more 
frequent in the problems without an auxiliary task than problems needing an auxiliary 
task. Since those in the video and no practice condition received the same base 
analogue, but different number of trials, any difference in descriptions between 
conditions would suggest that the number of trials has an impact on children’s 
representational ability. Overall, children were able to represent 77 per cent (216/280) 
of the base problems. Therefore, children may have been benefiting from multiple 
exposures to the base problems.  
 
Children also gave different descriptions depending on age and paradigm. Table 16 
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shows differences between 4- and 5-year-olds in both conditions. To assess possible 
age differences across both conditions, a chi-square analysis was performed. There 
was a significant difference in descriptions between 4- and 5-year-olds in both the 
video - χ2(1, N = 10) = 27.934; p<.05 and the no practice-condition χ2(1, N = 10) = 
11.560; p<.05. However, representational ability was still high in 4-year-olds in the 
video condition (88 per cent). Similar findings were revealed across paradigm. 
Children represented more base analogues in the problems without an auxiliary- 
compared to problems needing an auxiliary task χ2(1, N = 10) = 9.898; p<.05 (77 per 
cent and 56 per cent, respectively). In the problems needing an auxiliary task, children 
relied heavily on just one aspect – solution- or problem-only compared to the 
problems without an auxiliary task (31 per cent and 11 per cent, respectively).  
  
In relation to describing both problem and solution, overall, 53 per cent of 4-year-olds 
where able to represent the base analogue compared to 80 per cent of 5-year-olds 
χ2(1, N = 20) = 16.362; p<.05. Thus, indicating that 5-year-olds were better able to 
represent the base problem than 4-year-olds. Overall, 53 per cent in the no practice 
condition and 72 per cent in the video condition were able to represent the base 
problem fully. A chi-square analysis revealed significant differences between the 
conditions χ2(1, N = 20) = 7.701; p<.05. This suggests that the more exposure to the 
base analogue the better the performance with representation.   
 
To decide whether or not the differences across paradigm were affected by age and 
condition, the following results explore children’s representational ability across 
condition, paradigm and age. 
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Table 16: The Percentage of Children’s Descriptions of the Base Analogue in the Video and No Practice Conditions as a Function of Problem 
Type and Age 
 
        
       
   
        Video condition                     No practice condition  
      
         Without Auxiliary task Auxiliary task                      Without Auxiliary task          Auxiliary task  
     
Strategy      4-year-olds    5-year-olds      4-year-olds   5-year-olds        4-year-olds    5-year-olds      4-year-olds       5-year-olds      
  
No response/Irrelevant      12                2.5                      16                   3                    30                17                  36.5                 7                  
Problem or solution only  19       2.5                    36                  21                    20                  3                  36.5                36 
Problem and solution                   69                 95           48               76           50    80            27       57 
   
 159 
Table 16 illustrates that the highest percentage of correct representations was given by 
5-year-olds, in the video condition with the problems without an auxiliary task. 
Children represented 95 per cent of their attempts (accounting for a quarter of overall 
representations). The same children represented the problems needing an auxiliary 
task much less (76 per cent). A similar pattern was found in the no practice condition, 
but with lower percentages. On the same tasks (in the video condition with the 
problems without an auxiliary task), 4-year-olds represented 69 per cent of their 
attempts. A chi square revealed a significant difference between 4- and 5-year-olds 
correct representations compared to incorrect representations χ2(1, N = 20) = 22.900; 
p<.05. Four-year-olds in the no practice condition showed the poorest representation 
level in the problems needing an auxiliary task (27 per cent). The low figure indicates 
that these children were struggling to represent the hard problems due to a decreased 
amount of views of the base analogue compared to the same cohort in the video 
condition (48 per cent).   
 
Table 16 shows age differences in the easy/video and easy/no practice condition. 
Five-year-olds described significantly more representations than 4-year-olds in both 
conditions. Chi square analysis revealed significant age differences in children’s 
ability to represent the base problem in both easy and problems needing an auxiliary 
task. This indicates that 5-year-olds were able to represent more base problems 
regardless of the condition they were in. Differences were also found within 4-year-
olds representations on problems without an auxiliary task, across condition. Those in 
the video condition represented significantly more than those in the no practice 
condition. The same was found in 5-year-olds. Overall the figures in table 16 show 
that the best representational ability was in older children in the video condition in the 
problems without an auxiliary task. Thus, children’s ability to represent the base 
problem is dependent on practice, age and level of task difficulty. Despite practice 
(with the base problem) not having a significant effect on paradigm or age, two-thirds 
of the children descriptions were representations of the relations required to solve the 
target problem. Whether children utilized this information in the target problem was 
explored next.  
 
Notwithstanding children’s ability to express a representation of the base problem, 
this does not necessarily mean that they will use this information to solve the target 
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problem. To explore the benefit of representation on children’s ability to solve the 
target problem, children’s representational ability and solution on the target problem 
was matched. Results revealed children who were able to form a representation of the 
target problem were more likely to solve the target problem. Of the 67 per cent correct 
representations 44 per cent were used to solve the target problem. Compared to 15 per 
cent correct target solution without the forming of a representation. A chi square 
analysis found that children who represented the base problem were more likely to 
solve the target problem (44 per cent) than those who did not represent the base 
problem (15 per cent), χ2(1, N = 20) = 20.219; p<.05. This suggests that children 
benefited from being able to represent the base problem than those who could not.  
 
As previously stated children found representing the problems needing an auxiliary 
task more difficult than representing the problems without an auxiliary task. Children 
were able to form a representation and extract relations from the base problem more 
in the problems without an auxiliary task than in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task χ2(1, N = 20) = 33.072; p<.05. (61% and 21%, respectively), suggesting that the 
actual level of difficulty affects children’s ability to understand and use the 
representation to solve the target problem. This indicates that the tasks were both 
conceptually and physically difficult for children of this age.  
 
Since there were significant differences in representational ability between 4- and 5-
year-olds, age differences in children’s ability to use the representation in the target 
problem were expected. The figures reveal that 43 per cent of the 4-year-olds who 
gave correct representations went on to solve the target problem with the analogy 
based object with adaptation and 45 per cent of 5-year-olds. Despite almost half of 
each age group being able to represent the base and use it to solve the target problem, 
the differences between each group did not reach significance. Finally, of the 77 per 
cent in the video condition who represented the base problem, 49 per cent went on to 
solve the target problem. Of the 17 percent in the no practice condition 39 per cent 
went on to solve the target problem.  
 
It appears that representation does play an important role in young children’s ability 
to use information from the base problem. Almost half of all representations were 
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used to solve the target problem. However, there were still a large number of attempts 
that did not follow the expected pattern where children able to form a representation 
of the base, would go onto solve the problem using the relations they had observed 
and understood in the base problem. Therefore, it is imperative that children’s 
alternative representations and their strategies are examined. Not all children’s 
successful solutions were preceded by the representation; 29 correct solution trials 
were preceded by describing one aspect of the base (either noticing the problem or 
solution only). However, despite the fact that children were asked if they had reported 
everything in the video, it is not certain if these children were simply unable to 
verbalize what they had seen, it could be that they did understand the relations and 
were able to use them in solving the target problem. Interestingly, 113 correct 
representations (40 per cent) were followed by the level 2 errors strategy in the target 
problem. Thus, just because children were able to form representations and possess 
the knowledge of relations from the base problem, does not mean that they then go 
onto solve the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation. This 
finding suggests that children’s difficulty in using the analogy based object with 
adaptation is more than a lack of ability in representation formation or a lack of 
knowledge. The problem may lie in children’s ability to access the information from 
the base problem and transferring this information to an analogous problem.  
 
Up to this point children who have formed a representation and solved the target problem 
using the analogy based object with adaptation have been assumed to possess analogical 
ability. However, this may not be the case, for example it may be that children are using 
their experience of the world to solve the problems and not the information from a base 
analogue. To address this possibility there was a need to explore children’s explanations 
of their choices following target solution.   
 
6.3.3 Post-task descriptions  
 
It was expected that the majority of children would explain their object choice in 
relation to the base analogue (those in the no practice and video condition) and thus 
choose the analogous description. However, the most common explanation, after no 
preference/irrelevant information (49%) was a perceptual-based explanation (39%) 
and not analogy as expected (1% only).  
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Table 17: The Percentage Number of Descriptive Object Choices by Condition  
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Description of object choices  Video       Control    No Practice_________ 
 
No Preference                    35                60                    58 
Perceptual Preference  51           31                    29 
Goal-oriented    13            9           13 
Analogy               1              0                      0              
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 17 shows that the most common explanation from those in the video condition 
was the perceptual explanation (51 per cent) followed by the no preference/irrelevant 
information descriptions (35 per cent). Children in the video condition chose 
significantly more perceptual explanations than those in the control- and no practice 
conditions χ2(3, N = 10) = 12.698; p<.05 (51 per cent, 31 percent and 29 percent, 
respectively). Therefore, despite children not explaining their choices using analogy, 
they were relying on the perceptual attributes of the object. Children explained their 
choices with regard to goal orientation to a similar degree across condition, showing 
no preference for this description as a result of the condition they belonged to. 
Children in the control- and no practice-condition preferred the no preference/ 
irrelevant descriptions over the perceptual explanations (60 per cent and 58 per cent, 
respectively).  As in the cross-sectional study, analogical explanations were low. 
Therefore, it was decided that no further analysis on age, condition or paradigm with 
regard to post-explanation was necessary. It is evident that overall children were 
unable to express their reliance on the base problem. However, this does not mean 
that they did not use analogy, it could simply be that they were unable to verbalise it 
at this age. 
 
It was suggested in the study 2 that post-task explanations, through reflection, would 
have a positive effect on children’s subsequent performance. That is, if children could 
explain that they had used the base problem to solve the target problem, then this 
should cause them, on the following problem, to choose the correct object (and 
action). This should be more noticeable here than in the cross-sectional study, because 
children received multiple attempts with the same problems. However, this was not 
the case. Only four children were able to say that they had used the base problem 
Therefore, no firm conclusions can be made about the influence of reflection of 
choices on subsequent problem solution.       
 
Earlier results revealed that 44 per cent of children who were able to form a 
representation of the target problem went on to solve the target problem. These 
figures were used to explore children’s explanations of their object choice, to see if 
children had used the information from the video. Interestingly, those children who 
were able to explain their object choice using analogy were able to represent the base 
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problem and solve the target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation.  
 
The results of the post-task descriptions suggest that young children rely on 
perceptual aspects of a task to help them explain why they came to a particular 
decision. This could have been due to the fact that, as Gentner (1989) argued, children 
of this age will turn to perceptual-based strategies when in unfamiliar territory, or 
when they do not have the relational knowledge (this was more evident in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task). However, Gentner’s (1989) hypothesis was not 
supported in the solution of the target problem because some children where able to 
use the analogy based object with adaptation spontaneously with no reliance on 
explicit appearance similarity or any apparent shift from perceptual similarity to 
relational similarity. Furthermore, it could be that that children where using 
perceptual cues from the base problem, due to the high perceptual similarity across 
problems. In addition, it could simply be that children were only able to verbalize 
about perceptual similarity and not relational similarity. Finally, it could be argued 
that the true measure of analogical problem solving here, is in the problems needing 
an auxiliary task. The tasks in the problems needing an auxiliary task required 
children to use the information from the base analogue to solve the target problem. 
Children in this study found these tasks extremely difficult and were not able to use 
the information in the video to form the analogy based object with adaptation to solve 
the problem, nor were they able to express their choices through the use of analogy.  
 
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
 
Study 3 set out to explore a number of issues. The main aim of studying children’s 
problem solving over a 30 week period, was to see how children’s strategy choices 
changed over time, and what factors or processes affected such change. Picking up 
from the findings in study 2, study 3 examined problem solving strategies in 4- and 5-
year-olds. Since this study employed the use of multiple trials it was hoped that this 
would improve children’s ability to access the information from the base problem.  
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The results showed that 4- and 5-year-olds utilized a variety of strategies in analogical 
problem solving tasks. In the main, children were able to use analogy to solve video 
analogues. Children who were exposed to the base problem and practice over trials 
(video condition) performed significantly better than those who had not received 
practice with the base problem. However, even children who received no base 
problem (control condition) and no practice (no practice condition) were able to use 
the analogy based object with adaptation to solve the problem, but to a lesser degree. 
This indicates that children were benefiting from both practice with the target problem 
only, and the information from the base analogue. Children who did not receive the 
base analogue relied on the three object strategies equally. Since these children were 
receiving the same amount of practice with the tasks as those in the video condition, 
the instability of object choice was likely to be due to a lack of base problem. 
Children may receive practice with the trials, but the vital element of a base problem 
prevented children from selecting the analogy based object with adaptation. Children 
who had received the base problem, but no practice preferred level 2 errors over other 
strategies, and their use of the analogy based object with adaptation was significantly 
lower than performance with this strategy in the other conditions. This suggests that 
despite children receiving the base problem, the lack of experience affected their 
choice of strategy, in that they did not reap the rewards of practice. These differences 
indicate that the optimal conditions under which children choose the analogous 
strategy is the video condition, where children receive both practice and base 
analogue. The results of children performing better with the analogy based object with 
adaptation in the video condition confirm Chen’s findings of children’s performance 
with visual analogues. In Chen’s study children (in the no hint condition) performed 
significantly better with the analogy based object with adaptation than those in the 
control condition.  
 
The results in the present study revealed no significant age differences in the video 
condition. This supports previous research that suggests children of this age are in a 
state of transition in their ability to reason analogically. Chen and Daehler’s (1989) 
findings showed that 4- and 5-year-olds performed better gradually over time. Since 
children’s use of analogy in the present study reflect similar results to previous 
research indicates that 4- to 5-years of age is an important transition period in 
children’s development of analogical reasoning.  
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Only those in the video condition could be regarded as possessing true analogical 
reasoning ability because children received the analogous base problem and the 
required practice which acted as a hint to use the relations presented in the base 
problem. The results of those in the video condition revealed that almost half of all 
responses were analogical. This suggests that analogy was part of 4- and 5-year-olds 
repertoire of strategies. This figure is double of that found in Singer-Freeman’s (2005) 
study. However, this was to be expected as children here were older than the children 
in Singer-Freemans’s study. However, the use of practice may have improved 
performance. One of the issues in Singer-Freeman’s study was that no distinction was 
made between relational inference and relational knowledge. Therefore, it was unclear 
whether the children in her study found difficulty with inference, relational 
knowledge or both.  
 
Therefore, the present study monitored children’s use of relational knowledge by 
presenting children with the target problem, but no base problem (control). The results 
from this condition would indicate children’s ability to solve the problem without 
relational knowledge, compared to children’s performance with relational knowledge 
(video condition). If children chose the analogy based object with adaptation more in 
the video- than in the control-condition then it could be concluded that relational 
knowledge facilitates analogical problem solving. Children in the video condition 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation more than those in the control 
condition, which supports the notion that children need knowledge of relations in 
order to solve analogous problems. However, the added dimension of relational 
difficulty allowed us to examine the extent to which children need relational 
knowledge. Since children found problems with the auxiliary tasks difficult in both 
study 2 and 3 indicates the importance of relational knowledge (the effect of relational 
difficulty) in children’s analogical problem solving.  
 
The findings in the present study indicate that practice is more important than the 
presentation of the base problem as seen in the better performance of video and 
control conditions. However, this was only the case in problems without an auxiliary 
task. This suggests that children possessed the relational knowledge of these problems 
so, made target solution straight forward for them. It may be that children already had 
a problem solving schema which enabled them to solve the problem without the use 
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of a base problem. This suggests that children possessed enough knowledge from 
their everyday problem solving to solve problems without an auxiliary task. However, 
the same children performed less well with the analogy based object with adaptation 
in the problems needing an auxiliary task. Here both 4- and 5-year-olds preferred 
level 1 and level 2 errors in the no practice and control conditions. This suggests that 
children relied on lower-order relations with no base and practice. The effect of 
practice supports Siegler’s (1995) suggestion that the more strategies available to 
children the better their performance, and since children in the control condition 
received practice with the tasks, they were able to utilize the feedback from previous 
tasks in their subsequent strategy selection despite not receiving the base problem. 
However, when relations become more difficult, a base problem is more important 
than practice.  
 
In the control condition, children could not use the relations from a base problem, so 
they must have relied on something other than analogy. One suggestion is that 
children were using their knowledge of the environment. After all, the logical choice 
for retrieving an item out of reach is to select a long object. Although this seemed to 
work in problems without an auxiliary task, this reasoning failed when tasks became 
too difficult and required more than simple deduction. This was supported by the poor 
performance of children use of the analogy based object with adaptation in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Despite the problems needing an auxiliary task 
possessing a similar structure to that in the problems without an auxiliary task i.e., use 
something long to retrieve the sponge from the tube, the first thought of using a stick 
(as many had done in the problems without an auxiliary task) was not successful 
because alone, the stick was too short. Children had to move beyond this intuitive 
approach to select both sticks and attach them to create a long stick to retrieve the 
sponge. A large percentage of children failed to do this, especially when they had not 
received the analogous base problem. Thus, children relied on level 2 errors which do 
not rely on higher-order relations.   
 
Since children where finding problems needing an auxiliary task difficult and 
problems without an auxiliary task easier, future research may need intermediate tasks 
to monitor a transition from problems without an auxiliary task to problems needing 
an auxiliary task. Children’s performance in the problems needing an auxiliary task 
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supports the findings by Holyoak et al (1984). In their study Holyoak et al presented 
children with the magic genie problem which required children to transport jewels 
from one location to another. Success on the problem was low, as children in the 
present study discovered, solution required much more than object selection. Since 
children in both studies were of a similar age it can be concluded that object creation 
with the added complexity of relations may be too difficult for 4- and 5-year-old 
children, even with the base problem and a hint in the form of practice. Relational 
complexity also goes some way to answering the question of why children were 
unable to transfer their knowledge of relations from previous analogical problems. It 
was expected that practice with analogical problems would provide children with an 
increase in knowledge to solve more complex tasks. However, the increase in 
complexity caused children to choose alternative strategies.  
 
Despite the low use of the analogy based object with adaptation in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task, 5-year-olds seemed to grasp this concept more than 4-year-
olds. This is evident in the significant difference between 4- and 5-year-olds in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. In the control condition, half of all attempts, of 
the problems without an auxiliary task, by 4-year-olds, were the analogy based object 
with adaptation. Conversely, the same children failed to select the analogy based 
object with adaptation in the problems needing an auxiliary task. The same occurred 
in the no practice condition, although the use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation was less here than in the control condition (just under a third), children 
failed to select the analogy based object with adaptation in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task. This indicates that unless 4-year-olds were presented with a video 
analogue outlining the relations and action of creating an object, they were unable to 
solve the target problem. This provides clear support that when children are presented 
with relationally difficult tasks for which they require relational knowledge they need 
a hint in the form of practice with an analogous base problem. This adds credence to 
the notion that relational complexity plays a significant role in children’s analogical 
success.  
 
The results also highlighted the importance of children’s representational ability in 
target solution. Children able to form a representation of the base problem and thus 
extract the relations were more likely to solve the target problem using the analogy 
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based object with adaptation than those who did not form a mental representation of 
the base problem. Although the amount of representational ability was lower in the 
present study compared to Chen’s (2003) study, which impacted on a lower success 
rate in the target problem, it is likely that this was due to a lack of hint in the present 
study. Therefore, children’s ability to represent the base problem in Chen’s study may 
have been inflated by the fact that they were given a hint to use the representation.  
Furthermore, it may be that children were able to represent the problem, but because 
they were presented with the same base over a number of trials, they thought that their 
initial representations were incorrect. So they used different descriptions on 
subsequent trials. Maybe future research could provide positive feedback to children, 
so they know that their descriptions are correct. Children’s ability to represent the 
base problem also illustrated the importance of Siegler’s (1989) accessing component 
in analogical reasoning. Thus, children were able to access the representation without 
the use of an explicit hint. Since figures were lower here, demonstrates the critical 
role of access in analogical problem solving. If children are unable to access the 
representation then they are unlikely to reap the benefits of such a component on 
problem solution. However, as in Chen’s study, the accessing component used by 
children in the present study did not guarantee problem solution. Many of the children 
who were able to represent and access the representation failed to implement this 
knowledge in the target problem.   
 
Worthy of note here is the decrease in representational ability in the problems needing 
an auxiliary task. This indicates that children found the conceptual meaning of these 
tasks difficult. That is, the conceptual meaning of the base problem was not 
immediately apparent to children of this age. This demonstrates that the actual task 
may have prevented children accessing the correct relations and ultimately decrease 
the likelihood that they would transfer this knowledge onto the target problem. 
Furthermore, because the relations in the problems needing an auxiliary task were 
more difficult than in the problems without an auxiliary task, this may have created an 
obstacle in children’s ability to access the appropriate relations. This in turn caused 
children difficulty in the implementation of the relations. For example, before 
children can implement the accessed relations, they need to understand their 
relationship to the target problem. Therefore, children must transform the relations 
observed in the base problem to the target problem. Despite the relations in the 
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present study sharing similar structural and perceptual similarities across the base and 
target problems, the increase in task complexity may have presented too much 
information for children to hold, access and implement in a new set of target problems.  
 
Despite the lower than expected ability to implement the base information in the 
present study (even with multiple trials), children were still able to represent and 
transfer relational knowledge with some success without a hint from the experimenter. 
It seems that the main obstacle posed to children in the present study was the 
relational complexity of the problems needing an auxiliary task. When relations were 
already part of children’s conceptual knowledge (in problems without an auxiliary 
task), they were successfully able to transfer the required information from the base to 
the target problem.  
 
As well as the exploration of children’s representational ability, children were also 
asked to explain the reasoning behind their strategy choice. The present study 
measured children’s verbal explanations of their chosen strategy.  Siegler (2006) 
stated that using self-reports following attempts at problem solution adds another 
dimension of measurement on children’s strategy use.  Siegler argued that this 
additional information would provide the researcher with accurate information 
regarding the reasoning behind children’s choice of strategy. However, children’s post 
task explanations in the present study were less fruitful. Children were not 
forthcoming about their choices being analogical. Whether this was simply a case of 
poor explanation skills is unclear. What is clear is that children in the present study 
relied heavily on the perceptual attributes of their object choices. Those in the video 
condition explained over half of all their choices based on perceptual characteristics, 
i.e., ‘because it was the longest’. Children did not seem to benefit from reflecting on 
their previous choices, or at least this was not apparent in their self-report of their 
strategy choices.  
 
Worthy of note here is the small number of children’s propensity to look at the video 
screen whilst explaining their choice. Whether they were conscious of this fact and 
they simply thought that they were cheating somehow if they admitted that they had 
used the information from the video is unclear without actually asking them about this. 
What is clear is children’s lack of ability to report why they had made their strategy 
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choices.  Many of the children explained their choices with irrelevant details that bore 
no resemblance to their choices. This provides evidence that children of this age may 
simply be unable to verbalise their choices. That is, just because they did not say that 
they used the video to guide them to success with the target problem does not 
necessarily mean that they did not use this information to facilitate success at problem 
solving.   
 
 
6.5 Microgenetic Analysis  
 
 
The microgenetic methodology is seen as the most appropriate for studying change. 
The key achievements of this methodology are its capacity to record change while it is 
happening and to allow explanations of how changes are brought about. Through its 
use of both qualitative and quantitative methods many unanswered questions of a 
child’s development across a variety of cognitive domains are beginning to be 
answered. It has been long assumed that problem solving of any kind that includes 
strategy choices, feedback and strategy creation has one common element – change.  
 
The aim of this section is to examine whether the data revealed specific performance 
factors (practice, transfer and strategic variability) and specific patterns of behaviour 
and change, and how these factors affected individual behaviour and strategy choice.  
Since children were receiving multiple trials of the same tasks, the study allowed us to 
monitor variability in their strategy choices which illustrated patterns of strategy 
change. To this end, change shall be explored via Siegler’s five dimensions of change 
(path, rate, breadth, variability and source of change).  
 
The next three subsections explored the effects of practice, transfer and strategic 
variability. 
 
 6.5.1 Practice effect  
 
With the suggested importance of practice, the following set of results measure the 
effect that prior experience with the tasks had on children’s ability to solve the target 
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problem across trials 1, 3 and 5 (1 and 5 for the no practice group). The following 
data provides us with information about the effect of repeated trials and information 
on the path of change. According to Chen and Siegler (2000) the more practice 
children receive the more likely they are to change their strategies in response to the 
increase in knowledge gained from practice.  Chen and Siegler (2000) argued that 
children will begin to use different strategies and this in turn increases the likelihood 
of a better performance on the ability/skill being observed. Therefore, it is expected 
that those who receive multiple exposure to analogous problems (video condition) 
would improve in their use of the analogy based object with adaptation over the 
course of the observation period, due to practice with a base problem.  Practice effects 
were determined by exploring the differences between the three conditions on all 6 
tasks. Since the no practice group received trials 1 and 5 for each task, and was not 
exposed to the same number of trials as those in the video and control condition, any 
improvement over trials in the no practice condition would be due to the base 
information or knowledge of the task environment, and not practice with the problem. 
Any increase in performance across trials in the video condition would suggest a 
practice effect. However, practice in the control condition is different to practice in 
the video condition because children did not receive the base problem. Therefore, 
practice in the control condition is based on practice with the target problem only, and 
not practice with relational similarity (produced by the base problem). 
 
To explore exactly what type of practice affected children’s performance (relational 
similarity, problems, strategies or feedback), exploration across the two practice 
conditions was needed. Separate analyses were carried out to see if children had 
increased in their use of the analogy based object with adaptation from trial one to 
three to five. The percentages in table 18 were calculated by adding the amount of 
analogical responses from trial one of all six problems.  
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Table 18: The Percentage Number of Times the Analogy Based Object with Adaptation was chosen in Trial 1, 3 and 5, across each Condition 
 
_______________________________________ ________________________________________ 
 
Conditions   Trial 1         Trial 3    Trial 5____ 
 
Video   38         48         55 
 
Control  22               30       33 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 18 reveals that children increased in their use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation from trial 1 to 3 to 5, in both conditions. This suggests that children may 
have been benefiting from repeated exposure to the tasks. The largest increase was in 
the video condition, an increase of 17 per cent from trial 1 to trial 5. An increase in 
the control condition of 11 per cent suggests that mere practice with the problem is 
sufficient to increase relational use.  To assess whether children’s choice of analogy 
significantly increased over trials, a Page’s L trend was carried out on the 6 tasks 
across trials 1 3 and 5. Results revealed a significant trend in the video condition - 
observed L = 356.5, critical L = 79. The trend test indicates that children in the video 
condition improving over trials. The largest increase in both conditions was from trial 
1 to trial 3 and levelled off by trial 5. 
 
Similar results were found in the control condition. A Page’s L trend revealed a 
significant trend observed L = 357, critical L = 79. This suggests that children were 
getting better across trials due to practice with the tasks and not because they received 
additional help from a base problem. So it seems that children in the video condition 
and control conditions were benefiting from practice within the tasks, but the added 
advantage of the base problem in the video condition improved children’s use of the 
analogy based object with adaptation considerably more than those in the control 
condition.  
 
Figures 6 and 7 present children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation 
across trials 1, 3 and 5 in the video- and control –condition respectively. Each task 
will be explored in relation to the time taken (in trials) to consistently use analogy.  
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Figure 6: The Amount of Times Children Chose the Analogy Based Object with 
Adaptation on Each Task on Trial 1, 3 and 5 in the Video Condition Only. 
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Figure 6 shows that the best performance on trial 1 was in the gripper problem (task 2) 
and the poorest performance in the roll-up problem (task 6). Children’s performance 
on the snake problem (task 1) indicates that not all children were selecting the analogy 
based object with adaptation. However, with task 2 (gripper), children increased to 
100 per cent success over the 5 trials, suggesting that children were transferring what 
they had learned on the previous trials. However, this success did not transfer to task 
3 (toy problem). Children showed a decrease in their use of the analogy based object 
with adaptation on trial 5. The decrease in trial 5 may have been due to boredom, a 
belief that their strategy was incorrect as they were given the same task over 5 weeks, 
or a sign of them reverting back to earlier strategies in line with Siegler’s Overlapping 
Waves Theory.  
 
With the problems needing an auxiliary task (stick, pendulum, roll-up) the use of the 
analogy based object with adaptation decreased considerably. On the first trial of each 
of these problems analogy was low. On the stick and roll-up task the choice of the 
analogy based object with adaptation remained the same from trial 1 to trial 3, but 
increased on trial 5, which may suggest a practice effect. For example, in the stick 
problem, children who were unable to attach both sticks in the first few trials of the 
task, through practice with the problem, were able to see that they needed to attach the 
two sticks in order to reach the sponge in the tube. However, the rate at which they 
were doing this was slower than the problems without an auxiliary task. The 
pendulum showed an increase from trial 1- 3, but levelled out at trial 5, indicating that 
the same children continued to solve the pendulum problem. This supports the earlier 
suggestion that children may have had an issue with solving the pendulum problem 
because of the difficult relations involved, and no amount of practice would help them 
solve a problem for which they have no relational knowledge.  
 
Although figure 6 shows that children’s choice of the analogy based object with 
adaptation decreased depending which problem, it does indicate that within each 
problem children’s choice of the analogy based object with adaptation tended to 
increase. This occurred on all tasks except the gripper problem which began with 100 
per cent success and reduced by trial 5. This suggests that children were getting better 
with practice with the same tasks, but they were finding it difficult to transfer their 
success onto new tasks. Figure 7 presents children’s use of analogy in the control 
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condition.  
 
As in the video condition, figure 7 shows that those in the control condition 
performed best in gripper task. However, children’s use of analogy did not decrease in 
trial 5. Only 80 per cent of children in the control condition chose the analogy based 
object with adaptation compared to 100 per cent in the video condition. However, 
children showed an identical pattern of change on the snake problem across both 
conditions. The only difference being that the percentage use was higher in the video 
condition. The control condition revealed that no children chose the analogy based 
object with adaptation (with correct action) in any of the trials in the rollup and 
pendulum task, this provides evidence for the importance of practice with a base 
problem. It seems that practice with the problem alone, was not sufficient to allow 
children to solve these problems.  
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Figure 7: The Amount of Times Children Chose the Analogy Based Object with 
Adaptation on Each Task on Trial 1, 3 and 5 in the Control Condition Only. 
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Figures 6 and 7 also show us that children’s use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation increased in the problems without an auxiliary task, but decreased in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. The fact that an increase in the analogy based 
object with adaptation occurred across trials suggests that children were moving from 
less appropriate/non-analogous strategies to the appropriate analogous strategy. The 
rate at which this change occurred differed across trials. The rate of change was 
gradual from trial 1 to 3 and fast to trial 5. This indicates that children were improving 
in their accuracy with practice. The rate of strategy change was also dependent on the 
level of relational difficult. That is, if the relations within a set of tasks are not as 
obvious to the child (having to create an object rather than simply select it), then the 
rate of change is non-existent or in very few cases, slow. In the problems without an 
auxiliary task, for those in the video condition, the rate of change was slower than in 
the control condition.  It could be that children need more than 3 problems (15 trials) 
before they are able to solve use higher-order relations that require the making of an 
object, suggesting that knowledge needs building up over a longer period of time or 
increase in trials. This is evident in the very last trial (trial 30). More children chose 
the analogy based object with adaptation on this trial than on any of the previous 10 
trials.  
 
Although those in the video condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation 
more than those in the control condition, both conditions increased their use within 
each of the tasks. This implies that both groups were benefiting from practice with the 
tasks despite the different types of practice received (with or without base analogue). 
Therefore, the practice across both conditions must share some similar attributes. One 
particular attribute is that the practice observed can be seen as natural practice, 
because it does not arise from explicit instruction. The only explicit intervention is the 
natural feedback from children’s previous experience with the task in question.  
 
Results showed that during the problems without an auxiliary task in particular, 
children benefited considerably from practice with the tasks. One reason why children 
may have benefited more from practice with problems without an auxiliary task 
compared to problems needing an auxiliary task is provided by Ericsson and Lehmann 
(1996). They argued that it is the quality of practice that affects children’s 
performance. They made a distinction between repetition practice and deliberate 
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practice. Repetition practice is a simple, easy form of practice based on the 
consequences/outcomes of the task. This form of practice gradually decreases 
variability among strategies, and children begin to discover the most appropriate 
strategies for the purpose of successful solution. Unlike the simple, informative 
repetition practice, deliberate practice is more structured. Here, children deliberately 
explore and elaborate skills that increase their knowledge of the particular task at 
hand. Therefore, behaviour is more conscious; children make a conscious effort to 
extend their knowledge and use of strategies. Furthermore, deliberate practice not 
only provides children with the benefits associated with repetitive practice, but also 
involves meta-cognitive learning by gathering the appropriate information needed to 
solve the problems presented to them. The idea of deliberate practice explains 
performance of the video condition versus control condition, as the base problem 
provides more elaborate information (knowledge).   
 
This could also explain why children benefit from practice in the problems without an 
auxiliary task, but not the problems needing an auxiliary task.  Since children 
performed well on the problems without an auxiliary task, and their performance with 
the analogy based object with adaptation increased and strategic variability decreased, 
this suggests that children were using repetitive practice to solve subsequent problems. 
Children were able to work through the problems using a variety of strategies before 
arriving at the most appropriate.  Thus, through repetition, they were able to learn that 
to select appropriate relations and perform appropriate actions the analogy based 
object with adaptation was the best strategy for such tasks. This also explains the 
decrease in use of the analogy based object with adaptation in the problems needing 
an auxiliary task – children require even more elaborate information. Because of the 
nature of the problems needing an auxiliary task requiring object creation, they were 
qualitatively different from the problems without an auxiliary task. 
 
As stated previously, deliberate practice can cause meta-cognitive learning which 
enables children to generate new strategies by reflecting on their previous experience.  
However, this may have hindered children’s performance.  For example, many of the 
children became mentally set on previous strategies. They did not see that the new 
difficult tasks needed to be extended to include object creation they simply continued 
selecting one object (not two, for example, in the case of the stick problem).  This 
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suggests that practice may not be as efficient as first thought.  If children are not 
explicitly directed towards the novel aspects of a task, they face the possibility of 
failure due to prior repetitive practice on old tasks. However, such 
direction/instruction would affect the role of analogical reasoning, since analogy is 
spontaneous and not created through prompts/hints.   
 
The finding that practice has a larger effect on problems without an auxiliary task goes 
some way to explaining children’s difficulty in transfer from problems without an 
auxiliary task to problems needing an auxiliary task. Therefore, the following section 
explores children’s ability to transfer what they learned, either from the base problem or 
from previous experience with the task. Exploring transfer should also inform us about 
the breadth of change. If children were able to transfer analogy from one task to another, 
i.e., from the snake- to the gripper- to the toy-problem and so on, this ability to transfer 
provides them with the higher-order skill needed for analogy and other higher-order skills. 
The following section explores the breadth of change through the children’s ability to 
transfer the use of the analogy based object with adaptation used on previous trials to 
subsequent tasks.  
 
 
 
6.5.2 Transfer Effects  
 
 
Previous research has found that children find the transfer of knowledge difficult. 
Mainly because the learning environment in which the information to be transferred is 
contextually embedded. That is, children (and adults) are influenced by the current 
context on which the information was learned and find it difficult to move away from 
this context to a new situation.  
 
The literature review highlighted the importance of transfer in analogical problem 
solving. It emphasized the two concepts of transfer: symbolic representation of the 
problem itself (Brown, 1989 and Gentner, 1983) and the activity of the problem 
solver (Greeno, Smith and Moore, 1993). Thus, transfer involves recognition and 
extraction of structural similarity from the base and an ability to map this information 
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onto the target problem.  The microgenetic study incorporated both Gentner’s (1983) 
and Greeno et al (1993) concept of transfer. The tasks included both high surface 
similarity and activity similarity. The problems without an auxiliary task were based 
on similar actions and relations to help children recognise the similarity across tasks. 
Problems needing an auxiliary task were also matched on similarity levels. However, 
the problem types differed qualitatively due to an increase in cognitive load created 
by the added dimension of object creation.  
 
The microgenetic methodology allowed for the observation of two dimensions; 
within-task transfer and between-task transfer. Within-task transfer was measured by 
observing children’s ability to transfer the relations from the base to the target 
problem. These results were explored earlier in the results section. If children are able 
to transfer the relations from the base- to the target –problem, then they would choose 
the analogy based object with adaptation (almost a quarter responses in the video 
condition). Since a large percentage of responses were not analogous, the following 
section explored what it was children were transferring. Between-task transfer 
explored children’s ability to transfer analogy from the snake to the gripper to the toy 
and so on. Due to the difficulty level of the relations in problems needing an auxiliary 
task, transfer may not cross the difficulty boundary, and may not even exist in these 
tasks.  
 
Table 19 presents children’s performance on each problem across the three conditions. 
Trials were pooled together to give an overall percentage per problem. Table 19 
shows that in the video condition children preferred analogy in the first 2 problems, 
but this changed to analogy based object but without adaptation by problem 3. Despite 
a small increase in the first of the problems needing an auxiliary task, a preference for 
analogy did not last. Children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation 
decreased significantly on the pendulum- and rollup –problem. The higher percentage 
of analogy in the stick problem supports the notion that this problem shares perceptual 
similarity with the problems without an auxiliary task.  
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Table 19: The Percentage Number of Times Each Strategy were Selected Over the Six Tasks, by Condition  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
       Snake        Gripper       Toy    Stick  Pendulum    Roll-up                                                                                     
Video condition 
Analogy based object with adaptation   76  94  40  46  24   6 
Analogy based object without adaptation  10   0  58  14  40   8  
Level 2 error        4   6   2  38  14  64           
Level 1 error                  0   0   0   2  14                2  
No object choice        10   0   0   0   8  20  
Control  
Analogy based object with adaptation   46  80  38   8   0   0 
Analogy based object without adaptation  16   0  58   6  36   2 
Level 2 error              16  10   2  78  16  58 
Level 1 error                  0   0   0   4  14   2 
No object choice        22  10   2   4  34  38 
No practice condition  
Analogy based object with adaptation    20  50  25  20   0  0 
Analogy based object without adaptation  15  10  55  20  35  0 
Level 2 error              30  20  10  50  35  80 
Level 1 error                  5   0   0   0   5   0 
No object choice        30  20  10  10  25  20 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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In the video condition it seems that children were transferring relations from problem 
1 to problem 2, but not to problem 3.One explanation for the decrease in the analogy 
based object with adaptation at problem 3 is that children were able to solve the 
problem using the water pistol incorrectly (analogy based object but without 
adaptation). Instead of turning the water pistol around and using the hook (as in the 
video analogue) to drag the toy towards them, they simply held the handle and 
dragged the toy using the unhooked end of the water pistol. Even though this strategy 
took considerably longer than the correct strategy, children were able to solve the 
problem using the object in this way. Since 50 per cent of children chose this strategy 
on trial one, of the toy retrieval task, they had gained the appropriate feedback 
(problem solution), therefore failed to move away from that strategy choice. The same 
could be said about problem one (the snake task). Some children used the snake in 
such a way that did not incorporate the analogy based object with adaptation, but they 
managed to solve the problem. For example, they used the snake to drag the plate 
towards them, instead of using it as a tube. All other 4 tasks were unsolvable unless 
they used the analogy based object with adaptation. If this was an obstacle for 
children in the snake and toy task, then children would not see a need to change the 
successful strategy despite their choice of strategy not being the analogous strategy. 
This suggests a problem with implementation. 
 
Children’s continued use of the analogy based object but without adaptation strategy 
following the correct solution highlights the fact that children were influenced by the 
task itself and not the notion of analogy. This suggests that children’s problem solving 
is goal oriented. Children use the information surrounding the target problem itself to 
solve the problem; they select an object and action based on their prior knowledge of 
the situation, not necessarily the information from the base problem. Therefore, 
children are transferring attributes of the object and actions they believe fit the task 
itself, and not necessarily transferring relations to solve the problem using analogy.  
 
Similarly, the increase from problem 1 (snake) to problem 2 (gripper) does not mean 
that children were not transferring knowledge across problems. Because the problems 
without an auxiliary task were part of children’s conceptual knowledge, children may 
not have needed to transfer relations or knowledge of solution over trials and 
problems. They were simply attempting solution based on their own knowledge of the 
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world. This was particularly evident in the toy task, where children were selecting the 
correct object, but analogy based object but without adaptation. Therefore, they were 
not transferring all the information from the base or from previous experience on 
analogy. Children found transfer from the problems without an auxiliary task to the 
problems needing an auxiliary task particularly difficult because of the difference in 
relational knowledge and level of difficulty. Children showed some transfer, but 
failed to transfer what they had learned previously to the final two problems needing 
an auxiliary task. Children’s previous object choices may have affected their choices 
on the stick problem in that, on the first of the problems needing an auxiliary task 
children relied on level 2 errors as well as the analogy based object with adaptation. 
The level 2 errors strategy meant that children were selecting just one stick, as they 
had done in the problems without an auxiliary task. This suggests that children may 
have been influenced by their previous object selections, i.e., that a long stick-like 
object had helped them on previous trials. Thus, children’s previous learning may 
have interfered with new learning (negative transfer). 
 
It may be that children were unable to transfer knowledge across problems because 
they did not understand the relations within the problems. This was discussed at 
length earlier. If children do not understand what needs to be transferred, then 
children will rely on other means of solution. However, the results revealed that 
children were able to utilize relational similarity, even in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task. One explanation for children’s success is Gentner’s (1988) notion of 
relational alignment. Through relational alignment children are able to align the 
relations across multiple tasks which result in successful transfer. Furthermore, 
providing that the more difficult tasks are based on a similar premise and children 
receive the problems without an auxiliary task first aligning relations should be a 
straight forward progression in children’s strategy development. However, successful 
alignment only reached as far as problem four (stick problem). It seems that relational 
alignment does not explain children’s decrease in analogy in the final two problems 
needing an auxiliary task.  
 
As well as the exploration of important factors such as practice and transfer, one of the 
aims of study 3 was to investigate children’s variability in strategy use. The following 
section includes both strategic variability and individual case study data to highlight 
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similar patterns of behaviour.  
 
6.5.3 Strategic Variability  
 
Variability occurred on two levels. Seventy-three per cent of children used four or 
five different strategies over the course of their trials (32 percent = 5 strategies, 68 
percent = 4 strategies). Only one child used the same strategy throughout all trials (no 
object choice). The analogy based object with adaptation was used at least once in 27 
out of the 30 children (90 per cent), a similar percentage to experiment two. The 
analogy based object with adaptation was used the same degree (90 per cent); whereas, 
29 children used the level 2 error strategy at least once (97 per cent); object relations – 
10 (33 per cent) and other strategies 24 (80 per cent). Thus, each of the five strategies 
was used at some point during the experiment. The second type of variability was the 
frequency of use of each strategy by different children. The use of the analogy based 
object with adaptation ranged from 0% to 63%; the analogy based object but without 
adaptation from 0% to 47%; level 2 error from 0% to 40%; level 1 error 0% to 13% 
and no object choice from 0% to 63%. Children’s strategies in experiment two 
showed a wider range of 0-83%.   
 
Such variability indicates that children were not discovering analogy until they had 
tried other strategies first.  This explains children’s behaviour in the problems needing 
an auxiliary task, after a large number of children had previously used the analogy 
based object with adaptation in the problems without an auxiliary task. Therefore, 
supporting the notion that strategic variability in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task occurred due to the difficulty children faced with these problems, because they 
were unsure of the solutions they moved to other strategies in the hope that these 
would solve the problem.  
 
According to Siegler’s Overlapping Waves Theory children show variability in their 
object choices both across and within the tasks as part of their normal development 
and interaction with the tasks. Children may choose the correct strategy for solution 
on one trial, but change to another on the following trial of the same task (i.e., snake 
task). The following analysis tests this theory within all three conditions. The data 
were analysed visually for trends by comparing the patterns of strategy use in all three 
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conditions on each trial within the problems without an auxiliary task, and separately 
in the problems needing an auxiliary task with video condition (s 8-12). This trial-by-
trial analysis should track children’s development of analogy over the 30 weeks.   
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Figure 8: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the Video Condition (Problems Without an Auxiliary Task) 
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Figure 8 shows that children began using 3 strategies at trial one. These were the 
analogy based object with adaptation, analogy based object but without adaptation 
and level 2 errors. The choice of strategies indicates that children were using 
information from the base analogue because all three strategies rely on relational 
similarity. The level 1 error response did not feature in any of the problems without an 
auxiliary task in the video condition. Children’s use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation increased over the first 5 trials, levelled out on trial 6 (at 100 per cent 
correct) and decreased considerably by trial 15 on tasks 3. During the decline of the 
analogy based object with adaptation in the gripper task, 20 percent of responses 
included the level 2 errors strategy. The most frequent strategy in the toy task was 
analogy based object but without adaptation, while the analogy based object with 
adaptation declined.  
 
Children in the control condition began using four strategies at trial one. Again this 
decreased to only two in the gripper task. There was much more variability in the 
snake task compared to those in the video condition, in particular with regard to the 
use of level 2 errors and the no object choice. This variability in task one may have 
occurred because children did not receive the base analogue so they were relying on 
trial and error. As in the video condition, no child chose the level 1 errors. The control 
and video conditions show similar patterns of variability and strategic use, in that the 
predominant strategy is the analogy based object with adaptation until they reach the 
toy retrieval task where children change to the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy. Again, responses of analogy based object with adaptation 
increased in the first 5 trials, but to a lesser degree. Interestingly, 80 per cent of 
responses were the analogy based object with adaptation in the gripper task, this 
remained constant across all 5 trials, suggesting that the same children consistently 
selected the correct strategy on each trial.  
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Figure 9: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the Control Condition (Problems Without an Auxiliary Task) 
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One noticeable difference in performance between the video- and control -condition 
was in the toy retrieval task. It seems that the more steep the decline, the longer 
children were able to maintain performance. This is evident in the difference between 
children’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation in the toy retrieval tasks. 
Children in the video condition’s use of the analogy declined considerably over trials, 
to the start of the toy task and continued to do so. In contrast, those in the control 
condition increased more than those in the video condition. Figure 7 and 8 show that 
performance in the control condition may be more robust than in the video condition. 
This is evident in the more natural, exploratory use of different strategies in the 
control condition. It seems that here children are not confined to using the information 
from the base problem. They are free to explore the objects and target problem 
without the analogous base problem interfering with their object choices.   
 
Figure 10 shows that children in the snake task used all five strategies at trial one. 
And for the first time the analogy based object with adaptation is not the dominant 
strategy in the snake task. This difference is interesting because children here received 
the same analogue as those in the video condition yet the strategy choices are very 
different. This suggests significant individual differences between children in the 
video and no practice condition. Level 2 errors increased in the snake task and the 
analogy based object with adaptation also increased, although to a lesser degree. The 
analogy based object with adaptation became the most frequent strategy in the gripper 
task, but this was surpassed by the analogy based object but without adaptation 
strategy in the toy retrieval task.  
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Figure 10: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the No Practice Condition (Problems Without an Auxiliary Task) 
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The video condition in the problems without an auxiliary task (figure 8) shows the 
least variability, with the no practice showing the most variability. In the video 
condition children relied more on the analogy based object with adaptation from trial 
1 to 10, with the analogy based object but without adaptation from trial 11 to 15, 
while the analogy based object with adaptation gradually declines.  A similar pattern 
of variability can be seen in the control condition.  The wave pattern from trial 10 to 
15 is due to children's application of the analogy based object but without adaptation 
strategy.  But here, children’s decrease in the analogy based object with adaptation 
revealed a sharp decline at trial 10, which indicates a more sudden shift in strategy 
choice than in the video condition. This may have been due to relational difficulty 
because of the similar decline in all conditions.  However, this does not explain a 
steeper decline in the control condition or why those in the video condition changed 
strategy at the end of the problems without an auxiliary task, and those in the control 
condition did not, maybe the video was confusing them. The children may have 
realised that they needed to use the information from the video, because they had 
received it before each of the target problems, but they were unable to transfer the 
correct information to the target problem. Those in the control condition were not 
affected by such an obstruction, so were able to look at the target problem in isolation 
and work out the best strategy available from the objects presented to them.  
 
It may be that, in the snake problem, those in the video condition, showed a response 
to instruction from the video, whereas those in the control condition showed early 
exploratory learning. Children in the control condition were exploring other strategies 
more than those in the video condition which resulted in a gradual increase in correct 
choiceal use. This indicates that those allowed to explore the problem more freely 
(control condition), benefited from the exploration of alternative strategies. This 
supports Siegler’s Overlapping Waves Theory in that, children move around the 
different strategies learning of their potential to solve the problem.    
 
Children in the no practice condition showed much more variability in their strategy 
use.  Each of the strategies varied considerably showing that children in this condition 
often reverted back to less appropriate strategies.  This was particularly evident in the 
change from using the analogy based object with adaptation in the gripper task to 
using analogy based object but without adaptation in the toy retrieval task. 
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Furthermore, those in the no practice condition were less likely to use the analogy 
based object with adaptation than those in the video and control conditions. This 
confirms the effect of a lack of practice by those in the no practice condition. Those 
who received practice chose the analogical object more than those without practice, 
even if practice was with the target problem only.   
 
In spite of the percentage differences in children's choice of the analogy based object 
with adaptation across condition, (highest percentage choice in the video condition, 
followed by the control condition and then the no practice condition) a similar pattern 
of variability emerged.  For example, children in all three conditions showed an 
increase in analogy in the snake task, this increase levelled out in the gripper task and 
decreased in the toy task. The similarity across tasks suggests that children used 
similar strategic patterns whether or not they had received practice or a base problem. 
The only difference is the extent to which they chose a specific strategy (shown in the 
percentage differences). 
 
To explore whether the same variability occurred in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task the next set of graphs show performance in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task. Figure 11 shows strategic pattern for those in the video condition.  
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Figure 11: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the Video Condition (Problems Needing an Auxiliary task) 
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As in the video condition (problems without an auxiliary task), children used three 
strategies on the first trial. Initially, the level 2 error strategy was chosen more than 
the analogy based object with adaptation. However, the analogy based object with 
adaptation increased over the stick task.  The object match made an appearance in 
trial three only and did not return until trial two of the pendulum problem.  The 
pendulum task showed the most variability in strategic use, with the analogy based 
object but without adaptation strategy being the most dominant strategy. Unlike in the 
problems without an auxiliary task, the analogy based object with adaptation was not 
continually used across trials, level 2 error featured more heavily. Therefore, children 
were relying on relations, but not the most appropriate needed to solve the problem. 
The most interesting pattern is in figure 11 is the step-like progression of the analogy 
based object with adaptation in the stick problem. With practice children increased 
their use of the analogy based object with adaptation and their choice remained stable 
on trial 2-3 and 4-5. Although the analogy based object with adaptation became the 
dominant strategy on trial 4 and 5, this strategy decreased on trial 6, the first trial of 
the pendulum problem.  
 
It seems that children needed practice with the pendulum problem before 
understanding how it worked, and how it could be solved using the appropriate 
strategy. The stability of analogy suggests that the same children were consistent in 
their strategy choice over the remaining three trials on the pendulum problem. 
Similarly, in the final problem, children did not select the correct strategy until trial 3, 
suggesting that following practice with the base problem children learned how to use 
the analogy based object with adaptation. However, children took longer to get there; 
utilizing this strategy at trial 3.  
 
Figure 12 shows that children used two strategies on trial one of the control condition, 
but by the end of the stick task children began using all five strategies with the level 2 
error being the most dominant.  As in the video condition, the pendulum problem used 
all five strategies and the most variable in strategic use. However, the most dominant 
strategy was the no object choice and not the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy.  
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Figure 12: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the Control Condition (Problems Needing an Auxiliary Task) 
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Performance in the stick problem reveals that level 2 errors was the dominant strategy, 
unlike the analogy based object with adaptation in the video condition. However, 
despite the low percentage of the correct strategy, it remained consistent on the next 4 
trials of the stick problem. The level 2 errors strategy dropped considerably in the 
pendulum problem, and as in the video condition, the no object choice featured more 
here. The prevalence of this strategy was probably due to no base analogue; because 
children had no relational knowledge from a base problem, and were not familiar with 
the workings of a pendulum (lack of knowledge) they chose not to select a strategy. A 
number of children stressed that the real object was not present and therefore gave up.  
 
The level 1 error strategy was selected more in the pendulum problem than in any 
other problem. Here children chose the tinsel that featured in the video despite not 
seeing the video. This suggests that children could see the potential of using the tinsel 
to solve the problem. The majority of children who chose this strategy tried attaching 
it to the rope to make it longer. However, in spite of this all children failed to solve 
the task using this strategy. This behaviour suggests that the perceived function of the 
object is important. This confirms earlier findings that children select objects for their 
functional use.  
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Figure 13: The Pattern of Strategic Variability in the No Practice Condition (Problems Needing an Auxiliary Task) 
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All 4 strategies were used in the no practice condition. The use of the analogy based 
object with adaptation featured in the stick problem only, and then disappeared from 
the children’s repertoire. Of interest is the overlapping of the level 2 errors and 
analogy based object but without adaptation in the pendulum problem. This suggests 
that children were aware that they needed to attach an object to the rope, but the 
action or swinging of that item and attaching the correct bulldog clip proved too 
difficult for the majority of children of this age. As in the control condition, children 
here did not use the analogy based object with adaptation on the pendulum or roll-up 
task. Children here relied heavily on the level 2 errors, and this continued to increase 
across all trials. In spite of the no practice only providing 6 data points, variability 
across trials within the problems was low. Although children used all of the strategies 
across all six problems, the majority of responses were the same on trial one and five 
of each of the problems. This suggests that a lack of practice resulted in children not 
exploring other strategies.  
 
The previous three graphs show that each condition in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task showed considerable strategic variability. Children used all of the 
strategies, often reverting back to less effective strategies even when the appropriate 
strategies had worked for them. For example almost 60 per cent of children in the 
stick problem (trial five) were using the analogy based object with adaptation. This 
decreased over subsequent trials and was replaced by the use of the analogy based 
object but without adaptation strategy.  Even the most frequent level 2 errors were not 
consistently applied. The wave patterns in the video condition indicate that children 
were not as consistent as those in the problems without an auxiliary task.   
 
A similar variable pattern was observed in the control condition.  Despite the 
consistent use of level 2 error at the start of the problems needing an auxiliary task; 
this both increased and decreased in subsequent trials. This supports the finding that 
children find problems needing an auxiliary task more difficult, and when they have 
no base information they explore alternative strategies. Furthermore, because their 
choices were not solving the problem, they continued to search for the correct strategy.  
 
What is clear from looking at the figures above is the increase in variability in all 3 
conditions. This indicates that as relational difficulty increased, the use of the analogy 
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based object with adaptation decreased. Since children in the video condition chose 
the analogy based object with adaptation more than those in the no-practice and 
control –condition, suggests that strategic variability may facilitate analogy. The 
findings support Siegler’s (1994) suggestion that learning comes from exploring the 
task. The fact that children in the control condition were able to explore the same 
target problem as those in the video condition, but receive no base analogue, suggests 
that the base problem benefits the selection of the analogy based object with 
adaptation significantly more than exploration of the task itself, supporting the 
importance of analogy to children’s learning.   
 
When comparing the variability across the three problems needing an auxiliary task, it 
seems that on the stick problem strategy choices of those in the control condition were 
less variable. The majority of responses in the control condition were the level 2 
errors strategy. Although strategy choices were more variable in the pendulum 
problem than in the stick problem, variability was still low compared to the video 
condition. Finally, variability was similar in the roll-up task. Both conditions relied 
significantly more on the level 2 errors strategy than any other strategy. However, 
children were also selecting alternative, non-analogical strategies to a lesser degree.  
 
It seems that less variability in the problems needing an auxiliary task may be because 
children are more methodical in their choices. Rather than choosing random objects or 
object matches, or even being distracted by the information in the base problem, 
children consider the objects in relation to the task only. They have less information 
(from the video), but they use their own knowledge of the world and objects to try to 
select the most appropriate object. So, children are not restricted by rules from the 
base problem.   
 
The no practice condition illustrated the importance of practice. In particular, the least 
variability in the problems needing an auxiliary task suggests that children were 
unable to benefit from the same amount of experience of those in the video and 
control conditions. Despite the similar variability between the video and control 
conditions children in the video condition favoured the analogy based object with 
adaptation, confirming the influence of the base information in selecting the correct 
object to solve the target problem. 
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The problems needing an auxiliary task showed that when children are faced with 
relationally difficult tasks their strategy choices become more variable and less 
consistent. The results indicated that 4- and 5-year-olds showed an emerging ability to 
solve problems using the analogy based object with adaptation over multiple trials 
(i.e., with practice), but when tasks become more difficult, tasks for which they 
possess very little knowledge, strategic variability increases.  
 
The group data provided us with the variability in children’s performance across the 
three conditions. However, although it highlights children’s preferences and 
difficulties with certain problems, it does not inform us as to why some children, in 
the same condition, solved the problems and others did not, and how some children 
were able to transfer and others not. To explore these issues, the following section 
examines children’s individual performances. 
 
 
6.6 Individual case studies 
 
 
One of the aims of the microgenetic study was to explore the issue of children’s 
strategy change over time. There have been many studies over the past few decades 
that have tried to answer this question across a number of different domains. In spite 
of the increase in research and a general understanding of cognitive change, research 
has not been able to answer this enduring question.  One reason, according to Siegler 
(2006), is that change processes are inherently unobservable.  Siegler argues that such 
processes can only be inferred from observations at specific points in time.  
Furthermore, there are many factors involved in change.  In particular, children may 
undergo change due to maturation, improvement of working memory, an increase in 
knowledge, time frame improvements or even improved behavioural or neural activity; 
all of which require in-depth analysis as individual factors and as a whole. Despite 
these difficulties faced by researchers, the microgenetic methodology moves us a step 
closer to understanding how change occurs.   
 
Although the group data presented thus far allowed for the reporting of children‘s 
strategy use, it revealed little about each child’s individual pattern of strategy use i.e., 
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how the factors affecting their choices changed and varied within the child. The case 
studies should provide us with information as to why children changed their strategy 
on the same task on subsequent trials. Monitoring individual change can add depth to 
the group data which can often miss the intricacies of children’s understanding. It can 
tease out individual patterns in a child’s performance. An important feature here is 
that the changes are initiated by the children themselves and not by the researcher 
providing them with hints or instructions.  As well as identifying the path of change, 
researchers can isolate certain developmental transitions (Lavelli et al, 2005).  
 
The case study data discusses how individual children dealt with the effects of 
practice and lack of relational knowledge. Children’s performances were analysed for 
their changes, successes and failures. The group data in study 3 indicates a number of 
different strategic patterns such as, the predominant use of the analogy based object 
with adaptation in problems without an auxiliary task; a shift from no strategic object 
choice to the analogy based object with adaptation and a shift from analogy based 
object but without adaptation to the analogy based object with adaptation.  These 
three patterns of strategic behaviour all have something in common; all patterns were 
followed by a sharp decrease in the use of the analogy based object with adaptation in 
the problems needing an auxiliary task. This finding has implications for relational 
complexity when measuring analogical ability in young children in that, when young 
children are faced with difficult relations they rely on a variety of different strategies.  
 
The following case studies will be discussed in relation to these common patterns so 
as to shed light on the obstacles and facilitators explored previously in the group data. 
It was hoped that the case studies would provide us with information on the source of 
change in children’s performance. That is, why children change their strategies during 
the same or similar task and what causes children to revert back to less effective 
strategies once they have consistently used the correct analogous strategy.  
 
The following section presents some of the prevalent patterns of behaviour across 7 
individuals.  It explores children’s strategy use session-by-session, which offers 
insight into each child’s progress over the 30 week observation period. To understand 
why children displayed certain patterns of behaviour, each child’s performance was 
examined in relation to their knowledge of the base problem, strategy usage and 
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pattern, strategic change and explanation. This will offer an overview of children’s 
experience with the task from beginning to end, and should present us with an in 
depth picture of children’s strategy choices and intraindividual change and progress.  
 
Children in the case studies were chosen for their patterns of behaviour. Each child 
also represents a number of other children within their condition which suggests that 
these were common themes that ran throughout the trials. However, for the purpose of 
space here, only one child per pattern was discussed. Pseudonyms were used for every 
child to ensure anonymity. It was hoped that by the end of this chapter individual 
change will highlight important transition points in 4- and 5-year-old children’s 
thinking.  
 
Children in the case studies were chosen for their patterns of strategic behaviour. The 
three children selected from the video condition showed variability in strategy choices 
despite receiving problems under the same conditions. These patterns were prevalent 
across a number of children in the group data. The three children in the control 
condition and two children from the no practice condition were chosen for the same 
reasons.  
 
Figure 13 illustrates all seven children’s patterns of strategy use. Despite the similar 
performances in many of the trials, the graphs below show great variability between 
condition and within condition. The graphs are discussed first, before looking more in 
depth at each individual to understand why their choices varied so much. 
 
Children’s strategy choices in figure 13 follow a wave-like pattern, with the same 
strategies being used on a number of tasks, some being extinguished, the introduction 
of new strategies, while others do not appear at all. This is in line with Siegler’s 
Overlapping Waves Theory. Also apparent in a number of children above, is Siegler’s 
belief that children often revert back to less effective strategies even when they have 
used the most appropriate strategy on previous trials with some success.   
 
The most frequent pattern in all seven children was the use of the analogy based 
object with adaptation in the first three tasks. This strategy was extinguished in many 
cases by problem 4, with the introduction of a new strategy at the expense of the most 
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appropriate strategy. Some children were able to solve the first few trials in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task, but this was short-lived and was replaced by level 
2 errors or strategies based on surface- and not relational – similarity. Therefore, 
children performed well on the problems without an auxiliary task showing within-
task transfer, but the majority were unable to transfer the analogy based object with 
adaptation to problems needing an auxiliary task.   
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Figure 14: Children’s Strategic Patterns across all Six Tasks in the Video Condition  
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Figure 15: Children’s Strategic Patterns across all Six Tasks in the Control Condition  
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Figure 16: Children’s Strategic Patterns across all Six Tasks in the No Practice 
Condition  
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Reuben behaved in this way, he was able to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation until trial 3 of the stick task then he changed to a variety of less effective 
strategies. Reuben’s performance in figure 14 shows that because he was unable to 
use the information from the base problem, or his experience from the problems 
without an auxiliary task, he tried and tested all of the alternative strategies in the 
hope to find the correct object to solve the problem. Sam showed great variability all 
through his performance. Despite receiving the base problem which presented him 
with the knowledge of relations, he showed no preference for any particular strategy. 
Although when he did choose a strategy he was consistent in his use of it across trials 
within the same task. However, despite this consistency it brought Sam no nearer the 
solution in the problems needing an auxiliary task. Similarly, Linda and Mikey used a 
variety of strategies on the problems needing an auxiliary task. They seemed to move 
between different strategies in the hope to choose the correct one to solve the problem. 
Unlike Sam, their variable choices brought them nearer to the solution. This suggests 
that when children are unclear about the correct strategy they move between different 
strategies either through trial and error or in a more systematic way in the hope that 
they will eventually hit on the correct strategy, and in most cases in the video 
condition, responses were consistent within tasks, but not between tasks. This meant 
that children were not transferring their knowledge between tasks, but treating each 
task separately.  
 
One common pattern in all case studies was the greater variability in strategy choice 
in the last two problems (pendulum and roll-up). Tasmin and Reuben’s performance 
with the analogy based object with adaptation decreased considerably in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task, and despite the similarity in variability, they used different 
strategies. Tasmin relied more on level 2 errors whereas Reuben relied on analogy 
based object but without adaptation and Sam on both level 2 errors and analogy based 
object but without adaptation. This suggests that despite all three children receiving 
practice and the base problem, their strategy choices were not consistent.  
  
Mikey and Jeremy both found success in the problems without an auxiliary task 
despite not receiving the analogous base problem, although it took Jeremy a little 
longer than Mikey to use the analogy based object with adaptation. Jeremy even 
continued to use the analogy based object with adaptation on the stick problem. Thus, 
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like Mikey, he consistently used the analogy based object with adaptation on three 
problems. However, in the final two problems, Mikey and Jeremy relied on different 
strategies. Mikey preferred level 2 errors and the analogy based object but without 
adaptation, whereas Jeremy showed no preference, he chose level 2 errors, analogy 
based object but without adaptation, and the no object choice. Despite Mikey and 
Jeremy receiving the same problems under the same conditions, their strategy choices 
differed in the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
Finally, Bethan and Linda’s performance in figure 14 reveals some success with the 
analogy based object with adaptation. However, Linda’s use of the analogy based 
object with adaptation was consistent across the problems without an auxiliary task, 
but changed to level 2 errors and no object choice in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task. In contrast, Bethan only used the analogy based object with adaptation 
on the gripper task, for the majority of the other tasks she relied on level 2 errors and 
analogy based object but without adaptation. Interestingly, Mikey and Linda showed 
similarity in strategy choice within tasks. The only difference is their choice in the 
pendulum problem. Mikey chose analogy based object but without adaptation on all 
five trials and Linda chose no object. This suggests that practice and no base, and no 
practice and base had a similar effect on Mikey and Linda’s strategy choices. Since 
this pattern featured across a number of individuals in the group data, it can be 
assumed that when children do not receive both base and practice, they rely 
significantly more on alternative non-analogous strategies, and in some cases their 
strategy choices are similar across both conditions. This highlights the group findings 
that children who receive both base and practice rely significantly more on the 
analogy based object with adaptation strategy.  
 
The strategic patterns in figure 14 highlight individual differences in 4.5-year-olds’ 
strategy choices. To understand why children chose similar or different strategies the 
following section explores children’s patterns of behaviour in more depth.  
 
One pattern of behaviour that emerged among a number of children was the consistent 
use of the analogy based object with adaptation on all 15 trials in the problems 
without an auxiliary task. Children who showed this pattern are presented below. 
Since all children found the problems needing an auxiliary task more difficult than the 
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problems without an auxiliary task, their behaviour was discussed separately to 
highlight the obstacles encountered.  
   
 
 6.6.1 Case study: Reuben 
 
 
Reuben was typical of many of the children in the video condition who were able to 
solve the problems without an auxiliary task. Reuben may have solved the problems 
on the basis of receiving the base problem over multiple trials (video condition) and 
thus, benefited from the knowledge of relations and practice with the task. However, 
this explanation cannot be assumed for all children because a number of children in 
the no practice and control condition, who were not presented with the relations in the 
base problem or practice, displayed the same pattern of behaviour.  To understand 
why Reuben was successful his representational ability, post task descriptions and 
target solutions were explored in more detail.  
 
If Reuben’s success can be attributed to his representational ability, then it was 
expected that his descriptions of the base problem would match his successful 
solutions in the target problem. In the problems without an auxiliary task, Reuben 
gave just under half (7 correct representations) of the correct descriptions, with the 
other half only describing the solution and not the problem the actor was faced with. It 
seems that repetition played a role in Reuben’s representational ability in that, on the 
first few trials of each problem Reuben described the solution only. This suggests that 
he was showing progressive focusing on aspects perceived to be important and it was 
this focus that benefited his relational competence in the target problem.  However, 
due to his descriptions not being consistent on all trials suggests that Reuben’s one 
hundred per cent success rate with the problems without an auxiliary task may be 
attributable to more than representational ability.   
 
Reuben’s performance with the analogy based object with adaptation may suggest 
that he did not need to use the information from the base problem to solve the 
problem. Instead he may have possessed a schema based on prior experience that 
allowed him to solve the easy problem (i.e., he knew that to reach an out of reach item 
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he needed something long). However, the fact that he used each of the objects 
correctly (as presented in the video) suggests he may have used the information from 
the base. Reuben’s reliance on the base problem was supported by his description of 
the base problem in trial 1. Whilst describing how the actor passed the bow to another 
actor, he said “she put it through the other one and popped it out”. When asked 
“popped out of what?” he pointed to the snake and said “one of them”. This indicates 
that Reuben was able to see the relationship between the base and target problem in 
that he saw a relationship between the wrapping paper (long tube) in the video, and 
the snake (long tube) in the target problem. Reuben then went on to solve the problem 
using the analogy based object with adaptation. This suggests that Reuben saw the 
relationship between the objects and transferred the relations to the target problem. 
However, in his post-task description Reuben did not acknowledge the relationship 
between his choice of object and the base. Instead he claimed that he chose the object 
“because it’s big”. Reuben failed to mention the relations in the video. This may be 
because he was being asked specifically about the target problem he saw no reason to 
mention the base problem. It could also be that children of this age find verbalizing 
their reasoning following a task difficult, so they describe perceptual aspects of the 
object rather than relational aspects. This would support Piaget’s suggestion that 
children can not reason about abstract things, and since the post-task description 
required them to verbalise an abstract phenomenon, this was too difficult for Reuben.  
 
Reuben continued to notice the relationship between the objects in the base and in the 
target problem throughout the problems without an auxiliary task. This was 
particularly noticeable in the toy task (trial 12), while looking at the objects and then 
at the video, Reuben asked “where is the umbrella?” again showing an awareness of 
the link between the video and target problem. This highlights the importance of 
representation being explored prior to the target problem. It appears that despite 
Reuben not expressing full knowledge of the information in the base problem on 
every problem without auxiliary tasks, he was generally aware that the base and target 
problem were related in some way, but he was not always able to transfer this 
information to the target problem.   
 
Reuben did not show the same level of performance in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task.  He used the analogy based object with adaptation only on 4 of the 
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stick trials. The rest of his strategy choices included the analogy based object but 
without adaptation, level 2 errors and the level 1 errors strategy. Reuben’s 
representational ability was also considerably less here than in the problems without 
an auxiliary task (4 correct representations).  The 4 successful representations were in 
the last 4 trials of the roll-up task. Such poor representational ability and poor use of 
the analogy based object with adaptation suggests that Reuben was not using the 
information from the video.  This may have been due to difficulty in extracting the 
correct relations from the video.  However, looking at other children in the video 
condition suggests that the representations in the video were not impossible to extract. 
It may simply be that Reuben found the problems needing an auxiliary task difficult to 
both represent and solve, and no matter how much exposure to the base problem, this 
did not facilitate success on the target problem.  
 
On the first of the problems needing an auxiliary task Reuben was able to make the 
link between base and target. This was reflected in his ability to use the analogy based 
object with adaptation in the stick problem. However, this did not last. On the 
following tasks Reuben failed to see the link or use the analogy based object with 
adaptation, suggesting that the links he made previously had helped him solve the 
problem. As in the problems without an auxiliary task, Reuben was able to see the 
relationship between the base and target in the stick problem. When asked in the stick 
problem “how did she get it out?” Reuben replied “with these” and picks up the two 
sticks on the table. When asked “what did she do with them” he pushes the sticks 
back and forth.  To further emphasise Reuben’s reliance on the base problem, when 
he was asked why he had chosen to attach the two sticks to solve the problem he said 
“I saw it by the ball, the sticks were by the ball” and he points at the screen. This 
supports the assumption that he was aware of the relationship between base and target 
problem, but again Reuben was unable to transfer this information to the target 
problem.  
 
Reuben was able to form a representation of the roll-up tasks on 4 out of 5 occasions, 
but was unable to use this information to solve the roll-up problem. Whilst looking for 
the most appropriate object to solve the problem, he asks “where’s the carpet?” after 
some time studying the objects he points to the piece of paper and says “there’s the 
carpet”. Despite Reuben’s insight, he fails to use this information to solve the problem 
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in the same way as he had done in the problems without an auxiliary task. In the 
following trial Reuben says “I need the carpet, is that one for it (pointing to the paper), 
yes it is, look” (pointing to the screen). He finally says “the carpet’s like the paper put 
that (pointing to the polish canister) in the carpet”. Reuben is obviously aware that to 
solve the problem correctly he needs the paper, and that it relates to the carpet in the 
base problem, however, he fails to roll up the bone in the paper, because he is fixated 
on the canister being rolled up in the carpet and not taking into account the task at 
hand, which involves transferring a bone. Reuben's failure in this task highlights the 
importance of transfer and the understanding that an analogy is needed. In spite of 
Reuben possessing the relational knowledge and explicitly stating the relations he was 
unable to transfer them to the target problem.  
 
It is clear from the above example that Reuben was aware of the relationship between 
the base and target problem and this aided his use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation in the problems without an auxiliary task. However, he was unable to state 
the relations in the post task description. He did not mention his choice of object in 
relation to the base problem at all. Reuben tended to focus his attention on one aspect 
of object choice, relying heavily on perceptual-based descriptions (70 percent). In the 
majority of problems without an auxiliary task he mentions the length and not the 
object function (hook/drag or grip). This does not match his choice in the problems 
without an auxiliary task where he had obviously used two relations (long and 
hook/drag).  This may be a problem with verbalisation in children of this age, and not 
simply a lack of ability to draw out higher-order relations.  
 
Reuben’s descriptions of his strategy choice did not facilitate learning of the 
analogous strategy. In the problems needing an auxiliary task in particular, Reuben 
explained his choices based on perceptual explanations. This prompted him to rely 
more on analogy based object but without adaptation, which took only one 
transformation into account (i.e., length). In this respect Reuben’s explanation of his 
choices influenced his choice of strategies on subsequent trials, and as with his 
consistent perceptual explanations, his strategy choices were fairly consistent 
throughout the problems needing an auxiliary task. This suggests that although 
Reuben was not expressing analogous descriptions of his choices, his descriptions 
matched his subsequent attempts at target solution.    
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In the problems without an auxiliary task, Reuben was able to solve some of the target 
problems despite only representing the solution of the base problem on nearly half of 
all trials. This suggests that Reuben did not necessarily have to represent the problem 
and solution to enable him to choose the analogy based object with adaptation and 
solve the target problem. However, this decreased the likelihood of success in the 
hard problems. Reuben was only able to solve 4 of the stick trials using the analogy 
based object with adaptation which were preceded by solution only. Reuben’s 
performance on all three hard problems was not variable within the problems. The 
majority of strategies in stick problem were analogous, in the pendulum - analogy 
based object but without adaptation and in the rollup - level 2 errors. Thus the level of 
difficulty increased; his success decreased. The lack of exploration meant that Reuben 
tried the same strategy, but this did not work, as he was unable to solve any of the last 
ten trials in the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
Worthy of note here was Reuben’s success when he verbalized the relationship 
between the base and target during problem solution. However, when Reuben did not 
describe the relationship he relied on less effective strategies which resulted in failing 
the problem. Since Reuben was unable to express the relationship in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task suggests that Reuben’s good performance with the analogy 
based object with adaptation was dependent on his knowledge of relations between 
the base and target problem.  
 
In conclusion, Reuben’s use of the analogy based object with adaptation on the first 
four problems indicates that when presented with simple tasks which are part of his 
conceptual knowledge he was able to draw out the relations and use the analogy based 
object with adaptation. Only when the tasks became difficult and included relations 
not present in his repertoire did he find analogy difficult. Practice with similar 
problems needing an auxiliary task did not facilitate transfer of relations or strategies. 
Reuben continued to use relational strategies (level 2 errors), but failed to transfer the 
relations between the target and base problem to enable successful solution. The 
change from the analogy based object with adaptation to less effective strategies in 
Reuben’s case may be due to an inability to transfer the relations and because he saw 
the relationships between the base and target problem this distracted him from 
exploring objects, which also prevented him from relying on prior experience to help 
 216 
him solve the problem.  
 
Reuben’s performance at the start was not affected by practice. He selected the 
analogy based object with adaptation from trial one, and when he reached the 
problems needing an auxiliary task practice with the new difficult tasks did not ensure 
success. In contrast, a number of children were unable to use the analogy based object 
with adaptation from the start of the trials. They relied on less effective strategies 
which resulted in failure to solve the target problem, and either gradually changed to 
more appropriate strategies, or changed suddenly to the correct analogous strategy.    
 
 
 6.6.2 Case study 2: Tasmin 
 
 
Tasmin changed from no object to the analogy based object with adaptation. On the 
first 4 trials Tasmin chose no object, but on the fifth trial she chose the snake (the 
correct object). Tasmin continued to use the analogy based object with adaptation on 
all the remaining trials within the problems without an auxiliary task. It seems that 
Tasmin may have needed practice with analogy tasks before she was able to see the 
relations between the base and target, and realise that she could use the information 
from the base to help her solve the problem.   
 
Tasmin's representational ability was high in the problems without an auxiliary task, 
with her forming representations on 14 out of 15 trials.  Since Tasmin was able to 
represent all the problems without an auxiliary task her failure to use analogy based 
object with adaptation on the first four trials may be due to a problem of access. Thus, 
Tasmin possessed the knowledge of relations as expressed in her representational 
descriptions, but was unable to access this information to use on the target problem. 
However, once she had hit on the correct solution, she continued to use analogy on 
the tasks that followed. The issue of access was confirmed by Tasmin’s descriptions 
of strategy choice. When Tasmin was asked why she had not chosen an object on the 
first 4 trials she answered ‘because I can’t reach it’. When prompted to use an object 
on trial 2, Tasmin reached forward and said ‘I’m not long enough’. Only by trial 5 did 
Tasmin decide to select an object to attempt solution.  
 217 
By the second set of tasks (gripper problem) Tasmin began to show an understanding 
of the relationship between the base and target problem. For example, in gripper trial 
2 when asked about the video analogue she answers “she tried to get it with that” 
(pointing to the screen), when asked “what is that” Tasmin picked up the barbeque 
tongs saying “this”. Tasmin therefore saw the similarity between the gripper in the 
video and the tongs in the target problem. Even more explicit in the next trial, Tasmin 
explains why she chose the particular object “because I wanted to use them, like her” 
(pointing to the screen).  It seems that once Tasmin saw the relationship this allowed 
her to access and transfer the knowledge onto the target problem. The fact that 
Tasmin was able to form a representation on trial 8 then solve the target problem 
using the analogy based object with adaptation and explain her choice analogically 
suggests that she used the base information to solve the problem using analogical 
reasoning in the true sense. That is, she was explicitly aware that she had used the 
information of the base problem to solve the target problem.  However, apart from 
this single occasion Tasmin did not announce the explicit relationship on subsequent 
trials. Tasmin's descriptions of object choices following this insight were mixed.  
They ranged from no answer, to irrelevant information, perceptual-based to goal-
oriented descriptions.  
 
As with many of the children, Tasmin’s strategy use between the problems needing an 
auxiliary task varied. Within each task set Tasmin moved between different strategies.  
For example, in the stick trial, Tasmin chose level 2 errors on the first trial and 
attempted the problem using one stick, but failed. On the next trial Tasmin picked up 
both sticks, looked at them for a while, then put both into the tube to attempt the 
problem, however, she failed to attach both sticks.  This strategy of choosing the two 
sticks suggests that Tasmin knew she needed to use both, but she was unsure how to 
use them in order to solve the problem. On her next trial, because the first choice of 
strategy did not work, Tasmin moved to another - the object match.  Here she looked 
to the video for help to rely on something perceptually similar, however, yet again, 
this strategy failed. Tasmin's failure takes her back to her previous strategy choice 
(level 2 errors). Therefore, practice with the problems needing an auxiliary task did 
not help her choose the correct strategy in the same way as the problems without an 
auxiliary task. The return to level 2 errors can be seen on the two last trials of the stick 
problem. In these trials Tasmin acknowledged a relationship between the base and the 
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target problem.  Although Tasmin did not see she had used the information from the 
base problem to help her, she referred to the behaviour of the actor in video. In trial 4 
of the stick trial, when asked why she had chosen the stick from the table, she replied, 
“because the lady couldn't get it out with nothing on the….this” (points to the video 
screen).  On trial 5, when asked the same post-task question Tasmin replied “because 
the lady on the DVD gets it with the stick”. Both answers show that Tasmin was 
aware that what she was attempting in the target problem was the same as that in the 
video base problem. It can therefore be assumed that Tasmin had the knowledge of 
relations between the base and target and was able to access the relations, but she was 
unable to transfer this knowledge to help solve the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
 
The same pattern was seen across Tasmin’s pendulum problem and the roll-up task. 
This suggests that rather than choosing the incorrect object and sticking to it, Tasmin 
chose a different strategy in the hope that she would hit on the correct one. This 
eventually happened on the very last trial (roll-up task, trial 30). In the penultimate 
task Tasmin said “she wrapped it up in there”. Tasmin rolls up the paper but fails to 
solve the problem. By the final trial Tasmin realises that she had to roll up the paper 
and place the bone through it (as in the video), she attempted this and succeeded. This 
indicates purposeful progression towards analogy through systematically using the 
objects available to her. Tasmin’s choices were systematic in that she chose only 
objects that could solve the problem i.e., long items. It would have been interesting to 
see how Tasmin’s performance could develop from here, she may have eventually 
learned how to use analogy consistently, as she had in the problems without an 
auxiliary task, but in the problems needing an auxiliary task it simply took longer to 
get there. Again, Tasmin’s performance on the final problem indicates the role that 
practice plays in analogy. The more practice Tasmin received the better her 
performance. Tasmin’s performance increased over problems without an auxiliary 
task, but found difficulty in transferring this to the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
In spite of Tasmin’s insight of the relations across base and target problem in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task, she was unable to transfer the relations to solve 
the problem.  
 
The majority of Tasmin’s post-task descriptions were made up of irrelevant 
information such as ‘because I wanted to’, ‘coz I can’t reach’ and ‘I don’t know’. 
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Tasmin’s lack of appropriate explanations was mirrored in her subsequent strategy 
choices. Tasmin chose a variety of different strategies, especially in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task. Therefore, she was not benefiting from her explanations, 
because they were not allowing her to reflect on her choices in a systematic way. 
 
Of interest here is the similarity between Reuben and Tasmin. Both children 
performed well on the tasks, and were able to verbalise during solution. This not only 
highlights the importance of relational knowledge, but also supports children’s ability 
to access the relations, but not necessarily transfer them to the target problem. 
Tasmin’s representational ability was almost perfect in the problems without an 
auxiliary task. This supports her good performance using the analogy based object 
with adaptation. This changed in the problems needing an auxiliary task. She was 
only able to represent 3 out of the 15 trials this was reflected in her poor performance 
in the problems needing an auxiliary task. The majority of Tasmin’s descriptions were 
solution only. Tasmin was, however, able to represent the last two trials in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. It was here that Tasmin realised that she had to 
roll up the paper to create an object to solve the problem. This suggests that Tasmin 
used the information from the representation in the base problem to help to create the 
object needed to solve the target problem.  However, Tasmin’s description of why she 
had come to the correct solution in her last trial did not match her performance she 
simply said “that’s why”. This shows that she was satisfied with her choice and 
believed that she did not need to explain it further. It seems that unlike her previous 
attempts at the problems needing an auxiliary task, Tasmin had learned to transfer the 
information to the target problem, but when asked how she had done this, Tasmin was 
unwilling or unable to back it up with an analogical explanation.  
 
It is clear from Tasmin’s performance, that practice with problems without an 
auxiliary task helped her in her strategy choices.  However, the presentation of the 
base problem in the problems needing an auxiliary task did not help her choices until 
the end of the trials. For Tasmin, at least, practice and a base problem seems to be an 
important facilitator of learning in that the more practice Tasmin received the better 
her problem solving became, which eventually resulted in the success of the problem. 
Furthermore, despite Tasmin’s ability to represent the base problem and see the 
relations between the base- and target-problem she was not always able to transfer 
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this knowledge to the target problem.  This supports Goswami’s theory that suggests 
just because a child possesses the knowledge of relations does not mean they will use 
the analogy based object with adaptation. Tasmin displayed more strategic variability 
than Reuben despite receiving the same tasks, under the same conditions. Both 
Reuben and Tasmin showed knowledge of relations through their verbal descriptions 
of the base and target problem during solution. However, this seemed more beneficial 
to Reuben than Tasmin. Strategic variability within tasks did not improve 
performance with the analogy based object with adaptation. This questions Seigler’s 
suggestion that the more variable the choices, the better the performance becomes. 
However, it could be that children need more trials; that 30 weeks is not sufficient to 
learn the art of analogical problem solving. It might just be that children found the 
extra cognitive load of having to create an object in auxiliary tasks too difficult. 
Looking at Tasmin and Reuben’s performances it seems consistency is more 
beneficial than variability. Tasmin showed more variability than Reuben, yet Reuben 
performed better.  
  
 
 6.6.3 Case study 3: Sam 
 
 
Sam, also from the video condition, failed to solve the problems on the problems 
using analogy without an auxiliary task early on, but developed the ability with 
practice, over trials. Almost a less advanced version of Tasmin’s performance. In 
Sam’s first five trials (snake trial), he used the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy.  Sam chose the correct object, but used it incorrectly (as shown in 
the video condition) by balancing the ball on the end of the snake's mouth and reached 
over to drop it on the plate. Therefore, Sam was only using the length and not the 
hole/slide through function shown in the base analogue.  Sam continued to use this 
strategy because it solved the problem; after all he had no reason to change the 
strategy that had worked for him. Sam was unable to support his reasoning for object 
choice in the post-task description. On each of the snake trials he said exactly the 
same thing “because it’s the biggest, it's bigger than the others”.  Therefore, it seems 
that Sam was aware that he needed the length of the object, but his failure to mention 
the need for a hole to transfer the ball suggests he was not using the information from 
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the base problem, but using his knowledge of the task environment to solve the 
problem.  
 
Sam was able to explain fully what had occurred in each of the video analogues. 
Although Sam's representation was correct, he did not always use this information in 
his solution.  This suggests a problem of access, because apart from trial 2, Sam was 
able to give a representation of every base problem (29/30). However, it seems that 
this ability did not help him choose the analogy based object with adaptation, because 
out of the 30 trials Sam used the analogy based object with adaptation on just 9 
occasions.  Sam's most frequent strategy choice was analogy based object but without 
adaptation (14/30) the remaining seven strategies were used in the pendulum and 
rollup task, where Sam chose level 2 errors. 
 
Sam’s choices within each of the task sets were consistent on the snake, gripper and 
stick tasks, so despite Sam not using analogy his strategy choices did not vary within 
tasks. In the toy task, Sam chose the analogy based object with adaptation on trial 1 
and 5, but analogy based object but without adaptation on trial 2, 3 and 4. Sam chose 
the water pistol and turned it around only using the length and not the hook and drag 
function. So, despite him selecting the analogy based object with adaptation, Sam did 
not use its true analogical function.  Sam initially chose the correct action on trial 1, 
but then changed to analogy based object but without adaptation on the following 3 
trials, then reverted back to using the analogy based object with adaptation on the last 
toy trial. One explanation for this behaviour could be that Sam was simply using the 
water pistol as a long object to retrieve the toy.  He was not concerned with the 
object’s need to have a specific function (hook/drag) because the length alone was 
sufficient despite it taking considerably longer to solve.  So, to Sam, it was irrelevant 
how the object was used or how long it took him, as long as he solved the problem.  
This suggests that he was not using the information in the base problem. If he was, he 
would have used the most appropriate action with the object. Sam’s continued object 
choice descriptions confirm his reliance on the length of the object only.   
 
Sam’s behaviour highlights the fact that children could solve the problems without an 
auxiliary task without a need for a base problem, or using the analogy based object 
with adaptation. On all three problems without an auxiliary task Sam was able to 
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solve the tasks using the analogy based object but without adaptation. Sam continued 
to use the analogy based object but without adaptation in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task, but his choices here resulted in failure and not success. Sam relied 
more heavily on level 2 errors. In the stick task, instead of choosing both sticks to 
solve the problem, he chose only one, resulting in a failure to retrieve the sponge from 
the tube. Also despite Sam realizing that he could not solve the problem using one 
stick he continued to try to solve the problem with one stick and did not attempt to 
choose an alternative strategy on subsequent stick trials because it worked last time, 
or did not attempt to turn the tube around and grab the sponge. Thus, his consistency 
using this object resulted in a failure to solve the target problem. Sam returned to the 
analogy based object but without adaptation on the next 7 trials, again indicating a 
problem with the action and not the selection of object choice. This confirms the 
problem of access in that he may have possessed the relational knowledge from the 
base (evident in his representations), but he was unable to access it to help him solve 
the problems with auxiliary tasks.  
 
There was a change on Sam's fourth and fifth trial in the rollup task in that he solved 
the problem using the analogy based object with adaptation.  On his first attempt, he 
placed the bone onto the paper and tried to manoeuvre it towards the basket. Sam was 
aware that he needed to do something else so he stopped for a moment looked at the 
basket then decided to roll-up the paper and place the bone inside, reached over and 
dropped the bone into the basket. Despite Sam solving this correctly, he was unable to 
back up his actions in the post-task description.  When asked why he had chosen the 
paper to solve the problem, Sam replied “because it’s the biggest and bigger than the 
others so I can reach the basket”. Because of Sam’s lack of acknowledgement in his 
use of the base problem, it is likely that Sam attempted solution using his knowledge 
of the world and not information from the base problem. Sam and Tasmin were the 
only children to solve this problem using the correct strategy, and because both were 
in the video condition, they may have taken the idea of rolling up the paper from the 
video, but were unable to express it. Sam may have realised that his usual object 
choice of the stick could not help to solve this problem because he chose the stick in 
trial one, by trial two and three he chose the other long item on the table - the paper, 
but was unable to work out initially, how to get the bone into the basket using the 
paper, he simply placed the bone on the paper and tried to reach the basket, but it kept 
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falling off the paper.  By trial 4 Sam knew he had to change the action so he used the 
rolled up paper. It seems that Sam's ability to come to the right decision may have 
been practice-based in that, he had tried various ways to solve the task and failed, so 
he changed strategies in the hope that it would work.  
 
Therefore, practice with analogous problems may benefit children’s learning of 
analogy in relationally difficult tasks, but it seems that for both Sam and Tasmin, they 
needed a great deal of practice with problems needing an auxiliary task before they 
are successful.  Worthy of mention here is the different strategy choices Sam and 
Tasmin made prior to their success on the final two trials. Sam’s choices were 
consistent within each of the problems needing an auxiliary task. He did not explore 
different strategies within each problem. Tasmin on the other hand, showed greater 
variability in her choices within-tasks. Thus, it seems that Sam benefited from 
consistently using the same strategy, but through refinement (Siegler, 2001) he was 
able to solve the problem. Whereas, Tasmin systematically chose the strategies until 
she hit upon the correct object and action to successfully solve the problem.  The 
different behaviour observed in Sam and Tasmin reveals the importance of individual 
differences in analogical ability, and supports the notion that analogy is dependent on 
a number of processes in that two children presented with the same information, in the 
same condition can select different strategies leading to analogy, but still find success 
in relationally difficult problems.  
 
Finally, Sam's ability did not seem to reflect a use of the base problem. Despite being 
able to recognise what happened in each of the video analogues, he did not transfer 
this knowledge onto his target solutions because of his failure to use the same action 
as that in the video analogues. His post-task description also relied on simple 
perceptual attributes in that, every answer was based on item size (biggest) and its 
relative size to the other objects (bigger than the others). There was also no noticing 
of the relations between the video and the target problem/items as in the previous 
children's case studies.  Therefore, Sam, although showing some variability in 
strategy choices, relied heavily on his own judgment of choosing objects based on 
their length rather than utilizing the information from the base analogues. Only by the 
end of the hard trials did he show a glimpse of a shift toward analogical problem-
solving abilities using higher-order relations.  
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Children’s performance in the control condition shows the importance of children’s 
knowledge of the task and its relations within the target problem. For example, 
children understand that to retrieve an out of reach item they need a long object. This 
knowledge is likely to be based on their previous experience in their everyday 
activities. Interestingly, many of the responses ignored the alternative long objects in 
the problems without an auxiliary task. This suggests that children were aware of the 
hook/drag action involved in retrieving successfully. However, when the tasks 
became more difficult, the solution was less obvious and they needed help from a 
base problem to select the appropriate object and action. This suggests that knowledge 
of the task itself, regardless of whether children receive an analogous base problem, 
plays an important role in their success with the relationally simple problems.  
 
 
 
 6.6.4 Case study 4: Mikey 
 
 
Since Mikey did not receive the base problem, only practice with the tasks, his 
performance was monitored to see if a lack of base problem made a difference to 
success with the target problem.  Mikey was able to solve all of the problems without 
an auxiliary task using the analogy based object with adaptation. This supports the 
assumption made earlier that children may not necessarily need a base problem for 
simple retrieval problems. However, the group data on those in the control condition 
reveals that Mikey was quite unique in his success in problems needing an auxiliary 
task. This may have been due to Mikey’s good problem solving ability. Mikey was 
very clear in his descriptions of why he had chosen his strategies. He exclaimed on 
many trials that he chose the object “because it was the largest and I need the biggest 
object to solve it, because I can’t reach the toy without it”. Therefore, Mikey was 
choosing his strategy based on reaching the goal state. He understood what was 
expected of him and that he needed to select the most appropriate object to retrieve 
the item. Furthermore, since the tasks in the problems without an auxiliary task were 
straightforward he possessed enough knowledge from prior experience in his 
everyday problem solving to help him select the most appropriate strategy. However, 
his previous experience did not extend to the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
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Mikey’s strategy choice changed from using the analogy based object with adaptation 
to level 2 errors. Since Mikey did not receive the base problem, he had to choose his 
strategies based on prior knowledge from his own problem solving activities in 
everyday life. Mikey’s prior experience allowed him to solve the stick problem only. 
Although he did not solve it using the analogy based object with adaptation, he used 
one stick and pushed the sponge as far down as he physically could, then he turned 
the tube around and reached in and pulled the sponge out. Because he solved the 
problem in this way on attempt one, he continued with this solution on the remaining 
trials, and when asked why he had chosen this solution he replied “because it’s the 
longest and I can push it out half way”. Mikey continued to explain the majority of his 
object choices in relation to the perceptual attributes of the object. This was expected 
because he had not received the relational information from the base problem. 
Mikey’s consistency using the same object, and not turning to alternative strategies 
may have been constrained by a goal sketch (Siegler, 2001). Thus, Mikey only 
selected objects that seem obvious to solve the problem. This supports his behaviour 
in the problems needing an auxiliary task – he decided not to choose an object 
because he was focused on the goal, and because he believed none of the objects 
could solve the problem, he chose not to select and attempt solution. Maybe because 
unlike those who received the base, who could see that the problem could be solved, 
Mikey did not see the actor solve the problem in the video, so he did not know 
whether the problem could be solved.    
 
Mikey’s choice of strategy changed on the pendulum problem. Here he chose the 
analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. Closer examination of Mikey’s 
behaviour in the pendulum problem shows that he was aware that he needed to attach 
something to the rope, because both of his object choices could have been attached. 
The stapler was chosen in trial 1, and Mikey tried to attach this to the rope, but 
realized that this could not be attached, so on the following 2 trials he chose the 
correct object (bulldog clip), but failed to solve the problem. He was unable to carry 
out the correct action of swinging the attached clip.  In trial three he exclaimed “I 
know it’s done with that (holding the clip), but I don’t know how”. Due to his failed 
attempts with the clip Mikey tried the stapler again on trial 4, but again with no 
success at solution he reverted back to the clip for the final trial. Thus, even though 
Mikey realized that his strategy was not working, he was unable to extract the 
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solution from his own experience. Since Mikey exclaimed that he knew the clip was 
the correct object, but could not carry out the correct action, it is likely that the notion 
of a pendulum was not part of his conceptual knowledge. Therefore, it is a lack of 
knowledge (of what constitutes a pendulum) that caused him to fail the pendulum 
problem. Furthermore, reasoning behind his change in strategy came from the 
negative feedback from his failure to solve the problem. Therefore, it was his failure 
with the task that caused him to choose alternative strategies. Maybe he chose the clip 
as a process of elimination after exhausting the use of the other objects. Again his 
choice of objects suggests that his choices were goal directed, because he only chose 
objects that could be attached. His lack of knowledge resulted in him failing to 
understand what to do. More evidence to support his reliance on goal-oriented tasks 
comes from his post task descriptions on the pendulum task. His previous perceptual 
explanations based on the object’s physical attributes (i.e., its length). Here his 
explanations were based, not on the object, but on the fact that he was too small to 
reach and that nothing on the table was appropriate to help him solve the problem. 
Thus, choices were systematic, not random, but goal directed.  
 
Mikey’s post-task descriptions involved perceptual similarity between the attributes 
of the objects in two-thirds of cases. Unlike children in the video condition, Mikey 
used more perceptual explanations as to why he chose the specific objects in each task. 
For example, in trial 5 of the snake problem, when asked why he had chosen the 
snake he replied “because it’s the longest and has a hole in it, because it’s long and 
can stretch to there” (pointing to the plate). These are the correct relations needed to 
solve the problem, and perceptually similar to those presented in the video. Despite 
not receiving these relations in the video, Mikey was able to express them in the target 
problem. This indicates that the relations in the target problem may be part of his 
conceptual knowledge due to his personal experience that he brings to the task. For 
example, Mikey may already hold a schema in mind concerning retrieval in that he 
was aware that to retrieve something out of reach he needed a long object, and he 
simply chose the object he believed to be the most appropriate.  This would explain 
why he performed so well.  
 
Mikey’s post task descriptions did not always lead him to successful solution. It was 
expected that because he had to think about his choices and why he thought the 
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chosen object was the best choice for the job that he would move from incorrect 
strategies to more appropriate strategies. Thus, reflection on his choices would lead to 
a deep understanding and help him to work out what he needed to do on subsequent 
trials. Mikey’s descriptions did help him to change his strategy on a number of 
occasions, but not in a positive way. Reflecting on his choices made him realise that 
the chosen object was not going to solve the problem so on a number of trials that 
followed, Mikey chose no object and explained that he could not solve the problem 
using any of the objects. Therefore, self-explanation did not facilitate Mikey’s choice 
of the analogy based object with adaptation.  
  
In trial 2 Mikey said “I thought it (the stick) was going to be long enough to grab (the 
basket)”. Yet by trial 3 he claimed that “nothing’s long enough” and then asked “is 
this for that activity”? (Pointing at the paper). However, Mikey failed to utilize the 
paper despite him being aware that it was part of the task. Again this confirms the 
need for a base to act as a hint and to provide the all important relations to solve the 
problem. Finally, in trial 4 he used the stick and said “I thought it would work” and by 
trial 5 he had resigned himself to the fact that he could not solve the problem “I can’t 
do it”.  
 
Mikey showed that it was possible to solve the problems without an auxiliary task 
regardless of the fact that he had not received the base problem.  However, such 
success did not transfer to the problems needing an auxiliary task.  Mikey found the 
problems needing an auxiliary task difficult and relied on perceptual explanations in 
the description of object choice/solution. He could no longer rely on a goal sketch. 
The sub-goals of solving the problems were too difficult despite his use of systematic 
object selection. Mikey’s performance on the problems needing an auxiliary task 
indicates the need for him to receive the base analogue to solve the problem. The base 
problem may have helped Mikey more than Reuben, Tasmin and Sam because he 
knew he had selected the correct objects, he just needed a little help with carrying out 
the correct action. Furthermore, like Reuben, Mikey's performance across the 
problems without an auxiliary task cannot be attributed to practice with the target 
problem because he solved every task using the analogy based object with adaptation, 
with no increase in performance due to practice. Instead he consistently solved the 
target problem using the analogy based object with adaptation until he reached the 
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pendulum problem.  
 
It can be concluded from Mikey's performance that problems without an auxiliary 
task were solvable without the need for a base problem, but when relations became 
more difficult, children of this age performed better when they received a base 
problem. 
 
  
 6.6.5 Case study 5: Jeremy  
 
 
Despite Jeremy not receiving the base problem, he performed well overall using the 
analogy based object with adaptation.  He used the analogy based object with 
adaptation on almost half of all trials, whereas the average use in the control condition 
was just over a quarter. Jeremy chose no object in the first 4 trials, but on trial 5 and 
in every other trial in the problems without an auxiliary task he chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation and solved the target problem. This was similar 
behaviour to Tasmin.  Jeremy was able to solve the target without the use of the base 
problem on the majority of problems without an auxiliary task.  He knew he needed 
an object, because the plate was out of reach, but he did not know which object to use.  
He chose the snake on trial 5 and continued to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation throughout the problems without an auxiliary task, suggesting that practice 
may have facilitated his subsequent success with similar problems. 
 
In relation to his verbal descriptions of object choices, Jeremy gave irrelevant 
information apart from in the gripper trial, where he replied “I couldn't reach it sat on 
the chair”. This showed Jeremy was aware why this problem needed the use of an 
object. It seems that Jeremy did not need relations to solve this problem, just the 
knowledge that he could not reach the ball without an object, and the barbeque tongs 
seemed to be the best object available. The fact that he continued to use this object 
suggests that he either knew that this was the most appropriate object for solving the 
task or that it gave the required result, and thus saw no reason to alter his strategy. 
This supports the goal sketch suggestion in that, Jeremy was working towards the goal. 
Jeremy’s behaviour also demonstrated that experience with the task (practice) had a 
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positive effect on his ability to solve the problem. Even when Jeremy moved away 
from the analogy based object with adaptation on the first toy trial (trial 11), he 
managed to solve the problem using analogy based object but without adaptation. 
Here, Jeremy turned the water pistol around and used the length, but not the hook and 
drag action.  When asked why he had done this he answered, “coz I wanted one of 
those (pointing to the hedgehog), when asked why, he replied “coz it’s nice”.  On all 
subsequent toy retrieval trials, Jeremy used the water pistol correctly; he still gave 
irrelevant information for his descriptions.  
 
Throughout his trials Jeremy was unable to offer any explanation as to why he had 
chosen particular strategies, or more importantly, why he had changed strategy after 
trial 1 and 3 of the 6 sets of tasks. The reasoning behind these changes could not be 
determined from Jeremy's behaviour or descriptions.  So it can only be presumed that 
Jeremy may have attempted the tasks systematically through practice with the objects.  
This is evident in his strategic variability. Jeremy’s behaviour indicates that practice is 
important even without the base problem.  
 
Jeremy showed a similar pattern on the stick trial, this time choosing level 2 errors 
first, and then on the following 4 trials he chose the analogy based object with 
adaptation. It could be that Jeremy used trial one to choose the longest object then 
because this did not work he chose the next longest object to attempt solution. 
However, it is intriguing to see Jeremy attaching the two sticks and using them as one 
long stick, when he did not get this from a base problem. Unfortunately he was not 
able to give us an insight as to why he had chosen to do this. Jeremy's ability to create 
a longer object in this task is quite remarkable. He was the only child in the control 
condition to do this; not all children presented with a base problem as a hint were 
unable to solve this problem. Jeremy’s behaviour may have come from experience or 
a similar scenario in his everyday life. However, Jeremy’s insight into object creation 
ended here, because on the next 10 hard trials he failed to solve the problems (as did 
all other children in the control condition). Jeremy’s failure to solve the first of each 
of the tasks suggests that he learned from failure quickly. This is a good example of a 
lack of expression that does not equal lack of ability. It is likely that Jeremy 
succeeded with the stick task as it extended the concept of a long-object which 
worked for him in the problems without an auxiliary task. This illustrated a sequence 
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of mental set. That is, Jeremy had found success with long items on earlier problems, 
so approached the problem in the same way as previous attempts. Jeremy changed this 
approach on the following to hard problems, probably due to the fact that he realised 
that these tasks were not so much about length.   
 
The pendulum and roll-up task were more difficult than the stick problem in that the 
pendulum required a swinging action and the rollup task required a rolling-up action.  
Jeremy used a variety of different strategies, but failed to come up with the correct 
solution.  He chose the correct object on numerous occasions across the two tasks, but 
he was unable to work out the function needed for solution. Thus, Jeremy did not 
benefit from variability. If Jeremy had received a hint or the base problem, this may 
have provided him with the prompt he needed to solve the problem. Jeremy’s 
performance on the final two problems, suggest a lack of conceptual knowledge based 
on the need to understand how a pendulum works and the difficulty of creating a 
transportation object.  
 
Children’s performance in the video condition showed the importance of a base 
problem and highlighted the influence of practice in the video condition. However, it 
is hard to distinguish between the influence of practice and the presence of a base 
problem. However, the no practice condition takes practice out of the equation and 
monitors the effect of the base problem only.  
 
  
 6.6.6 Case study 6: Linda 
 
 
The results seem to suggest a practice effect in problems without an auxiliary task, but 
not the problems needing an auxiliary task. To see how performance differed in the no 
practice condition, Linda’s strategy choices were examined. Linda was able to solve 
all problems using the analogy based object with adaptation in the problems without 
an auxiliary task. Since Linda was in the no practice condition she only received 6 out 
of the 15 trials in the problems without an auxiliary task (trials 1, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 15). 
Therefore, any improvements between trial 1 and 5 of each task would be due to the 
presence of a base problem. Like Reuben and Mikey, Linda's performance included 
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the analogy based object with adaptation throughout the problems without an 
auxiliary task.  
 
Linda’s descriptions of the base problem were all true representations, in that she was 
able to describe all tasks correctly, commenting on both the problem and how the 
actor solved them. This suggests that Linda may have used the representation of the 
base problem to solve the target problem. Linda's representational ability in the 
problems needing an auxiliary task mirrored that of Reuben and Tasmin’s 
descriptions. Linda described the first 4 trials in the problems needing an auxiliary 
task taking into account just one aspect of the scenario (i.e., the solution) whereas, in 
the final 2 trials (roll-up task) Linda was able to form the full representation, 
understanding the higher-order relations involved.  However, she was unable to use 
this information to help her solve the target problem as she had done in the problems 
without an auxiliary task, indicating a problem of access. 
 
Despite Linda not eliciting explicit knowledge of relations between the target and 
base problem, she may have implicitly seen a relationship. This can be seen in her 
choice of tinsel in her second pendulum trial. While deciding on the choice of object, 
Linda kept looking at the video for help. This action prompted Linda to select the 
tinsel (level 1 error) because it was the only matching item in the objects. However, 
Linda was unable to solve the problem using the tinsel. This action supports Gentner’s 
suggestion that children will look to surface similarity before relational similarity on 
difficult tasks.  
 
Linda’s choice throughout all sets of tasks was consistent, she chose the analogy 
based object with adaptation on all problems without an auxiliary task and level 2 
errors on all (but one) of the problems needing an auxiliary task. This indicates that 
she was able to use analogy without practice in the problems without an auxiliary task, 
but when the tasks became more difficult she was unable to use analogy so relied on 
level 2 errors. This supports the idea that when young children are faced with 
challenging analogy tasks they revert to less effective strategies. Linda’s sudden 
change from the analogy based object with adaptation to level 2 errors suggests that 
the information from either the base or her own problem solving strategies were not 
sufficient to guide her to the analogy based object with adaptation. Therefore, children 
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of this age find transfer of analogy to novel tasks difficult, if not impossible.  
 
  
 6.6.7 Case study 7:  Bethan 
 
 
A similar pattern of behaviour was observed in Bethan from the no practice condition. 
Bethan was able to make the links between the base and target problem on all trials. 
However, this did not help her to solve the problem itself.  For example, while 
watching the video, in the snake task, Bethan picks up the bow and says “she put it in 
there” when she was then asked to explain what happened in the video she answered 
“putting this through the hole, like this”, she picks up the snake and pushes the bow 
down the snake’s mouth. She continues to announce the relationship between the base 
and target on all subsequent trials. Particularly impressive was her insight on her last 
two problems needing an auxiliary task. Bethan was able to see that the scenario in 
the video was the same as the pendulum task in front of her. When asked to explain 
the base problem, Bethan answered “she couldn’t get that” (pointing to the tinsel on 
the screen) she then picks up the tinsel and says “this, she can’t reach this, so she used 
one of these, like this” – Bethan picks up the bulldog clip and attaches it to the rope. 
However, she leaves the clip on the rope and chooses the stapler to try to solve the 
problem, but fails. Therefore, despite her knowing the relationship between the base 
and target and understanding that the actor in the video attached the clip, that was as 
far as Bethan could reason with the task; she was unable to identify the swinging 
action needed to solve the pendulum task. Similarly, in the roll-up task Bethan 
exclaims that the actor was “passing that to her” - pointing at the polish canister “she 
used that” – picking up the paper and polish, Bethan rolls-up the canister with the 
piece of paper. Bethan was very clear in her understanding of the relations, but she 
did not use this information to help her solve the problems. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that Bethan has the knowledge of relations and was able to access this 
knowledge in her descriptions, but she was unable to transfer it to the target problem.  
 
Bethan’s choice of strategy was consistent across trials. Apart from task one, Bethan 
chose the same strategy on both trials within each of the tasks, even if the first 
strategy choice was incorrect and did not solve the problem. Bethan’s ability to 
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represent the base problem was poor and mirrored her poor performance. On four out 
of the six tasks, Bethan’s second attempt (at week 5 on each task) at representation 
was correct, therefore, it can be assumed that Bethan needed a second viewing to 
understand and fully explain all that had occurred in the video or she needed to see the 
base and target relationship (as she seemed to do well at this straight away). One 
explanation of Bethan’s performance is that no practice left her unable to transfer. 
Because she was unable to cement the relations and knowledge with practice, she 
failed to transfer both within- or between-problems.   
 
Worthy of note is the effect receiving practice and the base had on selecting the 
analogy based object but without adaptation strategy. Reuben, Tasmin and Sam chose 
this strategy more than Mikey, Jeremy, Linda and Bethan. This suggests that children 
in the video condition benefit more from receiving the base problem because they 
were able to select the analogy based object with adaptation. Since those in the no 
practice condition also received the base problem we would expect them to select the 
correct object to a similar degree. If not, then practice with the base also affected this 
strategy choice. Linda and Bethan did not select the analogy based object but without 
adaptation. Instead they relied on level 2 errors. Thus, the base alone was not 
sufficient to select the correct object. Furthermore, Mikey and Jeremy’s choice of the 
analogy based object but without adaptation was less than those in the video condition. 
Practice with the tasks alone did not result in children choosing the most appropriate 
object. These findings add credence to the fact that children may have used the 
information from the video to select the correct object, but because the task was based 
on difficult relations, children failed to transfer them to solve the target problem 
correctly.    
 
The case studies suggest that it does not seem to matter if children can see the 
relationship between the base and target problem. Unless children can transfer the 
relations from one task to another, they fail to solve the target problem. This occurred 
in all children to some degree, but was particularly evident in Reuben, Tasmin and 
Bethan. They were able to state similarities and relations between the base and target 
problems, but this did not help them solve the problems needing an auxiliary task. It 
can therefore be concluded that transfer is a major obstacle in children’s analogical 
problem solving.  
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6.7 Discussion   
 
 
The case studies revealed that children’s analogical problem solving does not follow a 
strict single developmental continuum, but in fact shows that children demonstrate 
great variability in their strategy choices. By doing so, it is not simply a matter of 
children either solving the problem correctly or not solving it correctly, but how 
children’s performance during solution changes over the given time frame. By using 
trial by trial analysis we were able to monitor children's change in strategy use over a 
30 week period. Without the use of individual reports, group data in previous studies 
may have underestimated preschool children's cognitive ability, in particular that 
children are restricted to single ways of thinking about problems. The variability 
observed in the present study refutes this assumption.  
 
The key skill being observed in this thesis was analogy, and although its use was often 
low, the case study data revealed more than children’s analogical competence. It 
presented the differences between and within children’s alternative strategy choices. 
The case study data highlighted both stability and change in strategy use, enabling us 
to identify differences in individual children’s patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, the 
exploration of children’s individual path of change increased our understanding of the 
processes involved, and enables us to explain, as well as describe, the process of 
change.  
 
The case studies confirmed and provided further details of a number of issues that 
occurred in the group data. These issues include the problem of access and transfer, 
the influence of relations from a base problem, practice and variability in strategic 
change. A number of children in the case study data possessed the knowledge of 
relations presented to them in the base problem, but they were unable to use this 
information to solve the target problem using the analogous strategy. By following 
children trial-by-trial it provided us with the reasons behind their choices and changes 
in strategy.  
 
The results showed a significant drop in the use of the analogy based object with 
adaptation in the problems needing an auxiliary task compared to the problems 
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without an auxiliary task in all case studies. Since the problems needing an auxiliary 
tasks were conceptually more difficult for children than the problems without an 
auxiliary task their strategies changed. Children were performing in line with the 
knowledge-based approach in the problems without an auxiliary task, with an increase 
in the analogy based object with adaptation over easy trials. However, in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task, this did not happen. Children preferred level 2 errors above 
the use of the analogy based object with adaptation. Since children were expected to 
create the object, not simply select it this may have been too difficult for children of 
this age. Some children in the case studies were able to create a long object in the first 
of the problems needing an auxiliary task, but were not able to transfer this 
knowledge to the pendulum and roll-up task. Children found the pendulum and roll-
up task extremely difficult. Only those presented with practice and base problem were 
able to use the analogy based object with adaptation, but only on a very limited 
number of trials. It seems that practice with the target problem only, did not provide 
children with the relevant knowledge to enable transfer to the target problem. 
Similarly, those who had received the base information, but no practice failed to use 
the analogy based object with adaptation on the final 10 trials. This suggests that the 
base alone was insufficient to allow successful solution. 
 
Children needed relational knowledge and practice to enable solution on the 
pendulum and roll-up task. However, even then not all children used the analogy 
based object with adaptation. The biggest obstacle to children’s ability to use their 
knowledge of relations was transfer. It seems children could access the relations, but 
not transfer them. As creating a pendulum or transportation object was not part of 
their everyday conceptual knowledge, or at least not in the same way as selecting and 
using a long hooked object to retrieve an out of reach item. The lack of understanding 
was supported in the representational ability in the problems needing an auxiliary task 
compared to problems without an auxiliary task. Children were finding it difficult to 
represent the base problem correctly and this affected their ability to extract the 
relations from the base problem. Children found relations in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task difficult and therefore, could not represent them.   
 
Although access was also problematic, especially on problems needing an auxiliary 
task without practice with the base problem, children that relied on level 2 errors.  For 
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example, Sam found accessing the relations difficult. He was able to solve the 
problems without auxiliary task, but not always with the analogy based object with 
adaptation. His lack of ability to access the relations was confirmed by his inability to 
explicitly state a relationship between the base and target problem.  
 
In Bethan’s case, because she was unable to access the relations from the base 
problem, she could not see how one of the objects could help solve the problem, so on 
problem one, she did not select an object. On the following two tasks, Bethan chose 
the analogy based object, both with and without adaptation. However, in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task Bethan chose level 2 errors on all trials. Similarly, Linda 
relied on level 2 errors in the problems needing an auxiliary task also.  
 
Unlike Singer-Freeman’s study (2005), this study did not offer prompts to combat the 
problem of access.  Instead it used continued representations of the problem in the 
hope that children would recognise that an analogy was needed. Since Singer-
Freeman found that prompts did not necessarily benefit children’s performance it was 
hoped that continued exposure to both perceptually and conceptually similar 
analogues would be sufficient.  This seemed to be the case in the problems without an 
auxiliary task where children solved significantly more problems than in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task overall. However, it may simply be that children could solve 
the problems without an auxiliary task anyway.  
 
One reason why children were unable to access the information from problems 
needing an auxiliary task may have been because of a lack of knowledge of relations. 
This was seen in Mikey’s performance in the control condition. He was able to solve 
previous tasks using knowledge from his everyday problem solving, but the previous 
tasks contained relations that were familiar to him. Despite Mikey choosing the 
correct object, he did not understand what constitutes a pendulum, so he was unable to 
use the correct object appropriately. This supports Goswami’s relational primacy 
hypothesis which states that without the knowledge of relations within a task, children 
cannot reason with them. Therefore, it is not that 4-5 years-olds do not have the 
cognitive capacity to use analogy it is more likely to be due to not having the 
appropriate knowledge of relations within the task.   
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More generally, an access problem may have occurred because of the abstract nature 
of the target problem compared to the base problem. The video was presented to 
children in concrete form. They were presented with the information and all they had 
to do was watch the action and describe what happened. Then they were expected to 
access this information and carry out similar actions when they were presented with 
the target problem. Although it shares both perceptual and structural similarity with 
the concrete nature of the video, the target problem was incomplete and abstract in 
nature. Children not only had to recognize that an analogy was given, but they also 
had to access the correct relations and actions to solve the target problem.  
The problem of access has implications on children’s ability to transfer the relations 
from the base to target problem. Once children have accessed the relations they must 
transfer them to the target problem. Children (and adults) find this component 
difficult because of the pre-requisite of understanding the relations. For example, 
understanding what is expected of them, accessing the correct information and 
transferring this onto the target problem. Therefore, this process places great cognitive 
demands upon pre-school children. It is not surprising that many children in the 
present study were unable to transfer the relations. It was clear from those in the video 
condition that they could access relations through their discussions during solution, 
but they failed to transfer to target problem.  
 
The microgenetic methodology allowed for the observation of both between task- and 
within task –transfer. Between task transfer indicates that children can transfer 
relations from task 1 to 2 to 3 etc, whereas, within task transfer means that children 
can transfer the relations within each of the tasks i.e., from trial 1 to 2 to 3 on the 
snake trial. The case studies showed both types of transfer. Tasmin showed within 
task transfer on the problems without an auxiliary task, as she changed strategies 
within the same tasks and was able to increase her use of the analogy based object 
with adaptation. Between-task transfer occurred between the easy and problems 
needing an auxiliary tasks. Between-task transfer was the most prevalent type of 
transfer. This was evident in the majority of children, where children were able to 
transfer the successful strategy within the problems without an auxiliary task, but they 
were unable to transfer the analogous relations to the problems needing an auxiliary 
task. This may have been due to the lack of relational knowledge in that, the change in 
level of difficulty meant that relations were based on object selection and object 
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creation.  Therefore, the fact that the majority of those in the video condition solved 
the problems without an auxiliary task using the analogy based object with adaptation, 
but then swapped to the level 2 errors or the analogy based object but without 
adaptation strategy, in the problems needing an auxiliary task, highlighted the fact that 
children of this age find transfer to problems needing an auxiliary task difficult. An 
exception to this was Jeremy. He was able to transfer his success from the problems 
without auxiliary to problems needing an auxiliary.   
 
From both the group data and case studies presented here, it seems the biggest change 
in strategy use occurred between the first and last 3 problems.  As previously 
suggested in the group data, this is likely to be due to task complexity. This was 
particularly evident in Reuben’s performance. Here he found the problems without an 
auxiliary task much easier to solve than the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
Mikey's performance matched Reuben’s in the problems without an auxiliary task 
despite not receiving the base information. From this and other children in the control 
condition, it can be concluded that the problems without an auxiliary task may not 
have required a base problem to solve the target problem. Conversely, even the 
presence of a base problem was not enough for some children to use the analogy 
based object with adaptation. Bethan was unable to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation despite the fact that she had received the base problem and the relations 
across the base and target problems. Her poor performance may be explained by a 
lack of practice with the tasks. 
 
The difference in performance between the problems without an auxiliary task and 
problems needing an auxiliary task of the children in the video condition may have 
been a result of differences within the task structure. For example, children could see 
the simple perceptual attributes between the base and target problems i.e., the water 
pistol and the umbrella were both long and hooked, and all that was required of them 
was to choose the analogy based object with adaptation and use it appropriately to 
solve the problem. The problems needing an auxiliary task relied more on conceptual 
knowledge of relations. Here children had to hold in mind a choice of object and then 
create that object and use it appropriately to solve the problem. This explanation is 
consistent with suggestions that children of this age work better with perceptual- 
rather than conceptual-events, because they are inherently structured.  This 
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explanation is consistent with Holyoak et al (1984) who found transfer more difficult 
with the magic carpet story compared to the magic staff story.  The authors suggest 
that the staff and cane share more perceptual and functional attributes than do the 
magic carpet and sheet of paper, and that the former should facilitate transfer via the 
mapping process. Furthermore, the magic carpet task required children to create a 
number of mapping sequences (i.e., rolling up the paper to form a tube, positioning it 
correctly then rolling the balls through). However, despite the difficulties children 
faced in Holyoak’s study, the present study provided children with practice, so it was 
expected that they would perform better due to repeated exposure to the extra task of 
object creation.   
 
A further explanation of children’s success with analogy may have originated from 
strategies and experience that children bring to the tasks (Donaldson, 1978). Since the 
tasks were based on level 2 error that young children understand, it may be that the 
problems without an auxiliary task were too simple and children knew from previous 
experience outside of the experiment that to obtain something out of reach requires a 
long item. Therefore, this knowledge may constrain children using strategies that need 
to be analogous to those in the base problem (i.e., long/hooked), and children chose 
their strategy based on this previous knowledge.  A further explanation may be that 
through interaction with the problems/objects new strategies may have emerged and 
children began to see the problem in relation to the goal state only, and not the 
processes needed to get from strategy choice to solution. Therefore, children may 
simply be using a goal sketch.  
 
A goal sketch is a basic understanding of “the goals and causal relations” of a given 
task (Siegler and Crowley, 1994, p.196).  Here children create a hierarchy of goals 
needed to solve the problem despite not possessing the conceptual structures to 
understand how the goal should be obtained. So it is the goal that drives the children's 
behaviour, and not the knowledge that they need to use an analogous situation to map 
onto the presented problem.  Relying on this assumption, children may not need to 
conceptualise the analogous situation, they can simply act in accordance with what 
the task’s goal expects of them. Where some researchers argue that the goals that 
structure a child's problem-solving can bypass conceptual constraints (lack of 
relational knowledge), others argue that children's goals predispose them to use 
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strategies that they do not understand conceptually (Thornton, 1999). This might 
explain how some children in the control condition were able to solve the hard 
problems, because they looked at the goal of the target problem and were able to see 
the end goal without having to work through the appropriate stages (transferring the 
analogy based object with adaptation use from the base problem).   
 
The goal sketch provides a constraint which allows the child to use a new strategy 
even if the principle of which that strategy is based is not comprehended within the 
child's conceptual structure (Siegler and Crowley, 1994).  However, once a novel 
strategy is chosen in this way children can reflect and build on this and continue to 
choose novel strategies, which in turn can generate a novel conceptual structure 
(Piaget, 1983). This supports children’s tendency to change strategies even when they 
are successful. In the same sense, the goal sketch may prevent children moving away 
from the chosen strategy because they concentrate on the goal only and not on the 
steps required to reach that goal (Siegler and Jenkins, 1989). This may cause children 
to choose the incorrect strategy or at least to choose the correct object but fail to 
utilize it properly. Again, this could explain why some children were able to choose 
the correct object but were unable to adapt it based on analogy. Therefore, not 
working out the solution, but relying on the goal can lead to incompetence.  
 
Sam's performance on the problems without an auxiliary task may have been due to 
the presence of a goal sketch because despite receiving the base problem he did not 
use the relations from the base, but solved the problems using a different 
technique/action to that shown in the video analogue. Therefore, Sam was using 
something other than the analogue to solve problems – creativity.  His non-reliance on 
the base analogue can also be seen in his selection of strategies in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task.  Because the problems needing an auxiliary task required 
more elaborate mappings, Sam was unable to use his goal sketch on the tasks.   
 
Reuben, Linda and Mikey’s post verbal descriptions in the problems needing an 
auxiliary task suggest that they were concentrating on the goal sketch. They described 
their choices in relation to having to reach the item etc. Their dependence on the goal 
meant that they were not able to solve the tasks using the correct strategy. 
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The goal sketch also explains why children chose not to use the level 1 error strategy 
because they know that this object could not solve the problem, because it does not 
have the required attributes to obtain something out of reach i.e., length. Therefore, 
the majority of children in this study recognised the strategies that meet the goal’s 
requirements over those that do not.  So, even if children fail to choose the analogy 
based object with adaptation, they are more likely to choose a relational strategy 
based on the most suitable to fulfil the goal of retrieval. Therefore, the use of a goal 
sketch may constrain children's strategic choices and in particular, the generation of 
new strategies because children become fixated on the goal and not the steps towards 
solution.  
 
Mikey fits the criteria for using a goal sketch. Mikey was not presented with the base 
problem, so his chosen strategies were primarily goal-directed (with the reliance on 
previous experience in a similar situation). Mikey was able to solve all problems 
without an auxiliary task without a base problem, and when asked how he had done 
this, and why he had chosen the strategies he gave explanations based on the 
obtaining of the items out of reach. Mikey's performance on the problems needing an 
auxiliary task revealed more evidence that he was concerned solely with the goal 
through his use of an alternative strategy to solve the stick problem.  He was not 
concerned with attaching objects because the strategies in the problems without an 
auxiliary task did not require him to create such objects.  Therefore, prior solutions 
may have constrained generation of new, more advanced strategies.  Mikey continued 
to use inferior strategies throughout the problems needing an auxiliary task. He did 
however acknowledge that the clip in the pendulum problem was the correct object to 
reach the goal but he could not create the appropriate sub-goals to arrive at the correct 
solution. Again, suggesting that he was concentrating on the goal only.  
 
As well as the concept of the goal sketch constraining strategy generation, it may also 
contribute to the creation of new strategies by distinguishing between existing 
available strategies and new strategies by looking at components within each of them 
because both strategies are used to obtain the same goal. For example, some children 
were able to choose the analogy based object but without adaptation in order to 
successfully solve the problem.  But by using this strategy children could see that this 
was the correct object choice, and with practice they may change their behaviour to 
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the required action. Furthermore, because the level 2 errors strategy includes 
components of the required correct strategy choice, this may explain why children 
showed preferences towards the level 2 errors, analogy based object but without 
adaptation and the analogy based object with adaptation because they are more likely 
to reach the goal than the object matching strategy. 
 
Thus, the goal sketch may have helped children in the problems without an auxiliary 
task when they had no analogous situation.  Furthermore, because the goal sketch 
does not rely on conceptual knowledge it explains why young children were able to 
solve the problems without an auxiliary task and not provide conscious explanation 
relating to the reliance on the base analogue. However, the goal sketch does not 
provide an explanation for children's performance on the problems needing an 
auxiliary task, because these problems required conceptual knowledge to produce 
sub-goals and not simply to choose an object to solve the problem. 
 
To understand how children’s strategy choices in the present microgenetic study 
followed Chen and Siegler’s (2000) five dimensions of change, the following section 
explores the findings through the five dimensions.   
 
 
6.8 The five dimensions of cognitive change 
 
 
Since children’s performance in the microgenetic study highlighted a wave-like 
pattern synonymous with the Overlapping Waves Theory, children’s behaviour is 
explained in terms of the path, rate, breadth, variability and source of change. 
 
 
 6.8.1 The Path of change  
 
 
The path of change monitors the sequence of knowledge states or strategy changes 
during the observation period. The microgenetic methodology allowed us to assess 
children’s transition through these different states of thinking. Observing children’s 
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strategy use on a trial-by-trial basis revealed whether children progressed directly 
from one state to another, following practice, without any regression, or whether 
children fluctuated between earlier and later strategies.  
 
Children followed a number of different paths. For example, some children were able 
to use the analogy based object with adaptation consistently from trial 1 -15, where 
others began with no object or analogy based object but without adaptation or level 2 
errors then changed to using the analogy based object with adaptation. Some even 
used less effective strategies on the first few trials, moved to the analogy based object 
with adaptation and reverted back to a less effective strategy on the following task. 
Despite this inconsistency in their choice of analogy, children tended to be 
consistence within a task once they had chosen their strategy. That is, once children 
had chosen a specific strategy on trial 1 of a task, they generally continued to use that 
strategy on the following trials within that task. However, this was not the case on the 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Children selected different strategies within the 
same tasks, sometimes using up to three different strategies within one task. Therefore, 
not only did the majority of children fail to solve these problems needing an auxiliary 
task, they also failed to adopt any consistent alternative strategy.  
 
Some children chose the path of using the analogy based object but without 
adaptation and continued to use this strategy throughout the trials despite its lack of 
success. This may have been due to reproductive thinking (Wertheimer, 1959). 
Reproductive thinking involves applying strategies that have already been used on 
previous tasks. Although this type of thinking has been seen to benefit those using it, 
it can also hinder success. For example, children in the present study may have 
continued to use strategies they had previously used in the hope that they would work. 
This was supported by children’s post task descriptions. When children were asked 
why they had chosen the strategy in question, they often replied ‘because I used it 
before and it is the longest’. Therefore, they chose it because it was the best option 
based on perceptual similarity, and because it had worked on previous tasks they 
decided to continue to use it.  
 
The case studies highlighted important characteristics of quantitative cognitive growth. 
With practice children were able to use the analogy based object with adaptation in 
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the problems without an auxiliary task, and when they used it, the majority used it 
increasingly well. This support’s Goswami’s assumption that children in the pre-
operational stage are able to use analogy provided that they possess the relational 
knowledge required for problem solution. However, because children’s success did 
not transfer to the problems needing an auxiliary task also supports Goswami’s theory 
that suggests if children do not possess the knowledge of relations, they will select 
alternative strategies.  
 
The results in the present study indicate that 4- and 5-year-olds’ path of change 
included both qualitative and quantitative change, and that children followed 
relational- and surface –similarity strategies in almost equal measures. This supports 
Siegler’s (1995) notion that although qualitative change occurs through new ways of 
thinking (i.e., changing old- for new-strategies), simply viewing cognitive change as 
qualitative change is not sufficient, because children in the present study followed 
different patterns within each condition. This was evident in the case study data of 
children in the video condition. For example, despite receiving the same problems 
under the same conditions, children’s thinking and problem solving changed over the 
observation period. .  
 
 
 6.8.2 The Rate of change 
 
 
Stage theories suggest that developmental change is sudden, discontinuous and abrupt, 
whereas microgenetic studies support the notion that cognitive change is gradual and 
continuous (based on an increase in knowledge). The rate of change is measured by 
how many trials/experience separates the initial use of analogy from consistent use of 
it. It was decided that consistent use in the video- and control –condition was the use 
of analogy on 5 consecutive trials. 
 
Previous research suggests that change is slow in that children make small changes 
when they adopt analogy due to a lack of practice with the problem. Therefore, with 
practice children’s rate of change in the video condition should be faster to that of the 
previous research. Despite the current age cohort being chosen to capture a shift 
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towards analogical reasoning, the results revealed no global shift. The rate at which 
children moved towards analogy varied across condition and problem type. Many of 
the children in the video condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation 
from the start and continued to do so, on subsequent problems without an auxiliary 
task. Those in the no practice condition needed a little practice before they began 
using the analogy based object with adaptation, many of them did not select the 
analogy based object with adaptation until the final problems without an auxiliary task. 
Although children in the control condition were not selecting an analogous strategy, 
their rate of change was quicker than those in the no practice condition. This suggests 
that the rate of learning was quickest in the video condition followed by the control 
condition. Since these had practice in common, suggests that this plays an important 
part in the rate of change.  The rate of strategy change reported supports Siegler’s 
(2006) suggestion that children often discover a strategy after only a small amount of 
experience and they begin to use this new strategy gradually. Only after extensive 
experience with a task will they discover a new strategy and use becomes rapid and 
consistent.  
 
It seems that practice did not benefit children’s selection of analogy in problems 
needing an auxiliary task. Tasmin and Sam chose analogy on the final two tasks, 
following an impasse, where both were unable to solve the previous 13 trials using 
analogy. Of interest is Tasmin and Sam’s choices preceding success. Both children 
chose the analogy based object but without adaptation. Therefore, both selected the 
correct object, but were unable to select the correct action until the final two tasks. 
This suggests that the attributes of the analogy based object but without adaptation, 
with practice, were sufficient to allow them to move to the more appropriate strategy.  
 
The group data shows that throughout the 30 week period, children demonstrated that 
the multiple ways of thinking co-exist both within and between tasks and some 
strategies develop from level 2 errors to the analogy based object with adaptation, or 
level 1 errors to level 2 errors, increase in frequency, decrease in frequency, and even 
reveal the introduction of new strategies. It seemed that the main influence of these 
changes was practice. The more practice the quicker the move to successful ways of 
thinking. More specifically, the more practice with analogical problems, the quicker 
the success in strategy choice, and thus solution. However, this pattern was not only 
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evident in the problems without an auxiliary task. Although children’s use of the 
analogy based object with adaptation was consistent across the stick problem (first of 
the problems needing an auxiliary task) children’s strategy choice became less 
effective with later problems. However, those in the control and no practice condition 
did not carry their success onto the problems needing an auxiliary task at all. Instead 
they changed their strategies to less effective strategies much sooner than those in the 
video condition, showing the benefit of an analogous base problem, which provides 
children with the appropriate relations, in the problems needing an auxiliary task. 
Thus, the rate of change was dependent on experience with the base and experience 
with the target problem. However, generally, the rate of change was slow, gradual and 
variable. 
 
 
 6.8.3 The Breadth of change  
 
 
Another important aspect of cognitive change is children’s ability to transfer newly 
acquired knowledge to a similar problem or task or even to another domain. That is, 
when children acquire a new strategy, they are able to apply it to other problems. The 
microgenetic study allows for the measurement of such change by observing when 
children choose the correct strategy and whether they apply this to subsequent 
problems. The present study measured the breadth of change by exploring whether or 
not children were able to transfer their strategy choices structurally similar tasks - 
problems needing an auxiliary task. 
 
Previous research has shown that older children and adults frequently learn to solve 
one problem, but fail to transfer its solution to another structurally similiar problem 
within the same domain. However, many of these studies have included difficult 
analogies that require a great deal of conceptual knowledge (Siegler, 1981). The 
problems without an auxiliary task in the present study were already part of their 
conceptual knowledge and all tasks were both structurally and perceptually similar. 
Similarly, despite the problems needing an auxiliary task requiring an extra element 
(object creation), because these too were based on a similar structure, children should 
have transferred what they had learned from the problems without an auxiliary task to 
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problems needing an auxiliary task.   
 
The results indicate that on the whole, children did not transfer their newly acquired 
ability to relationally difficult problems. Children in each of the three conditions 
chose the analogy based object with adaptation significantly less in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task compared to the problems without an auxiliary task. Only in 
the first hard task (stick problem) was transfer noticeable. Almost half of all attempts 
in the video condition included children using the analogy based object with 
adaptation.  This suggests that these children were able to transfer their recently 
acquired knowledge onto the stick problem, in spite of the relational complexity of the 
task. This may have occurred due to the similarity of action produced in the problems 
without an auxiliary task.  Children had to carry out similar actions i.e., use a long 
object to retrieve the toy and ball. Therefore, children may have reproduced the action 
from earlier tasks and with the presence of the base problem children were able to 
apply the correct strategy. This indicates that the higher the surface similarity across 
tasks, the better the transfer and breadth of change. However, transfer in analogy is 
not based solely on perceptual similarity, but relational similarity. When children 
were faced with tasks that were less perceptually similar in the pendulum and the roll-
up tasks, and that required relational similarity above surface similarity, children 
changed to less effective strategies.  
 
Despite the success of those in the video condition, with the stick problem, perceptual 
transfer in analogy was not mirrored in the non-analogical conditions (control and -no 
practice condition). This indicates that the optimal conditions under which children 
are able to transfer analogy is both practice and the presentation of a base problem. 
However, it seems that even presentation of both base and practice was not sufficient 
to enable children to continue solving the problems needing an auxiliary task using 
the analogy based object with adaptation. Children’s use of analogy on problems 
needing an auxiliary task was low.  Over the final ten problems needing an auxiliary 
task children in the video condition used analogy on less than a fifth of all attempts, 
even though these tasks required children to use analogy based on structurally similar 
objects to those in the problems without an auxiliary task. For example, in the 
pendulum problem children had to retrieve an out of reach rope. This task was similar 
to the problems without an auxiliary task requiring children to retrieve an out of reach 
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toy.  However, knowledge of a pendulum is not part of a child’s conceptual 
knowledge, whereas children at this age may have seen or attached two items, as 
required in the stick problem, they are unlikely to have observed the use of a 
pendulum. Therefore, children’s poor performance with the pendulum problem may 
have occurred due to lack of conceptual/relational knowledge.  
 
The findings do not confirm the prediction that children will transfer what they learn 
from the problems without an auxiliary task to the problems needing an auxiliary task.  
Therefore, the breadth of cognitive change in children’s use of analogy, in the present 
tasks, was not far reaching. It can also be assumed that since children were not able to 
transfer their use of the analogy based object with adaptation between the two 
problem types, within the same domain, with structurally and perceptually similar 
tasks, 4- and 5-year-old’s ability to transfer such higher-order relations to different 
domains, would be doubtful. Future research may be wise to provide children with 
experience within the classroom of object creation. Although children may use objects 
as part of their everyday activities, it seems that object creation is not yet part of 
children’s conceptual knowledge and it was this that hindered children’s ability to use 
analogy and not a lack of general analogical ability. 
  
 
 6.8.4 Strategic Variability 
 
 
Variability is important because it provides children with an opportunity to learn and 
increase their experience of particular domain, which often leads to improved ways of 
reaching their particular goal/desired behaviour. In their study Siegler and Taraban 
(1986) found a relationship between strategic variability and task experience.  They 
concluded that the higher the strategic variability the more experience children gained, 
which resulted in an overall better performance with simple balance scale problems. 
Therefore, it was predicted that children would use a variety of strategies over the 30 
trials and this would result in a high performance in the observed behaviour (analogy). 
 
This was partly true. Children used all five strategies on at least one occasion.  The 
greatest variability occurred in the problems needing an auxiliary task.  Children’s 
 249 
strategy choices in the problems without an auxiliary task consisted mainly of the 
analogy based object with adaptation and analogy based object but without adaptation.  
In the video condition, children’s consistency in the problems without an auxiliary 
task suggests that they understood the relations in the base problem and this facilitated 
their use of the analogy based object with adaptation. Almost half of all attempts in 
the video condition were analogous; a fifth was analogy based object but without 
adaptation and the same amount for level 2 error.  Therefore, children who received 
the base problem and practice were able to use relational similarity above any other 
strategy and since its use was variable over trials supports Siegler’s suggestion that 
variability improves performance.  
 
Strategic variability occurred in all three conditions. Even after children had 
successfully solved the problem with the most appropriate object they often reverted 
back to less effective strategies. Some children even chose not to select an object on 
some trials despite previous success using an object. Cognitive variability was 
particularly great in the problems needing an auxiliary task. Children in the video 
condition started well with the analogy based object with adaptation, but then moved 
to the level 2 error or in some cases object matches. However, none of these changes 
were consistent; they varied both within and between tasks within all three conditions. 
Furthermore, selecting the correct object did not guarantee success in solving the 
problem, children often failed to use it appropriately. Therefore, even if children had 
acquired the correct strategy on previous trials and succeeded to solve the problem 
appropriately, it did not guarantee that they could execute that strategy on subsequent 
trials.   
 
Previous research on strategic variability has noted that children change strategies 
both between and within tasks/trials. With regard to change within the task, previous 
research that has explored number conservation (Siegler, 1995) and map drawing 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) has found that change in strategies within a task has some 
benefit since the use of new strategies proved even more useful than the strategy 
being observed.  However, children in the present study often selected alternative 
strategies that were less effective than the strategy they had been using consistently.  
Why children did this is unclear.  It could simply be that providing children with 
alternative strategies allowed them to explore the tasks environment in search of a 
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more advanced strategy, even when they received positive feedback from the solution 
of previous tasks. Another explanation could be that because children received 
multiple trials on the same task they looked to other strategies.  They assumed that 
they needed to select a different object to solve the problem.  Thus, children may even 
be affected by demand characteristics, thinking that because the same task was 
presented previously they were using the incorrect object and needed to select an 
alternative strategy.   
 
Children’s variability in the problems needing an auxiliary task was much greater. 
This behaviour not only occurred between different tasks, but also within the same 
task. It seems reasonable to assume that children’s selection of new, less effective 
strategies is acceptable as the new problems needing an auxiliary task presented a new 
set of expectations, even though they followed the same structure. We can forgive this 
to a degree because children see a different task, and if they have not yet mastered the 
art of analogy they turn to alternative strategies. But through practice, and maybe an 
understanding that the tasks are similar in nature, they should revert back to the most 
effective strategy. This behaviour can benefit children’s learning and cognitive 
change as they can learn from previous experience.  However, within task variability 
is not as straightforward to explain. Although still associated with cognitive change, 
within task variability sees children change from the most appropriate strategy 
(analogical object) to a less effective strategy (that does not solve the problem) on an 
identical problem. Why children choose to do this is unclear.  Why would a child 
choose a different object when the previous object-choice solved the problem?  Why 
would they move to a less effective strategy following success? Why do children 
begin with low variability when successful and increase variability when unsuccessful? 
Thus, the overriding questions seem to be - is strategy change maturational or 
experiential, and does prolonged practice show moderation of experience to enable 
change?  
 
The microgenetic study was able to answer this question. If change is experiential 
then children who received practice should have chosen the analogy based object with 
adaptation more than those in the no practice condition. This was found. Children in 
the video- and control –condition chose the analogy based object with adaptation 
more than those in the no practice condition. The pattern of strategic variability in 
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problems without an auxiliary task moved from low- to high –variability. Whereas, in 
the problems without auxiliary tasks, variability was low, high then low.   
 
Children’s variability in problems needing an auxiliary task could be explained by 
Siegler and Taraban’s (1986) notion of the ‘moderate experience hypothesis’.  Siegler 
and Taraban (1986) suggest that children progress from low variability when they 
have little or no experience with the task to higher variability following moderate 
experience, to low variability when they have substantial experience with the task. 
The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that children begin with a limited amount of 
ways to solve a problem, but with experience they generate a wider variety of ways 
and finally settle on the most appropriate way to solve the problem. However, 
children in the present study started with low variability, with little experience. As 
experience grew, and relational difficulty increased, variability increased. But, unlike 
in Siegler and Taraban’s study, children did not settle on the correct strategy and 
decrease variability. This may have been de to children’s continued failure with the 
tasks.  
 
Thus, the evidence for variability acting as a facilitator of analogical reasoning is not 
supported by the present study. Children who chose the correct strategy to solve the 
problem on one trial and changed to a less effective strategy that failed to solve the 
problem often continued selecting incorrect strategies.  Only a small percentage of 
children learned from within task variability. This may be due to only following 
children’s performance over thirty weeks. Thus, the microgenetic methodology may 
not have captured the full extent of analogical reasoning in 4- and 5 year-olds. It 
seems that variability was caused by an increase in relational difficulty. Therefore, 
future research would be wise to extend the observation period to monitor the impact 
of strategic variability.  
 
 
 6.8.5 The Source of change  
 
 
The source of change relates to the causes of change in strategy use over the 
observation period. There were a number of sources of change that arose during the 
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findings of the present study.  These included explicit feedback, transfer, practice, 
access, variability and relational difficulty.  It is unlikely that just one of these is 
responsible for strategy change and problem success. It is more probable that a 
mixture of some, if not, all are responsible for the change observed in the present 
study. 
 
With regard to feedback, the results showed that if children found success with the 
analogy based object with adaptation, then they were less likely to change that 
strategy than if they had chosen an incorrect strategy that did not result in successful 
solution. The negative feedback from not solving the problem resulted in the majority 
of children selecting a number of alternative strategies in the hope that they would hit 
on the correct strategy to solve the problem. The success of this strategy based on 
feedback seemed to work better in problems without an auxiliary task or when 
children understood what was expected of them. However, the reverse was not true, 
although feedback from failure to solve the problem encouraged children to choose 
alternative strategies, feedback, in the form of success, did not necessarily encourage 
successful solution. Children often chose the analogy based object but without 
adaptation, which did not allow them to successfully solve the target problem.  
 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of transfer in analogical problem-
solving.  If children are to benefit from the presentation of a base problem or 
experience, then they need to master the art of transfer.  As previously stated children 
found this extremely difficult.  Even when they had chosen the analogy based object 
with adaptation in the target problem, they did not always continue to do so within or 
between tasks. According to Gentner and Goswami transfer acts as a barrier to 
children’s success on subsequent problems because without a hint children do not 
always see the relevance of transferring what they know from one problem to another. 
The problem of transfer was particularly noticeable in the case studies. Children 
possessed the knowledge of relations, clearly understood the relationship between the 
base and target problems, and the majority even accessed this information. However, 
when it came to transferring the relations to the target problem, children failed to do 
this. Despite an inability to transfer, indirectly according to Siegler, this shold benefit 
children’s ability to solve the target problem on later trials. Since a lack of transfer 
encourages alternative strategy choice and use which increases new ways of thinking. 
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Therefore, a lack of transfer may act as an indirect facilitator of qualitative cognitive 
growth.   
 
As previously discussed, an important source of change in strategy use, was practice. 
The more practice children received, the better their performance in solving the target 
problem. However, the suggestion that this would eliminate the problem of access did 
not occur in the present study. Many children understood the relations, but failed to 
access them from the base problem at the appropriate time. The problem of access 
goes some way to explaining why some children in the video condition were able to 
use analogy, and other could not.   
 
Siegler (1996) suggested that variability can increase learning.  In isolation, the 
present study does not support this.  It seems the more variability children 
demonstrated in their use of alternative strategies, the poorer the success in problem 
solution. For example, where children used more strategies on problems needing an 
auxiliary task, the performance with analogy was low. Therefore, variability does not 
act as a positive source of change towards analogy. Instead it acts as an indicator of a 
lack of analogical problem solving. However, it may be that children in the present 
study did not have enough time to develop the strategies that they possessed. This is 
an issue that needs further research over a longer period of time with children of 
different ages. Therefore, children may benefit from prolonged variability until they 
are able to understand its benefits and select the most appropriate strategies 
consistently.    
 
It was expected that representation would facilitate change, not only because it shows 
an understanding of the relations in the base problem, but self-explanation enhances 
depth of processing. However, children’s representational ability did not always lead 
to the analogy. Furthermore, an increase in representational ability did not increase 
the likelihood of success with analogy.  
 
A major factor that affected children’s change in strategy use was relational difficulty. 
The increase in difficulty in problems needing an auxiliary task had a huge impact on 
children’s ability to use the analogy based object with adaptation. This also impacted 
upon strategic variability and the positive influence of experience. Children’s ability 
 254 
to solve the target problem significantly decreased in all three conditions regardless of 
whether they received practice or a base problem. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
when children do not possess the relational knowledge included in a particular task, 
children rely on strategies based on perceptual similarity and lower-order relations. 
This has implications for children’s analogical development in that if the tasks are too 
difficult and involve relations not yet part of their conceptual knowledge, then the 
observation of pre-school children’s analogical ability will be misleading. 
To conclude, the microgenetic study suggests that the use of analogy was influenced 
greatly by experience and relational complexity, and more importantly that the 
traditional view that children develop a skill in sequence using single ways of 
thinking is outdated. The results showed that children in the present study did not 
progress from one consistent understanding to another, to another and so on. The 
amount of variability, both between and within-child, the use of multiple strategies 
and the different paths of change highlighted, indicate that cognitive development is 
far more complex than previous advocates propose.  
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Chapter 7 
 
 
7.1 General Discussion  
 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine why children continue to find analogical 
reasoning difficult in spite of a tendency towards success in classical and problem 
analogies. Since research has demonstrated that preschool children are in a state of 
transition in their use of analogy, the present microgenetic study monitored children’s 
strategy change in the hope to observe children’s development and change in 
analogical problem solving. The present study confirmed research that indicated that 
children often fall at the first hurdle of inference in classical analogies, and that 
problem analogies present a different hurdle in the way of access. Along with these 
processes, children’s success with analogy was also determined by relational 
knowledge and relational difficulty. When relational knowledge was absent and 
relational difficult high, children chose alternative strategies. 
  
The present findings support a knowledge-based account of analogical problem 
solving. When children were presented with simple relations that were already part of 
their conceptual knowledge, they performed well with analogy. This supports the 
notion that relational knowledge plays an important role in children’s analogical 
reasoning. Further evidence for this came from children’s difficulty when the 
relational difficulty increased in the final three problems needing an auxiliary task. In 
spite of the problems possessing similar structure children were unable to transfer 
what they had learned from the first three problems without auxiliary tasks. Thus, the 
findings of the present thesis support previous findings that a lack of relational 
knowledge and relational difficulty affects children’s ability to use analogy and 
causes children to rely on alternative less effective strategies.  
 
One of the key aims of this thesis was to create a bridge between classical and 
problem analogies by incorporating the strategies used in previous classical analogies 
and building the problem analogies around these strategies. Findings showed that 
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children as young as 3 years of age were able to use analogy on classical analogies 
and problem analogies. Furthermore, children chose different strategies across the two 
types of analogies. Children preferred level 1 errors in the classical analogies and 
level 2 errors in the problem analogies, and the use of analogy was more prevalent in 
the problem analogies, as expected. 
 
One explanation as to why problem- and classical-analogies did not use the same 
strategies was the processes of access and inference (Singer-Freeman, 2005). For 
example, children may have relied more heavily on the object-match in classical 
analogies because the issue of inference.  Here children have to extract the relations 
from the a:b terms and match them to the c:d terms. This process is difficult for 
children of this age, especially if they do not recognise the relations.  Even though the 
relations in the present classical analogy tasks were simple (i.e., pattern and shape 
change), children did not always extract them because they did not see the 
transformations take place, they had to infer them.  This led children to rely on 
surface similarity instead, which resulted in them choosing object-matches.  In 
contrast, children were not faced with such a limitation in problem analogies. Here, 
the relations were already made clear in the base problem. Therefore, it was the job of 
the child, not to infer relations, but to access the relations and realise that they could 
be used to solve the target problem.  However, unlike the classical analogies, where 
children were told that they could use the a:b terms, in problem analogies children 
were not given this information.  Therefore, children in problem analogies were faced 
with the problem of accessing the relations.   
 
Many researchers (Singer-Freeman, 2003; Chen 2003) argue that the difficulty with 
access occurs because children are not explicitly told to use the information presented 
in a base problem. Previous research by Holyoak, Junn and Billman (1984) found that 
when provided with a hint to use base information analogical performance increased 
considerably. However, some argue that prompting children to use the base 
information does not allow the observation of naturally occurring change. More 
recently, research has proposed that providing children with experience will implicitly 
direct children to use the knowledge base (Brown and came 1988; Tunteler and 
Resing, 2002).  Because children in the problem analogies were presented with 
multiple trials it was expected that they would learn to use the base information over 
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time. Furthermore, by ensuring that children received tasks under optimal conditions 
the problems in the present study were isomorphic (perceptually similar in base and 
target). This should have encouraged children to recognize their similarity. Despite 
the consideration of these elements, it was not enough to eliminate the problem of 
access. Children still found this element of problem-solving challenging.  
 
More generally, an access problem may have occurred because of the abstract nature 
of the target problem compared to the base problem. The video was presented to 
children in concrete form. They were presented with the information and all they had 
to do was watch the action and describe what happened. Then they were expected to 
access this information and carry out similar actions when they were presented with 
the target problem. Although it shares both perceptual and structural similarity with 
the concrete nature of the video, the target problem was incomplete and abstract in 
nature. Children not only had to recognize that an analogy was given, but they also 
had to access the correct relations/actions to solve the target problem.  
 
Further explanations for the differences between classical and problem analogies may 
lie in the actual stimuli used. The classical tasks required children to select cards to 
complete a pattern, whereas problem analogies required children to solve an action-
based problem.  Evidence suggests that children find action-based problems easier 
than pictorial problems (Tunteler and Resing, 2002). And because the card and video 
analogues were not matched may have caused children to perform better with one 
than the other – making any comparison difficult. To bring the two types of analogy 
closer in structure, as well as strategy choices, future research could present children 
with pictorial cards or video presentations based on the similar relations/scenarios 
presented in the problem analogies. Relational knowledge could then be matched or 
even mapped over both types of analogy, because if children understand the relations 
in the classical analogies they should also understand the relations within the 
structurally and perceptually similar problem analogies and vice versa.  
 
The classical analogies also addressed the issue of relational knowledge raised in 
Singer-Freeman’s (2005) study. One of the limitations of Singer-Freeman’s 
methodology was the lack of distinction made between relational knowledge and 
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relational inference. Since the use of pictorial stimuli in the present classical analogies 
reduced the need to have relational knowledge, children could simply follow concrete 
patterns which needed no/little relational understanding. However, despite the 
inclusion of concrete referents above abstract referents, children still relied on object 
matches. This could have because children were presented with cards in a vertical line. 
To encourage children to see the cards as a whole and not as a linear sequence future 
presentation of the cards could be placed in a matrix. This may benefit children in 
seeing how each of the cards relates to one another as a whole.      
 
Goswami and Gentner argued that relational knowledge was the key to analogical 
reasoning. So, it was one of the aims of this thesis to explore children’s relational 
knowledge when presented with relations requiring object selection and relations 
requiring children to select and create an object. Relational knowledge was monitored 
in the present study by presenting children with a target problem, and no base 
problem (control). Children in this condition received no relational knowledge from a 
base problem. Despite some children in the control condition using the analogy based 
object with adaptation its frequency was less than in the video condition. This 
supports the notion that children benefited more from receiving an analogous base 
problem, than not. The very fact that some children in the control condition used the 
analogy based object with adaptation suggests that they were relying on practice and 
their own knowledge of the problems. However, when these became more difficult 
(problems needing an auxiliary task) children regressed to less effective strategies – 
namely lower-order relations. 
 
A further measure of relational knowledge came from children’s ability to describe 
the base problem. It was believed that if children could represent the base problem, 
then they should understand the relations. However, with practice, children found this 
difficult. Previous research (Chen, 2002) found that children are unable to express 
representations of the base problem due to excessive demands on their memory. The 
current study reduced such demands by using visual stimuli. However, despite this 
measure, children’s level of descriptions in both the pre- and post-tasks were poor. 
Children did not always verbalise the full, correct representation, or an analogical 
explanation in the post-task. This may have been due to a lack of verbal ability and 
not necessarily a lack of ability to represent or inability to explain their choices 
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analogically. Therefore, future research should assess children’s vocal level prior to 
testing. Just because children are able to use specific objects and use them 
successfully to solve a problem, does not mean that they understand the reasoning 
behind their choices, or that they understand analogical problem solving. This has 
implications for children’s ability to transfer their successes to subsequent problems 
within the same domain or to other other domains. The findings of the present thesis 
suggest that relational knowledge acts as a facilitator of analogy when present, but 
when relations become more difficult (auxiliary task), children’s success with analogy 
decreases and children rely on a variety of strategies.  
 
Results of the classical analogies supported previous research that preschool children 
find these types of problems difficult, regardless of the use of pictures that are 
familiar to young children. The main issue with using such stimuli lies in children’s 
inability to ignore surface similarity. The results support Gentner’s suggestions that 
children will rely on surface similarity before relational similarity. Children were 
distracted by the object matching cards and because they received no feedback to 
suggest that this was not the correct choice, they continued to use this strategy.  
 
The findings in the classical analogies question Goswami’s suggestion that classical 
analogies are a “pure” measure of analogical reasoning. Even when presenting simple 
tasks that include relational knowledge already present in a child of this age (shape 
and pattern change) children still relied on alternative strategies. This has implications 
for using perceptual-based tasks to measure analogy in that, can we say that these 
tasks inform us about the conceptual ability inherent in analogy. Children may simply 
by-pass the need to analogise in favour of surface matches because they simply see 
the patterns and not the need to complete an analogous pattern.   
 
In the problem analogies, children relied less on object similarity and more on 
relational similarity. Reasoning behind children not relying on surface similarity may 
be because the object-match strategy in the problem analogies provided a completely 
different strategic opportunity for children. It was obvious to children that the object 
match object could not solve the problem. Children understood that a toy hedgehog 
could not be retrieved using an identical toy hedgehog (repeat of c-term). Thus, it was 
not simply a case of choosing a strategy to complete a pattern children had to choose a 
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strategy to solve a real-life action problem. To address this limitation future research 
could incorporate action-based classical analogies. That way, the comparisons across 
both types of analogy would be far more beneficial, which should highlight the 
positive effect of feedback on analogical reasoning.  
  
As well as the influence of surface similarity, Gentner and Ratterman (1991) argued 
for a relational shift. It seems that the underlining question regarding the relational 
shift is whether perceptual similarity is a necessary step in the development of 
analogical reasoning (Rattermann & Gentner, 1998) or merely a performance factor 
(Goswami, 1996), and can children ignore perceptual similarity?  This issue is 
important because the idea that children develop a perceptual-to-relational shift may 
be the key to unlocking the development of children’s analogical reasoning. It seems 
that children in the classical analogies were unable to ignore surface similarity, but 
those in the problem analogies could. In study one, 3-year-olds relied heavily on 
object-matches, 4-year-olds relied on lower-order relations and 5-year-olds on higher-
order relations. However, the same was not true in problem analogies. The only shift 
observed was in 4-year-olds from session one to session two. The shift occurred from 
a reliance on lower-order relations, analogy based object but without adaptation and 
the analogy based object with adaptation. Thus, a shift occurred between relational 
reasoning (lower and higher-order), and not the predicted perceptual-to-relational shift. 
The lack of relational shift from surface similarity to relational similarity may be 
because the present study tested children partway through this shift, when they had 
already moved away from object-matches to more the sophisticated lower-order 
relations. 
 
The present problem analogies did not use hints to help children realise that an 
analogy was needed, but instead relied on children to utilize the implicit hints 
provided in the base analogue and repeated exposure to the tasks. Over half of 
children presented with the base analogue in the microgenetic study were able to 
solve the target problem using analogy, out-performing children in Tunteler and 
Resing’s (2002) study where almost a third of children found success without the use 
of a hint. Children in the present study were not told about the aim of the study and 
were not given any explicit feedback about their choices, successes or failures. 
However, children were able to solve some of the problems using analogy, because of 
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the negative feedback they received when they could not solve the problem. Thus, this 
encouraged children to select different strategies on subsequent trials. Success was 
higher in the problems without an auxiliary task, and in those in the video condition, 
suggesting that children were benefiting from the use of a base problem and repeated 
practice with trials. The difference in performance between study 2 and study 3 
supports the positive effect practice has on analogy in that, children who received 
multiple trials in the study 3 were twice as likely to find success using analogy.  
 
Another aim within the problem analogies was to examine the benefits of visual 
analogues on children’s success. Visual analogues have dramatically reduced 
children’s cognitive load which frees up memory to allow them to concentrate more 
on the task at hand. Furthermore, because video analogues do not require children to 
transform conceptual ideas into concrete actions, this should have facilitated 
children’s transfer and subsequent success on the target problems. It seems that 
children in the present study were able, with varying success, to utilize video 
analogues to solve analogous action problems. The use of video scenarios had not 
been used until now, and the increase in success over previous analogical studies may 
account for the use of visually engaging stimuli. The success of using videos in 
analogy has implications for teaching analogy in the classroom. Teaching 
professionals strive to engage and stimulate students in interactive, hands-on learning 
experiences. The use of videos in the classroom has been shown to generate 
excitement, and benefit auditory and visual learners (Kozma, 1991). Video 
presentations tap into student’s emotions which stimulate similarities with everyday 
experiences, and also provide an innovative and effective means for schools to 
address curricular subjects. Therefore, from the success of children’s analogical use in 
study 3, it seems sensible for future research to continue with video analogues and 
maybe to incorporate video presentation in classical analogies, and more importantly 
to take video analogues into the classroom as a new way of teaching analogy.  
 
Children in the control condition were able to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation with some success despite not receiving the analogous base problem. 
Therefore, children were able to use their experience of the problem itself.  It could be 
the actual positive/ negative feedback children received following their attempts at the 
problems that enhanced relational use. That is, if children are using higher-order 
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relations successfully to solve problems, they are more likely than not, to continue 
using that strategy on subsequent problems.  This suggests that any kind of experience 
with problems may enhance learning of appropriate strategies. It was clear that 
children understood what was expected of them in the problems without auxiliary task. 
Children were able to use their previous experience of the world to help them solve 
the problems. However, experience may have hindered children’s ability to solve 
problems needing an auxiliary task. Children had learned from the first three 
problems that all they needed to do was select an appropriate object and use it solve 
the target problem. When the rules changed in problems needing an auxiliary, 
children were not informed that they now had to select and create an object, and 
because they had not received this information in the form of a base analogue, 
children had to rely on their own knowledge of the problem.  
 
A further suggestion for children’s success in the control can be explained by Thelen 
and Ulrich’s (1991) notion of change. According to Thelen and Ulrich (1991) change 
often occurs without any specific relevant experience. They found change that occurs 
under such circumstances is often equal in size to the change that occurs among 
children who receive the relevant experience in experimental conditions. This 
occurred in the present study and also supports a study by Adolf (1997). Children in 
the control group, in Adolf’s study, did not receive the same experience as those in 
the experimental conditions.  Children in the ‘home group/control’ simply gathered 
their experience at home, crawling up and down stairs, on and off furniture.  Children 
who received direct practice on a weekly basis, over a number of months received 
experience of climbing ramps and slopes.  Despite the differences in experience, the 
performance of those in the control group matched performance of those in the 
experimental conditions. This suggests that experience of any kind can, and did, 
enhance learning.   
 
Children who received no practice with analogies, in study 3, performed less well 
than those in both the video- and control -conditions. This suggests that children were 
unable to spontaneously use analogy without repeated exposure to the base and target 
problem. This finding is counter to those in Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) study where 
spontaneous, unprompted changes in children’s analogical performance was observed 
over session. However, the difference here was probably due to the effect of hints 
 263 
provided to children in Tunteler and Resing’s (2002) study.  
 
The difference in performance with analogy across condition in the microgenetic 
study suggests that optimal conditions under which children solve problem analogies 
is when they receive practice and a base problem. However, despite those in the video 
condition performing the best with the analogy based object with adaptation, 
performance was not as good as expected. What can be concluded from these findings 
is that even when children receive a base problem and practice on relationally simple 
tasks, not all preschool children were able to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation. This was likely due to difficulty in accessing the relations from the base 
problem. However, this was not the only explanation. Since children often chose the 
correct object but used it in a non-analogous way suggests that children were 
accessing and transferring the base information but were failing at the implementation 
stage of analogical problem solving. In contrast, on problems needing an auxiliary 
task, children’s failure was likely to be due to a lack of relational knowledge.    
 
As well as relational difficulty affecting children’s ability to use the analogy based 
object with adaptation, it also affected children’s representational ability. Children’s 
representations were observed to increase the likelihood that they would encode the 
information from the base problem. Representation was better in problems without an 
auxiliary task, which impacted upon children’s performance with the target problem. 
Overall representation played an important part in children’s ability to solve problems 
without an auxiliary task, but this did not extent to the relationally difficult tasks. 
Successful use of representation in studies 2 and 3 were similar to that of previous 
research (Tunteler and Resing, 2002). It appears that representation was useful when 
relations were simple, but when difficulty increased, representations decreased, but 
not to the same level of failure to solve analogy. This indicates that representation acts 
as a facilitator on simple relations, but when the relations become too difficult, 
representation is not sufficient to encourage success. Similarly, self-explanations in 
the post-task did not guarantee success on subsequent problems. This does not support 
Siegler (1989) and Cheshire, et al (2005) notion that self-explanation benefits 
analogical development. The majority of children’s explanations were based on 
perceptual information regarding the object’s attributes in relation to the task’s goal. 
The usefulness of children’s self-explanations was not apparent in the present study. 
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Future research would be wise to explore children’s explanations further, since meta-
cognitive development can be beneficial not only in analogical reasoning, but across a 
number of different domains.  
 
The use of the microgenetic method also explored another important process involved 
in analogy – transfer. Children’s transfer from problem to problem was high in 
problems without an auxiliary task, but not in those needing an auxiliary task. The 
poor transfer to problems needing an auxiliary task observed in the present study 
supports many author’s that suggest that transfer is a sophisticated skill that may not 
exist (Detterman, 1993).  Poor transfer has been found in many studies in more 
difficult domains. Reed, Dempster and Ettinger (1985) found poor transfer in their 
study on algebra word problems. Despite the situations in their study being similar, 
college students still failed to transfer learned solutions from one problem to another. 
Reed et al (1985) concluded that true spontaneous transfer is rare. Those studies that 
do claim that transfer has occurred are those that provide participants with hints or 
explicit manipulations that encourage some level of transfer. What has been found 
from the present study and many others that explore transfer in analogy and pure 
transfer problems is that, transfer is dependent on the similarity between the two 
problems/situations. Therefore, the more similar the problems in structure and surface 
similarity the more likely children will be successful in transfer. This explains 
children’s success on the stick problem. However, even when the tasks are aligned 
perceptually and conceptually, children still fail to transfer. This has serious 
implication for children in the classroom because even when problems share 
similarities, children fail to transfer when they are not prompted or provided with a 
hint. 
 
This thesis not only monitored analogical performance, but children’s alternative 
strategy use, and how their strategies changed over the observation period.  The 
results of the microgenetic study showed great variability. Variability occurred across 
conditions, age groups, problem type, with and without practice. Furthermore, 
children used specific strategies in unique and diverse ways (e.g., using the snake to 
drag the plate towards them). Such variability was more noticeable in the problems 
needing an auxiliary task which suggests that the more difficult the relations, the more 
children had to search for strategies available to them. Goswami suggests that 
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relational knowledge is either assumed (part of their conceptual knowledge) or 
presented to them (in a base problem). Therefore, unless children possessed this 
knowledge or were presented with this knowledge, children should not be able to use 
analogy to solve an analogous problem. However, children in the present study were 
able to construct the knowledge themselves by exploring different strategies. Thus, 
children were expanding their repertoire to include new ways of thinking that did not 
always necessarily work for them, but they refined their choices and strategies over 
trials to make the strategies work for them. This finding is unique. It is not 
knowledge-based (given) or knowledge already known (developmental), but 
knowledge they have created from exploring the problem environment and object 
refinement. This idea extends the knowledge-based approach to incorporate a more 
constructivist endeavour.   
 
This has implications for children’s problem solving in that, in the absence of 
knowledge children do not select object matches, but explore numerous strategies in 
order to extend their knowledge of the problem. Thus, through self-construction of 
solution children were able to use current strategies (already present in the problems 
without an auxiliary task) and knowledge to create new ways of thinking. Such 
‘knowledge creation’ provides a more detailed shift where lower-order relations give 
way to higher-order relations via exploration and practice with the problem.  
  
Children’s strategy use throughout the study also supports Chen and Siegler’s (2000) 
notion of ‘effective execution of new strategies’. Chen and Siegler (2000) believes 
that through practice, children are able to strengthen their existing strategies through a 
process of refinement which in turn allows the child to concentrate more on effective 
strategies which over time reaches the effective execution of new strategies- 
particularly noticeable in the case studies. Sam continued to use one strategy, but 
refined his actions with practice in the roll-up task. He had to fail the task prior to 
refining his chosen strategy then he succeeded. Similarly, the results here support 
Chen and Siegler’s proposal that once a child reaches this stage of effective execution 
they do not necessarily remain at this level. Children may revert back to less effective 
strategies and the process of refinement starts again in the hope to regain strength in 
strategy use and effective execution of analogy. Even when it seemed that children in 
the present study had grasped the concept of analogy and had successfully solved the 
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target problem using analogy on numerous consecutive trials, many often chose less 
effective strategies which resulted in non-solution.  
The findings in the present study have uncovered a new way of looking at children’s 
analogical reasoning. It seems that children’s choices were variable and a shift 
became apparent based on their exploration through practice. Children were creating 
their own knowledge which facilitated analogical use. However, the present study 
stopped observations before the full potential of such an explanation could be truly 
established. Children were not succeeding with analogy following an increase in 
variability. Therefore, future research could extend the observation period to a further 
six months. This would determine the extent of a relational shift from lower-order 
relations to higher-order relations, and may witness the stability of analogical 
reasoning.    
 
The fact that children also found success with analogy in the absence of a base 
analogue supports the notion of a knowledge creation theory. Children explored the 
problem environment and relied on their existing knowledge to assimilate new ways 
of thinking. Therefore, what children come to know, via exploration with objects, 
increases their knowledge of the problem which leads to success on subsequent 
problems. Children in the present study who did not receive or possess relational 
knowledge, approached the problem using multiple strategies due to exploration of 
the problem, and with practice over time children relied on lower-order relations, 
eventually showing a shift to higher-order relations. This behaviour indicates that the 
mechanism that drives a shift and change in strategy use is exploration. When 
children have no knowledge from which to draw information, it is the job of the child 
to explore the possibilities within the problem, and along with practice this further 
drives children’s refinement of appropriate objects. This process does not end here. 
Children may revert back to using lower-order relations once they select higher-order 
relations and successfully solve the problem. Children may even create completely 
new objects (as in the analogy based object but without adaptation) based on 
exploration of the problem’s environment. What is certain is that children move 
through this process at different points in time and they are not necessarily sequential. 
That is, children may select the lower-order relations strategy and continue to use this 
strategy with no success at solving the problem. On the other hand the same child may 
use the same object, but use it in a non-analogous way and still solve the problem 
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using a different action. These possibilities make it difficult to place children into a 
developmental trajectory for analogical problem solving, but tell us a great deal about 
children’s exploratory learning.  
 
The exploration of children’s alternative strategy choices in study 2 and 3 provided 
evidence for children’s general problem solving skills. Children often selected the 
analogy based object but without adaptation and had to rely on their own knowledge 
of the world. This supports previous studies that suggest that children are rational 
problem solvers (Thornton, 1995). Many children were able to logically select 
appropriate objects and use a variety of solution techniques which were not always 
the most appropriate. This tells us something about the domain of analogical problem 
solving. Children do not always follow the rules, but often select strategies based on 
their own experiences and not the experiences presented to them in the study. This has 
implications in their later problem solving when they are faced with problems for 
which they are unable to use their own experience. Thus, letting go of previous 
strategies that no longer solve the problem may be difficult. Children have to adjust 
their thinking to accommodate new alternative ways of thinking. This may be easier 
when not constrained by rules of analogy for example. Evidence for children’s 
difficulty in letting go of less effective strategies was evident in a number of case 
studies. In particular, Kiean received no base problem, but was still able to solve the 
majority of trials using the analogy based object with adaptation. Kiean was not 
confined to the rules of analogy because of the lack of base problem. He was able to 
create his own knowledge from previous experience, showing success with the 
problems needing an auxiliary task, and selecting the analogy based object with 
adaptation considerably more than some children who had received that base problem. 
Kiean’s performance indicates that when children are not presented with a base, or do 
not possess the relations themselves, they are free to explore the problem with no 
constraint placed on their exploration by a base problem. 
 
This natural exploration observed in Kiean and others performance, can be explained 
by a ‘generation effect’ (Slamecka and Graf, 1978). In the generation effect children 
perform better when they are able to generate their own solution/strategy choices 
compared to when they receive information on which to base their attempts. Thus, a 
correct strategy once found seems more robust and transferable for those in the 
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control condition (across problems without an auxiliary task) compared to the video 
condition. Furthermore, children may give up when the tasks become more difficult, 
and they rely on single, level 2 errors. As in the video condition, those in the no 
practice condition knew the task could be done, but they received little practice. We 
would expect children to perform similarly to those in the video condition on the first 
trial, but then children increase their use of the analogy based object with adaptation 
in the video condition due to repeated exposure to the base- and target -problem. This 
behaviour provides evidence for a non-maturation hypothesis, but also supports a 
maturation and knowledge hypothesis (maturation, as better on trial 5, attempt 2). It 
seems that practice played a key role within a child’s natural abilities (knowledge), 
and performance was better when given analogy (relational knowledge).   
 
Worthy of note here is the negative side of generating individual strategies. Pine and 
Messer (2003) found that children often made errors in their balancing tasks due to 
naïve theories based on erroneous knowledge that children held. It has been shown 
that getting children to change or move away from erroneous strategies is difficult 
which suggests that a generation effect could have a negative impact upon later 
learning.  
 
It is clear from study 1 and 2 that preschool children showed showing an emerging 
ability to use analogy. However, its use was unstable. Children’s ability was affected 
by a number of factors which are difficult to distinguish or separate. Therefore, the 
answer to what makes analogical performance difficult for children is multi-faceted, 
and includes many difficult processes which impact upon one another. For example, 
the problem of access impacts upon children’s ability to transfer relations. Relational 
knowledge impacts upon children’s ability to recognise that analogy is needed, and 
relational difficulty impacts upon children’s ability to recognise higher-order relations. 
The complex array of elements makes monitoring of analogy extremely difficult using 
traditional cross sectional methods, and particularly in the present study, caused 
children to select alternative strategies.    
  
Therefore, study 3 incorporated a microgenetic methodology to shed light on the 
effects that these elements have on children’s change in strategy over time. The 
majority of research on analogy has focused on events before and after changes 
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without considering the process of change itself. The use of the microgenetic 
methodology has become popular in the past decade.  The aim of the microgenetic 
method used in study 3 was to present a clear view of change as it was happening. 
Many authors (Gentner, 1989; Goswami, 1989; Chen and Daehler, 1992; Siegler, 
1992) have discovered that change can be gradual or rapid. Very few studies support 
the notion that change can be both, within the same observation period. Therefore, 
contemporary research may well need to move away from thinking about cognitive 
development in terms of a slow process through trial and error, or through 
spontaneous insight which results in a rapid rate of change. Cognitive development is 
not as straight forward as this dichotomy announces.   
  
Strategy change in the present study showed both types of rate change. The rate at 
which children moved between different strategies was dependent on the knowledge 
that children possessed. Children in the present study were able to learn new strategies 
fairly quickly in the problems without an auxiliary task (when knowledge was 
assumed). Some children were successful at the start some needed practice while 
others gradually moved from strategies that could not solve the problem to effective 
strategies that did solve the target problem. This gradual onset of new strategies was 
often preceded by a process of refinement of strategies. This was particularly evident 
in the snake and toy task. Children began selecting analogy based object but without 
adaptation, but after a number of attempts they were able to utilize the object 
analogically which resulted in success. This supports Siegler and Jenkins’ (1989) 
finding that children’s initial use of the min strategy did not improve accuracy. It was 
not until children had regressed and alternated their strategy choices did they realise 
the benefit of the min strategy, and only then did they consistently use and benefit 
from using this strategy. However, because of the variability observed in the present 
study due to analogy being a complex, higher-order ability, it may require more 
practice and refinement than the 30 weeks in the present study allowed.   
 
The variability in the problems needing an auxiliary task complicates the issue of 
what it is that is changing.  Multiple strategy use follows a different path of 
development.  Changes involve strategy decline, stability and increase in frequency of 
use. It is therefore difficult to map a single path of change because of the change in 
strategy both within- and between-tasks.  This has implications for traditional 
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explanations of development in that such explanations may be oversimplified.  Unlike 
the traditional assumption of progressing through a sequence of knowledge states 
based on a single way of thinking, children progress through a number of ways of 
thinking and reasoning before, during and after the desired behaviour (analogy). 
Along with his classic conservation tasks, Piaget’s findings on analogy created a 
framework for children’s thinking and paved the way for descriptions that provided an 
empirical basis for what we understand development to be (Siegler, 1996). In this 
sense analogy can be seen as multi-levelled reasoning where one type is superior to 
another, and change is discontinuous. However, the findings in the present study 
contradict this in that children used a variety of strategies and types of reasoning 
which varied in complexity both before and after success with the problem, which 
suggests change is continuous and dependent on previous experience with strategies 
and from the child’s own exploration with the problems.  
 
Explanations behind an increase in variability in the microgenetic study supports 
change as a function of experience. This was evident in the differences in variability 
between the first – and last task. In particular, children’s variability increased 
considerably over the last three problems. This was likely to be because of the 
increase in relational difficulty. Despite receiving practice with the problems, children 
were not benefiting from variability.  Therefore, variability in problems needing an 
auxiliary task may be a component that derives from relational complexity.  
 
Worthy of note here is that the present study followed children’s strategy choices 
within analogical problems - a single type of problem. Therefore, it is difficult to 
generalise children’s variability and cognitive change to other domains. Despite 
children’s ability to transfer some of what they had learned in the problems without an 
auxiliary task, to more difficult tasks, this was still within the analogical problem 
solving domain. Future research could measure the use of analogy across a number of 
domains such as science and mathematics. This would not only examine 
preoperational abilities in more depth, but would also have a great educational 
advantage. After all, if children are able to learn one strategy in mathematics and 
transfer this to a similar task in a science class, this would have great pedagogical 
potential.  
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The individual cases study data highlighted the extent to which variability existed in 
similar tasks and within the same task.  Why does a child who uses the correct 
analogical strategy go on to use an incorrect strategy on an identical problem? This 
question was answered earlier with regard to within and between variability.  It seems 
sensible to assume that children chose different strategies between tasks because they 
needed to explore the tasks and available strategies.  Therefore, using different 
strategies across different tasks may have contributed to children’s learning in their 
search for the best strategy. The implication of such deviation from the required 
strategy is that within task variability may not lead to the same type of learning as 
between task variability.  Although still associated with change, within-task 
variability reflects cognitive conflict and it is the conflict experienced during this 
change in strategy that creates new ways of thinking, but does not necessarily solve 
the problem correctly. 
 
The discussion on variability has illustrated its importance in leading children to 
increase performance on the observed behaviour (analogy). The results have shown 
that children gather information from experience with the problems, which provide 
them with new ideas and new ways of thinking about the tasks.  This in turn leads to 
greater variability in their strategy choices. This supports Siegler’s (1996) concept of 
self-instruction. Here, feedback from working with problems acts as a driving 
mechanism to successful change. Through his mechanism of ‘self-instruction’ Siegler 
argued that children learn to use new strategies successfully through a process of 
meta-cognitive learning. Through meta-cognitive learning children are able to 
generate new strategies by reflecting on their previous experience with problems. 
Similarly, further research has suggested that within task variability reflects cognitive 
conflict, which encourages children to establish new ways of thinking.  Therefore, 
children’s within strategic variability increases the learning of new advanced 
strategies due to exploration of potential future strategies (Goldwin-meadow, Alibali 
and Church, 1993). Children’s within-task variability in the present study supports 
this. In the problems without an auxiliary task, children who showed greater 
variability tended to show higher rates of success than those who showed less 
variability. This also supports Siegler’s suggestion that the more variable the strategy 
choices, the better the performance with analogy.  However, this did not extend to the 
problems needing an auxiliary task which suggests that children only benefit from 
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variability when they understand the task and possess the required knowledge.   
 
As well as the rate of change, the present study measured the breadth of change. 
Children found transfer between tasks and within tasks difficult. One reason may be 
because they did not see the relationship between the base and target problem. Thus, 
children’s poor transfer may reflect poor performance with analogy from the start 
which suggests a lack of understanding of analogy and not a lack of ability to transfer 
per se. Evidence to support this notion was shown in Opfer and Siegler’s (2004) study. 
Children were asked to categorise biological objects that were familiar to them. 
Although children’s classifications were not perfect, when they were asked about 
novel objects, they managed to categorise them based on earlier repetitions. Thus, 
they were able to categorise a variety of diverse objects, suggesting their breadth of 
learning reached novel objects.  
 
The use of case studies in the microgenetic study allowed us to monitor intra-
individual change of children’s strategy over the 30 week period. This allowed us to 
monitor an individual over time, when the task environment remained constant. The 
case studies revealed that children strategy choices were variable, and the frequency 
of each strategy chosen changed over time and over problem (Kuhn, 1995).. Although 
it was expected that the more variable the strategies the more frequent the use of 
better, more effective strategies and less frequent use of less effective strategies, this 
was not the case. It was found that children used a range of strategies variably and 
selectively across different tasks, and within the same task. Such variability in 
children's strategic use has been observed in many microgenetic studies (Siegler 1995, 
2005; Opfer and Siegler, 2004).  
 
The case studies revealed that the path of change across individuals was not consistent. 
Children moved along more than one path of change. The case studies showed some 
children gradually discovering the analogy based object with adaptation, but then 
showing a gradual decrease over the problems needing an auxiliary task. Others 
showed initial success without the need for practice, and others showing no success 
with the analogy based object with adaptation, but were consistent in their use of 
lower-order relations throughout. Such different pathways reveal the fact that group 
data may be limited when trying to monitor children’s path of change over trials. Not 
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every child follows the same path; they even change paths throughout the observation 
period. This suggests that there is no clear path of change in 4- and 5-year-olds use 
and development of the analogy based object with adaptation. 
 
As observed in some children in the case studies, the uptake of the analogy based 
object with adaptation was sometimes slow. This supports Resing and Tunteler (2002). 
Here, as in their study, children often used the analogy based object with adaptation, 
but regressed back to less effective strategies. Such regression is common among 
other domains (memory – Coyle and Bjorklund, 1997 and storytelling – McKeough 
and Sanderson, 1996). Children even regressed back to less effective strategies once 
they had found success in solving problems.  
 
The case studies also explored why children’s uptake of the analogy based object with 
adaptation was slow in some children and fast in others. Some children were able to 
use the analogy based object with adaptation from the start because the first tasks 
were simple for children of this age. However, not all children showed this path of 
success with the analogy based object with adaptation from the start. It seemed to be 
more the case for those in the video condition, which suggests that children needed 
the base to help them. Others discovered the strategy early on and used it on 
numerous trials, but then regressed to less effective strategies. This was particularly 
noticeable from task 2 to 3, on the toy retrieval task. Despite the majority of children 
choosing the accurate strategy, with great success, on the task before, on task three 
children reverted back to a slower, less effective strategy – the analogy based object 
but without adaptation. This can be explained by children’s continued success in 
solving the toy retrieval problem despite using a less effective strategy. They took 
longer to solve the problem using this strategy, but they did manage to solve it all the 
same. Therefore, children were solving the problem based on their own experience 
and not that presented in the video analogue.  
 
With regard to the breadth of change, there have been many studies that have 
discussed issues of transfer and narrowness of children’s learning (Siegler, 1989, 
2005 and 2006). Success on one task does not necessarily mean that you 
automatically find success in solving another. Children often turn a familiar task into 
a novel problem. This would explain why some children in the present study were 
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able to use analogy in task one, but then change to a less effective strategy in task two. 
One study that explains this phenomenon is Adolph’s (1997) exploration of how 
infants and toddlers learn to move up and down ramps of varying slopes. Whilst 
following children’s descent down the steep slopes, she noticed that they opted for the 
safe strategy of sliding on their bellies. However, once they had mastered the art of 
walking (a new more effective strategy of moving around), when faced with the steep 
slope they reverted back to the less effective strategy of sliding on their bellies. In 
spite of the fact that they had learned to walk, when they attempted to walk down the 
steep slopes they fell. Thus the new skill of walking converted a familiar task into a 
novel task. 
 
The previous example also demonstrates why children’s learning is often narrow. 
When children are faced with learning new abilities they are faced with two options 
when transferring knowledge; recognising when previous knowledge/learning is 
relevant and recognizing when it is not relevant. For children of 4- and 5-years of age, 
this may have proved a little difficult because they had to possess the ability to adapt 
the same strategy to a novel problem. Transfer in the present study was not good 
between problem types suggesting that the leap in relational knowledge was too high 
and children could not transfer what they had learned in the previous problems 
without an auxiliary task. Transfer was better between the problems without an 
auxiliary task, in that children continued to use the analogy based object with 
adaptation across the three different tasks, illustrating that children recognise when to 
use the knowledge from previous problems.  
 
An important finding from the case studies was children’s verbalisations throughout 
the target problem. When children verbalised the relationship between the base and 
target problem, they all successfully solved problems without an auxiliary task, and 
two children solved problems needing an auxiliary task. This information did not 
come out in the group data. Therefore, the case studies are important to catch 
individual nuances that traditional group data misses. This data tells us that children 
could see the relations between the base- and target problem, but they did not 
understand how to utilise them to solve the analogous problem. This supports 
children’s difficulty with transfer. Children were able to recognise relations, access 
them, but not transfer them to the target problem. This suggests that children have the 
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ability to see relations, but not use them. Future research should incorporate the 
notion of verbal reports during problem solution.   
 
The microgenetic methodology has taken us one step further towards understanding 
of change. It confirms previous findings that indicate that children use a number of 
new ways of thinking over a short space of time, which do not necessarily change 
only when a previous strategy fails or succeeds. Neither do children need a change in 
qualitative structure before they are able to use a new, more advanced strategy. 
Providing that children possess the knowledge of the particular domain and key 
components within a task (i.e., relations), then children can and will use a variety of 
strategies on similar tasks.  
 
An important aspect of looking at cognitive development using the microgenetic 
method is the potential for introduction of these findings into the classroom. For 
example, we know the stages and processes through which children make the 
transition from no understanding to full understanding of scientific concepts, and how 
important analogy is in transfer concepts to other subjects. Science and mathematics 
are probably the most frequently represented. However, teachers are not always 
sympathetic to children’s difficulty and frequent failures at using analogy (Richland, 
Holyoak and Stigler, 2004). Teachers often assume that providing that they present 
children with the appropriate analogy for the task at hand, that children will learn to 
utilize this skill, assuming that children will and can transfer the appropriate relations 
when needed. However, this is not always the case. Because children have not been 
instructed of the need for analogy or how the process of analogy works, then children 
do not see the relevance or need for analogy, and therefore do not benefit from its 
potential in a learning environment.  The present study supports these difficulties. 
Children did not always benefit from a base and practice, and often found transfer 
within and between problems difficult. Therefore, expecting children to transfer 
between different curricular subjects places great demands on their ability to improve 
and succeed. Therefore, if schools were to embrace analogy earlier in the classroom, 
through the use of simple video analogues already part of their knowledge repertoire, 
and train individuals to use analogy as a skill in its own right, then the benefits of 
transfer and learning would be great.  
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Although the use of the microgenetic methodology in the present study revealed how 
behaviour can and did change, it does not illustrate whether such change will occur in 
a natural everyday setting. The manipulation of tasks within the microgenetic study 
was artificial despite not presenting explicit hints to children.  However, when 
children have to apply analogy to an everyday situation, it is not always the case that 
they receive continued practice with analogy or repeated exposure to similar problems. 
The artificial settings presented by the methodology pose the question of its 
usefulness in understanding natural cognitive change. However, in spite of this issue, 
the results could be used to benefit learning and instruction with video analogues in 
the classroom. Future research may wish to incorporate analogy into the classroom as 
part of children’s everyday problem solving tasks, and should incorporate tasks 
relevant within the curriculum, such as mathematics or spelling.  
 
Another potential problem with this methodology, especially when participants are 
children, is that it demands a great deal of resources.  Not only were children 
observed through intensive trial by trial analysis, the presentation of multiple trials 
may have placed high demands on children’s motivation.  In the microgenetic study 
children received six problems, five times.  During the repeated sessions, many of the 
children expressed their disappointment at receiving the same task, and asked why 
they had attempted the task again. Receiving the same tasks lowered their motivation 
levels, because they were unable to solve the problem may have caused them to give 
up. Therefore, children may not have felt challenged enough. Research by Campbell 
(1988) has found that increasing cognitive and motivational processes improved 
strategic development and subsequent success. Therefore, if children find a task more 
challenging, they are more likely to search for alternative solutions to existing 
problems which are more likely to result in successful solution. However, the children 
in the present study did not benefit from such improvements. This suggest that their 
ability to use the most appropriate strategy to solve more complex problems lies in 
skills other than that provided by an increase in complexity. Such skills included 
transfer and knowledge of relations. However, multiple exposure to trials could not be 
avoided in the current study and was essential to monitor children’s within-task 
strategy change.  Therefore, it may be that the benefit of monitoring this kind of 
change in strategy outweighs the costs of children’s motivations. However, the use of 
repeated trials allowed us to monitor change and even examine the causes of later 
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change or potential to learn. Thus, when children chose the new strategy on 
subsequent trials, because we had information on their previous attempts, we could 
measure learning or a practice effect.  This could then provide us with predictive 
powers on their future attempts. The traditional methodology that observes at specific 
points in time would not allow this.  
 
The next step for is to acknowledge the elements that intervene in the children’s 
ability to use prior experience in their learning. Evidence from microgenetic studies 
can help predict when certain abilities will begin to emerge and how and when 
interventions can be beneficial.  As well as exciting opportunities within educational 
the microgenetic method can offer help to applied, clinical settings. The application of 
the microgenetic method among clinical settings is limited. The microgenetic method 
could monitor change and improvements in health and treatments to provide 
clinicians with a unique, in depth look at their patient’s journey.   
 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
 
 
The fact that children under 5 years of age were able to effectively use analogies 
involving multiple relations appears to be at odds with the maturational view of 
analogy development. Children showed great variability in their thinking and 
behaviour which questions the longstanding structuralist viewpoint. The variability in 
thinking raises issues of whether future research should continue to discuss 
development in terms of sequences/stages. The findings here propose a more variable 
pattern that includes multiple ways of thinking, multiple strategy use and different 
paths of change during the period of development.  
 
The finding that 3, 4, and 5 year-olds used a variety of strategies before, during and 
after success with analogy suggests that children of this age do not recognise analogy 
to be the most appropriate strategy for problems of this kind. Therefore, analogy is 
just one of a number of strategies children use when solving problems. Children did 
benefit from practice and preferred problems without an auxiliary task. 
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The microgentic study confirmed Siegler’s (1996, 2002, 2005) suggestions that 
strategies differ in their accuracy, length of execution, cognitive demands, and 
consistency over time. And since children in the presents represent all of these things, 
they were able to show flexibility and adaptability in their problem solving. It seemed 
that variability was a general characteristic in children’s performance, and the present 
study was able to observe a relationship between variability and performance, even if 
this was not always in a positive way. In some cases, children’s variability led to an 
increase in success with the problem, however, this was generally the case in 
problems without an auxiliary task only.  
 
This thesis was unable to pinpoint one process as being the ultimate obstacle to 
children’s success. Multiple factors hindered children’s ability to use analogy. 
However, what can be concluded is that children used a number of strategies when 
they were unable to use analogy and these varied both within and between children of 
the same age. When children used analogy they often reverted back to less effective 
strategies which highlights the difficulty faced when exploring children’s analogical 
problem solving. Future research should continue to build on the findings from the 
microgenetic methodology literature to further explore children’s development and 
change in analogical reasoning.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 279 
 
References 
 
Adolph, K. E. (1997). Learning in the development of infant locomotion. 
Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 62 (3) 251. 
 
Bjorklund, D. F., & Coyle, T. R. (1995). Utilization deficiencies in the 
development of memory strategies. In E. F. Weinert & W. Schneider (Eds.), Memory 
performance & competencies: Issues in growth & development (pp. 161-180). 
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Blanchette, I., & Dunbar, K. (2000). How analogies are generated: The roles 
of structural and superficial similarity. Memory and Cognition, 28, 108-124. 
 
Brown, A. L (1989). Analogical reasoning & transfer: What develops? In S. 
Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity & analogical reasoning (pp.369-412). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Brown, A.L., & Kane M.J. (1988). Preschool children can learn to transfer: 
Learning to learn & learning from example. Cognitive Psychology, 20, 493-523. 
 
Brown, A., Kane, M. J., & Echols, C. H. (1986). Young children’s mental 
models determine analogical transfer across problems with a common goal structure. 
Cognitive Development, 1, 103-121. 
 
Campbell, D, J. (1988). Task Complexity: A review & Analysis. The Academy 
of Management Review, 13, 1, 40-52.  
 
Campione, J.C.& Brown, A.L. (1985). Dynamic assessment: One approach 
and some initial data. Center for the Study of Reading. Technical Report No. 361. 
Cambridge, MA: Illinois University, Urbana.  
 
Chen, Z. (2002). Analogical problem solving: A hierarchical analysis of 
 280 
procedural similarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 28, 81-98. 
 
Chen, Z (2003). Worth one thousand words: Children’s use of pictures in 
Analogical Problem Solving. Journal of Cognition & Development, 4, 4, 415-434. 
 
Chen, Z., & Daehler, M. W. (1992). Intention & outcome: Key components of 
causal structure facilitating mapping in children’s analogical transfer. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 53, 237-255. 
 
Chen, Z. & Siegler, R. S. (2000). Across the great divide: Bridging the gap 
between underst&ing of toddlers' & older children's thinking. Monographs of the 
Society for Research in Child Development, 65, 261. 
 
Cheshire, A., Ball, L. J., & Lewis, C. N. (2005). Self-explanation, feedback 
and the development of analogical reasoning skill: Microgenetic evidence for a 
metacognitive processing account. In B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society. Alpha, NJ: Sheridan.  
 
Crisafi, C. M & Brown A, L. (1986) Analogical transfer in very young 
children: combining two separately learned solutions to reach a goal. Child 
Development, 57, 4, 953-968. 
 
Crowley, K., & Siegler, R. S. (1999). Explanation & generalization in young 
children's strategy learning. Child Development, 70, 304-316. 
 
Coyle, T. R, & Bjorklund, D. F. (1997). Age differences in, and consequences 
of, multiple and variable – strategy use on a multi-trial sort recall task. Developmental 
Psychology. 33 337-380.  
 
Dagher, Z. (1995). Analysis of analogies used by science teachers. Journal of 
Research in Science Teaching, 32, 259-270. 
 
 281 
Detterman, D.K. (1993). The case for the prosecution: Transfer as an 
epiphenomenon. In D.K. Detterman & R.J.Sternberg (Eds.), Transfer on trial: 
Intelligence, cognition, & instruction (pp. 1‐24). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing 
Corp. 
 
Donaldson, M. (1978). Children's Minds. London: Croom Helm 
 
Driver, R. and Erickson, G. (1983). Theories-in-action: some theoretical and 
empirical issues in the study of students’ conceptual frameworks in science studies. 
Science Education, 10, 37-60. 
 
Ericsson, K. A., & Lehmann, A. C. (1996). Expert & exceptional performance: 
Evidence of maximal adaptation to task constraints. Annual Review of Psychology, 47, 
273-305.  
 
Falkenhainer, B. H., Forbus, K. D., & Gentner, D. (1989). The structure 
mapping engine: Algorithm & examples. Artificial Intelligence, 41, 1-63.  
 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. 
Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170.  
 
Gentner, D. (1988). Metaphor as structure mapping: The relational shift. Child 
Development, 59, 47-59. 
 
Gentner, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. In S. Vosniadou 
& A. Ortony (Eds.), Similarity & analogical reasoning (pp. 199-241). London: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Gentner, D., & Rattermann, M.J. (1991). Language and the career of similarity. 
In S. Gelman & J.P. Byrnes (Eds.), Perspectives on thought and language: 
Interrelations in development. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gentner, D., & Toupen, C. (1986). Systematicity and surface similarity in the 
 282 
development of analogy. Cognitive Science, 10, 277-300. 
 
Gholson, B., Eymard, L. A., Morgan, D., & Kamhi, A. G. (1987).  Problem 
solving, recall, and isomorphic transfer among third-grade and sixth-grade 
children.  Journal of Experimental Child Psychology 43, 227-243. 
 
Gick, M.L., & Holyoak, K.J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. 
Cognitive Psychology, 15, 1-38. 
 
Glynn, S. M. (1997). Learning from science text: Role of an elaborate analogy.  
College Park, MD: National Reading Research Centre. 
 
Goldin-Meadow, S., Alibali, M.W., & Church, R.B. (1993). Transitions in 
concept acquisition: using the hand to read the mind. Psychological Review, 100, 279-
297. 
 
Goswami, U. (1989). Relational Complexity & the development of Analogical 
Reasoning. Cognitive Development, 4, 251-268. 
 
Goswami, U. (1991). Analogical reasoning: What develops? A review of 
research and theory. Child Development, 62, 1-22. 
 
Goswami, U. (1992). Analogical Reasoning in Children: Essays in 
Developmental psychology. Sussex: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Ltd. 
 
Goswami, U. (2001). Cognitive Development: No stages please--We’re 
British. British Journal of Psychology, 92, 257-278 
 
Goswami, U., & Brown, A. L (1989). Melting chocolate & melting snowmen: 
Analogical reasoning & causal relations. Cognition, 35, 69-95.  
 
Granott , N. & Parziale, J. (2002). Microdevelopment: Transition Processes in 
Development and Learning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 283 
Greeno, J. G. (1974). Hobbits and Orcs: Aquistion of a sequential concept. 
Cognitive Psychology 6, 270-292. 
 
Greeno, J. (1995). Understanding Concepts in Activity," Discourse 
Comprehension. Weaver, Mannes and Fletcher, (Eds). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
NJ. 
 
Greeno, J.G., Moore, J.L., & Smith, D.R. (1993). Transfer of situated learning. 
In D.K. Detterman & R.J. Sternberg (Eds.), Transfer on trial: Intelligence, cognition, 
& instruction (pp. 99‐167). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp. 
 
Halford, G. S. (1993). Children’s understanding: The development of mental 
models. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.   
 
Holyoak, K. J., Junn, E. N., & Billman, D. O. (1984). Development of 
Analogical Problem-Solving Skill. Child Development, 55, 2042-2055 
 
Hosenfeld, B., van der Maas, H.L.J., & van den Boom, D.C.(1997). Indicators 
of discontinuous change in the development of analogical reasoning. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 64, 367-395. 
 
Inagaki, K. & Hatano, G. (1993). Young children’s understanding of the mind-
body distinction. Child Development, 64, 1534-1549. 
 
Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. (1958). The Growth of Logical Thinking from 
Childhood to Adolescence. Basic Books, New York, NY. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1979). A Functional Approach to Child Language. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1992. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective 
on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press 
 
 284 
Kotovosky, L., & Gentner, D. (1996) Comparison & Categorization in the 
Development of Relational Similarity. Child Development, 67, 2797-2822 
 
Kozma, R. B. (1991) Learning with media. Review of Educational Research, 
61, 20 pp. 179-212.  
 
Kurtz, K., & Loewenstein, J. (2007). Converging on a new role for analogy in 
problem solving and retrieval: When two problems are better than one. Memory & 
Cognition, 35, 2, 334-341. 
 
Lavatelli, C. (1973). Piaget's Theory Applied to an Early Childhood 
Curriculum. Boston: American Science & Engineering, Inc.  
 
Lavelli, M., Pantoja, A., Hsu, H., Messinger, D. M., & Fogel, A. (2005). 
Using microgenetic designs to study developmental change processes.  In D. M. Teti 
(Ed.), H&book of research methods in developmental psychology (pp. 40-65).  NY: 
Blackwell.   
 
Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of 
mind." Psychological Review, 94, 412-426.  
 
Mandler, J. M (1992). How to build a baby II: Conceptual Primitives.  
Psychological Review. 99 587-604.  
 
Mckeough, A., & Sanderson, A. (1996). Teaching storytelling: A microgenetic 
analysis of developing narrative competency. Journal of Narrative and Life History, 6, 
157-192. 
Miller, P., & Aloise-young, P. (1996). Preschoolers’ strategic behaviours and 
performance on a same-different task. Journal of experimental Psychology, 60, 284-
303. 
 
Novick, L. R., & Holyoak, K. J. (1991). Mathematical problem solving by 
analogy. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 17, 
398- 415. 
 285 
 
Opfer, J. E., & Siegler, R. S. (2004). Revisiting preschoolers' living things 
concept: A microgenetic analysis of conceptual change in basic biology. Cognitive 
Psychology, 49, 301-332. 
 
Pedone, R., Hummel, J. E., & Holyoak, K. J. (2001). The use of diagrams in 
analogical problem solving. Memory & Cognition, 29, 214-221. 
 
Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. International 
Universities Press, New York.  
 
Piaget, J. (1954). The construction of reality in the child. New York: Basic 
Books. 
 
Piaget, J. (1964). Development & learning. In R. E. Ripple & V. N. 
Rockcastle, Piaget Rediscovered: A report on the Conference on Cognitive Studies & 
Curriculum Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.  
 
Piaget, J. (1976). Time & the intellectual development of the child in The child 
& reality: Problems of genetic psychology. Middlesex, Engl&: Penguin Books. (p. 1-
30)  
Piaget, J. (1983). Piaget’s theory. In P. Mussen (Ed) Handbook of child 
psychology. Volume 1, pp 103-128. New York; Wiley.   
 
Piaget, J., Montangero, J. & Billeter, J. (1977). La formation des correlats. In J. 
Piaget (ed.) Recherches sur L'Abstraction Reflechissante I, pp. 115-129. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
 
Pine, K. J. & Messer, D. J. (1999). What children do and what children know: 
Looking beyond success using Karmiloff-Smith’s RR framework. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 17, 17-30.  
 
Pine, K. J. & Messer, D. J. (2003). The development of representations as 
children learn about balancing. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 21, 2, 
 286 
285 - 301. 
 
Rattermann, M. J., & Gentner, D. (1998). More evidence for a relational shift 
in the development of analogy: Children's performance on a causal-mapping task. 
Cognitive Development, 13, 453-478. 
 
Reed, S. K, Dempster, A., & Ettinger, M. (1985) Usefulness of analogous 
solutions for solving algebra word problems. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory & Cognition, 11, 106-125.   
 
Reeves, L. M. & Weisberg, R. W. (1994). The role of content and abstract 
information in analogical transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 3, 381--400.  
 
Reubenander, P. A., Willson, V.L., White, C. S., Fuqua, J. D., Clark, G. D., 
Wilson, A. F., & Kulikowich, J. M. (1989). Development of analogical resoning in 4-
and 5-year-old children. Cognitive Development, 4, 65-88. 
 
Richland, L, E, Holyoak, K, J & Stigler, J. W. (2004). Analogy use in Eighth-
Grade Mathematics Classrooms. Cognition and Instruction, 22, 1, 37-60. 
 
Richland, L.E., Morrison, R.G., & Holyoak, K.J. (2006). Children’s 
development of analogical reasoning: Insights from scene analogy problems. Journal 
of Experimental Child Psychology, 94. 
 
Shimojo, Bauer, O’Conell & Held (1986). Pre-stereoptic binocular vision in 
infants. Vision Research, 26, 501-510. 
 
Seligman, M.E.P. (1974).  Depression and learned helplessness.  In R.J. 
Friedman and M.M. Katz (Eds.), The Psychology of depression: Contemporary theory 
and research, Winston-Wiley. 
 
Siegler, R. S. (1981). Developmental sequences within & between concepts. 
Monographs of the society for Research in Child Development, 46, 2, 189. 
 
 287 
Siegler, R. S. (1989). Mechanisms of cognitive development. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 40, 353-379. 
 
Siegler, R. S. (1995). How does change occur: A microgenetic study of 
number conservation. Cognitive Psychology, 28, 225-273.  
 
Siegler, R. S. (1996). Emerging minds: The process of change in children's 
thinking. New York: Oxford 
 
Siegler, R. S. (2000). The rebirth of children's learning. Child Development, 
71, 26-35. 
 
Siegler, R. S. (2005). Children's learning. American Psychologist, 60, 769-778. 
 
Siegler, R. S. (2006). Microgenetic analysis of learning. In W. Damon, R. M. 
Lerner, D Kuhn & R. Siegler (Eds), 6th ed. H&book of child psychology: Cognition, 
perception & language, Vol. 2 (pp. 464-510). Hoboken, N. J: John Wiley & Sons.  
 
Siegler, R., & Crowley, K. (1991). The Microgenetic Method: A direct means 
for studying cognitive development. American Psychologist, 46, 606-620 
 
Siegler, R., & Crowley, K. (1994). Constraints on learning in non-privileged 
domains. Cognitive Psychology, 27, 194-227. 
 
Siegler, R. S. & Jenkins, E. (1989). How Children Discover New Strategies. 
Hillsdale, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Siegler, R. S., & Svetina, M. (2002). A microgenetic/cross-sectional study of 
matrix completion: Comparing short-term & long-term change. Child Development, 
73, 793-809.  
 
Siegler, R. S., & Taraban, R. (1986). Conditions of applicability of a strategy choice 
model. Cognitive Development, 1, 31-51 
 
 288 
Singer-Freeman, K, E. (2005). Analogical Reasoning in 2-year-olds: The 
Development of Access and Relational Inference. Cognitive Development 20, 2, 214-
234. 
 
Slamecka, N. J., & Graf, P. (1978). The generation effect: Delineation of a 
phenomenon. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Learning & Memory, 4, 
592-604. 
 
Spencer, J.P. & Schutte, A.R. (2004). Unifying representations and responses: 
Perseverative biases arise from a single behavioural system. Psychological Science, 
15, 187-193. 
 
Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Component processes in analogical reasoning. 
Psychological Review, 84, 253-378. 
 
Sternberg, R. J., & Nigro, G. (1980). Developmental patterns in the solution of 
verbal analogies. Child Development, 51, 27–38. 
 
Sweller, J., & Cooper, G. A. (1985). The worked examples as a substitute for 
problem solving in learning algebra. Cognition & Instruction, 2, 59-89.  
 
Teti, D.M.,(Ed.). (2005). Handbook of Research Methods in Developmental 
Science. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
 
Thelen, E. & Ulrich, B. D. (1991). Hidden skills: A dynamic systems analysis 
of treadmill-elicited stepping during the first year. Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development, 56, 223. 
 
Thornton , S. (1995). Children solving problems. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
 
Thornton, S. (1999). Creating the conditions for cognitive change: The 
interaction between task structures and specific strategies. Child development, 70, 
588-603. 
 
 289 
Tunteler, E. & Resing,  W.C.M (2002). Spontaneous analogical transfer in 4-
year-olds: a microgenetic study. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 3, 
149-66 
 
Wertheimer, M. (1959). Productive Thinking. New York:Harper & Row.  
 
Wertsch, J, V & Hickman, M. (1987). Problem solving in social interaction. A 
microgenetic analysis. In M Hickmann (Ed) Social and Functional approaches to 
language and thought. Pp 251-266. San Diego. CA: Academic’s press.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 290 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Problem 1 – The Snake Problem 
 
Snake Problem 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 Two women sat on the 
floor. One woman wants to 
pass a bow to another 
woman to wrap a Christmas 
present  
 
Two plates on the table, one is out 
of reach, the child has to transport 
balls from the nearest plate to the 
out of reach plate 
 Resources 
provided Wrapping paper tube  
Long toy snake, Long stick, short 
stick, string, balls, bow 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
Cannot get up, covered in 
presents and wrapping paper 
Needs to reach the other 
woman to pass her the bow 
 
Must not get off the chair 
The child needs to transport balls 
from one plate to another plate 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
Auxiliary task None None 
Key subgoal 
attained 
Woman uses the wrapping 
paper as a transportation 
tube  
 
Child selects the snake as a 
transportation object 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
The woman pushes the bow 
through the long tube to 
reach the other woman  
 
Child pushes the ball through the 
long snake (tube) to reach the 
other plate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 291 
 
Problem 2 – The Gripper Problem 
 
 
Gripper Problem 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 A woman needs to retrieve a 
book from a high shelf 
 
A ball is out of reach on top of a 
high shelf. 
 Resources 
provided 
Extending helping gripper 
arm 
Long barbeque tongs, long stick, 
small gripper, ball, book, string. 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
Most not drop the book 
Needs to retrieve the book 
 
Must not get off the chair 
The child needs to retrieve the 
ball 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
Auxiliary task None None  
Key subgoal 
attained 
Woman uses her long 
helping gripper  
 
Child uses long barbeque tongs  
 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
Woman uses the gripper to 
grab and retrieve the book  
 
 
Child uses long barbeque tongs to 
grab and retrieve the ball.  
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Problem 3 – The Toy Problem 
 
 
Toy problem  
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 A woman dropped her scarf 
on the floor out of reach 
 
A toy is out of reach on a table 
 Resources 
provided Umbrella  
Long water pistol, Long stick, 
Short toy golf club, Scarf, Toy, 
Plate 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
 
Most not drop scarf 
Needs to retrieve scarf 
 
Must not get off the chair 
The child needs to retrieve the toy 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
Auxiliary task None  
None  
Key subgoal 
attained 
Woman uses her umbrella 
as a retrieval object 
 
Child uses the water pistol as a 
retrieval object 
 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
Woman hooked and 
dragged the scarf with the 
umbrella  
 
Child hooked and dragged the toy 
with the water pistol 
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Problem 4 – The Stick Problem 
 
Stick problem 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 Woman and child kicking a 
ball through a long play 
tunnel, the ball gets stuck in 
the middle. 
 
A sponge is stuck in the middle of 
a long plastic tube.  
 Resources 
provided Two twigs from a tree 
Two long attachable sticks, short 
stick, football, sponge, sellotape  
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
Most not reach into the 
tunnel 
Needs to get the ball out of 
the tunnel  
 
Must not reach into the tube 
Child needs to retrieve the sponge 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
Auxiliary task Need to create a long object  
Child needs to create a long object  
Key subgoal 
attained 
Attach the two sticks to 
create one long stick  
 
Child needs to attach the two 
sticks to create a long object  
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
The woman pushes the ball 
out with the long stick 
 
 
The child pushes the sponge out 
with the long stick 
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Problem 5 – The Pendulum Problem 
 
 
Pendulum problem 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 A woman is putting up 
Christmas decorations, she 
cannot reach the tinsel 
hanging down  
 
Two pieces of rope dangling 
down, they are too far apart from 
each other for the child to reach 
 Resources 
provided Hair clip  
Bulldog clip, stapler, rope, pen, 
tinsel, stick, plate 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
Needs to attach the tinsel to 
the ceiling  
 
The child needs to reach the rope  
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
 
Auxiliary task 
Woman uses her hair clip as 
a heavy object to create a 
pendulum   
 
Child uses the bulldog clip as a 
heavy object to create a pendulum   
Key subgoal 
attained 
Attaches the hair clip to the 
tinsel  
 
Child attaches the hair clip to the 
rope 
 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
Woman swings the tinsel 
and catches it  
 
Child swings the rope and catches 
it  
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Problem 6 – The roll-up Problem 
 
 
Roll-up problem 
Video Problem (base) Physical Problem (target) 
Initial state 
 Two women washing a car, 
one needs to pass the polish 
canister to the other  
 
Child cannot reach a basket  
 Resources 
provided Car mat  
Piece of paper, long stick, bone, 
polish canister, string, DVD case 
 
Constraints & 
Requirements 
 
Needs to pass the polish 
canister over the car 
 
Must not get off the chair 
 
The child needs to transport a 
bone to the basket 
Solution 
Principle or 
Path 
Auxiliary task 
 
Create a transportation 
object from the car mat  
 
Create a transportation object 
from the  piece of paper  
Key subgoal 
attained 
 
Roll up the car mat into a 
transportation object 
 
Roll up the piece of paper into a 
transportation object 
Goal state 
Solution criteria 
satisfied 
 
Put the polish canister into 
the rolled up mat and pass it 
over the car  
 
Put the bone into the rolled up 
piece of paper and drop the bone 
into the basket 
 
 
 
